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U.S. NATO Modernization Policies Reviewed

LD1303205590 Moscow TASS in English 2006 GMT 13 Mar 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS—NATO leaders, including those in the military, are withdrawing support from Washington's plans to modernise U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe at any cost. They disapprove of the United States' refusal to conduct negotiations on short-range nuclear weapon systems.

Several days ago, Belgian Foreign Minister Marc Eyskens called for a revision of U.S. plans for the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

On Monday West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, who usually supports NATO policies, stated his support for the Soviet proposal to put tactical nuclear weapons on the agenda of the Vienna talks.

The West German minister told a symposium in Hamburg that agreement on large cuts in nuclear arms with a range of less than 500 kilometres should be reached immediately after the conclusion of the first stage of such talks.

Stoltenberg, specifically, declared for the complete elimination of nuclear artillery.

It is apparent that the change in world public opinion on the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons stems from the Soviet Union's practical actions to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe. It was, specifically, prompted by Moscow's decision to withdraw 500 warheads of tactical nuclear weapons from East European countries last year.

Although positive changes have taken place in the military-political situation in Europe, Washington continues to plan compensation for medium-range and shorter-range missiles that are being eliminated with other, no less dangerous nuclear weapons.

As a West German journalist put it, this nuclear compensation is in effect replacing the knife at Europe's heart with a pistol at its temple. Washington has no intention to withdraw nuclear weapons from West Germany, although in the present conditions it prefers not to advertise its plans.

U.S. General John Gelvin, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, who favours nuclear compensation, said he had recently drawn up recommendations for the presence of U.S. weapons in Europe.

Why does Washington fear negotiations on tactical nuclear arms? U.S. official representatives previously declared that under the pressure of pubnlic opinion such talks would inevitably lead to their elimination, and this would undermine the NATO strategy of "flexible reaction", based on the first use of nuclear weapons.

The United States is now faced with the alternative of continuing power politics while the military-political situation in Europe radically improves or, at long last, embarking on a policy based on common sense.

It is apparently not easy for the U.S. Administration to take a realistic view of the situation in Europe. A decision to negotiate on tactical nuclear weapons would be an important indication of Washington's choice in global problems of war.

Baker Interview on Arms Control Reduction Cited

PM1303135990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "J. Baker Interview"]

[Text] New York, 12 Mar—The U.S. Administration hopes to reach agreement with the Soviet Union this year on reducing conventional weapons and to eliminate in the process of talks all main obstacles on the path to signing a treaty on the reduction of strategic arms. This was stated in an interview with THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker. U.S. policy in the arms control field, he said, is aimed at achieving aims agreed during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Malta.

Baker assessed highly the results of his recent trip to Moscow, pointing out that the meetings and talks there "were very interesting and extremely productive." "We have made headway on all questions on our agenda," the secretary of state said. "Progress in the arms control sphere and several of our discussions of regional problems convinced me that we are moving away from confrontation toward cooperation. Differences still exist between us but I can see a great mutual desire to reduce these differences and to create a basis for cooperation." According to Baker, the U.S. Administration's strategy is "to seek ways of achieving mutual advantage, ways in which we will be able to move our relations away from rivalry toward cooperation in those spheres where it is to the advantage of both sides."

The head of the State Department stressed that the United States is seeking "to use the opportunities which have emerged in international relations thanks to the reforms in the USSR."

Foreign Ministry Makes Official Statement

LD1303205290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1737 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar (TASS)—We are transmitting the official text of the USSR Foreign Ministry statement which was circulated here today:

The process of rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR, which has begun recently, and the real prospect of the unification of Germany which has arisen, have again brought the German question to the center of world politics. Public attention is now focused on such key elements as the conclusion of a world treaty, the military-political status of the future Germany, its borders, the preservation of stability and the balance of forces which have developed on the continent, and the further development of the general European process, including the creation of new structures of collective security. A solution to each of these tasks, taken both separately and together, in view of their sheer scale, is conceivable only on a coordinated basis.

With due consideration of this, a decision was taken in Ottawa on the creation of an appropriate negotiating mechanism comprising the two German states, the USSR, Great Britain, the United States, and France, within the framework of which all participating parties will act in accordance with the nature and scope of rights and responsibility belonging to them. This does not, of course, rule out the participation in one form or another by any other European state during examination of matters relating to a German peace settlement which are of interest to it. Particular attention has to be devoted to resolving the problem of synchronizing the rapprochement and possible unification of the two German states with the common European process. Such substantial work, if, of course, one is to approach it with a proper level of responsibility, cannot be carried out at one sitting even by the efforts of many participants. For this reason the only thing at issue can be a staged development, without artificially urging it on or creating an atmosphere of some kind of time-limit around the construction of German unity. Strictly speaking, it is on this that the majority of interested states base their views. There would also appear to be agreement on this in Bonn. But in practice certain circles in the FRG are continuing to drive matters toward essentially excluding a number of potential participants from a German settlement, and presenting the international community, including the four powers, with a fait accompli.

Some of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union] politicians see the key to the attainment of this goal as that of invoking Article 23 of the FRG's Basic Law which provides the possibility of a mechanical unification of the GDR with the FRG in parts, separate laender, or as a whole, as an entire republic. In other words, it is essentially the usurpation of one German state by the other that is being staked upon. In this case, in Bonn they are evidently reckoning on depriving the GDR of its sovereign prerogatives to defend as a partner with equal rights, the rights and interests of the GDR citizens, their social gains, and those values that have been created by dogged labor during the republic's existence. The practical line taken by the FRG with regard to the GDR is also being formed in keeping with such an aim at the present time. By means of massive interference in the internal affairs of the republic, encroachment on its national economic, property, and social structures they would like to make it be faced with the threat of economic chaos. In the GDR, and not only there, it is being pointed out that such a variant would strike at the vital interests of the republic's citizens and place upon them the main burden and costs of adaptation to other social, economic, and political conditions and systems. Nor would it require small sacrifices on the part of the West German taxpayers either.

And what about the FRG's obligations under international agreements? If it is intended to transfer them to the GDR then this would predetermine the military and political status of the united Germany, that is its inclusion in NATO. Further, Article 23 of the FRG's Basic Law allows for the possibility of the bringing of territorial claims against other states. But surely all of this directly touches upon external aspects.

From whatever side the invocation of Article 23 is approached, such type of action would appear unlawful and unacceptable. Issues which have a truly fateful significance for the whole of Europe cannot be resolved on the basis of the Constitution or of some internal act of the FRG and cannot be the handiwork of the Germans alone.

It must not be forgotten that the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the United States, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, continue to preserve their rights and responsibility for Germany, on the whole, in order that no threat to peace ever again ensues from German land. Their direct duty, together with the FRG and the GDR, is to implement this fundamental tenet in the form of reliable, international legal guarantees.

It should be remembered that the Potsdam Agreement proceeds unambiguously from the fact that the restoration of German statehood should occur within a regulated and democratic framework and that the procedure and conditions for the unification of the two German states should be resolved on the basis of the agreement of all the interested sides and above all of the four powers. Later, this fundamental tenet was also reinforced in corresponding agreements between the FRG and the three Western powers and between the GDR and the Soviet Union, in accordance with which the four powers fully preserve their rights and responsibility in relation to Germany as a whole. This also applies to West Berlin with its special status as determined in the four-power agreement.

Thus, it is not the swallowing up of one German state by another and not rash and one-sided actions dictated by opportunist estimations but the uniting of the efforts of all of the interested sides which can provide for a mutually acceptable, long-term solution to the very complex problems of a German settlement. It is also indisputable that the majority of European states at the same time see as the main point of reference the preservation and strengthening of stability on the continent based on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

Lively interest in such an approach is also being demonstrated by Germans both in the GDR and the FRG who are aware that the future Germany will only be able to occupy a worthy place within the world community and acquire its trust if it places all of its potential at the service of peace and cooperation in Europe. The lessons of the Second World War oblige all of us who were touched by this tragedy to do everything to prevent it from ever being repeated in the future.

The Soviet Union's position on German affairs is dictated primarily by the sincere desire to live in peace and harmony with the German and other European peoples and to make a weighty and constructive contribution to all-European peace construction and to guaranteeing reliable security on collective principles.

Case for Maintaining Military Blocs Rebutted

PM1403095190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Vasiliy Pustov commentary under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Does Europe Need Blocs"]

[Text] The major events taking place in Europe are to be assessed first and foremost in the following terms: Will they help stabilize the situation on the continent or, on the contrary, undermine it. It is from this viewpoint, for instance, that the German question is being considered in European countries. Especially since certain NATO circles are insisting on the inclusion of the united Germany in the North Atlantic bloc—a development which would undoubtedly shatter the existing equilibrium on the continent which is the foundation of stability, security, trust, and cooperation.

Moreover, that equilibrium is also determined by other factors. Mutual relations within the system of military-political alliances—the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact—are a highly important factor. The future of these alliances is being vigorously discussed by statesmen, public figures, political specialists, and journalists writing on international affairs. "Until the conditions for German unification become clear," an AFP correspondent reported from NATO headquarters in Brussels, "all options are possible—ranging from the disbandment to the preservation and even amalgamation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." It is noted that both alliances "have lost their purpose and threaten to impede the movement toward a new European equilibrium."

We can see that even in NATO circles people cannot now disregard the topical question of the blocs' future. Does Europe need them? The importance of the problem is undoubted. People can see the abnormality of the situation whereby a dangerous military confrontation embodied in the two most powerful military groupings in human history (approximately 7 million men—that is the overall numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces in Europe and adjacent waters) has been maintained for decades in peacetime. This abnormality seems ridiculous against the backdrop of the positive changes taking place in Europe.

High-ranking Western officials, who until recently thought it obligatory to refer under all circumstances to the "threat from the East," have been forced to take stock of the new conditions. Now even in their speeches in favor of preserving NATO they change the tone and substance of their arguments, and this inevitably makes their opinions contradictory. In this respect, what is the meaning of NATO Secretary General M. Woerner's assertion that "we must not abandon the North Atlantic bloc, even though the threat of Soviet aggression has effectively disappeared?" Even the formal reason originally invented for the creation of the NATO bloc has disappeared.

The increasingly frequent claim of late regarding possible "retrograde steps" in USSR domestic and foreign policy does not hold water either. The farfetched nature of this apology for a thesis is acknowledged by none other than CIA Director W. Webster. Speaking at the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, he said that even if a "conservative regime" took office in the USSR it "would not have any particular reason to get involved in major confrontations with the United States and would hardly begin to extensively build up its armed forces."

Given the obvious shortage of convincing arguments in favor of rejecting the idea put forward by the USSR and its allies of eliminating both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a new thesis regarding "Third World militarism" and the shift of confrontation from the "East-West" sphere to the "North-South" sphere is becoming popular, so to speak, on both sides of the Atlantic. Since they possess chemical, missile, and, possibly, nuclear weapons, some developing countries could allegedly pose a threat to the West and even "strike at any moment" if it relaxes its vigilance. They also charge the "Third World" with its poverty, starvation, and desperation, which allegedly also create an "explosive mixture." All this together is presented as justification for the continued existence of the North Atlantic alliance and its military structure. When you hear this, you cannot help asking yourself the following question: Is this not a case of having to invent an enemy because no real enemy exists.

At any rate, you think about this every time that the conversation turns to specific strategic installations and state-of-the-art types of arms that do not come within the remit of talks. Thus, a flat denial greets the possibility of NATO's rejecting such relics of the past as "nuclear deterrence," "forward-based defense," and other doctrines and concepts that seem to have lost their meaning. The bloc's military-political leadership describes the "modernization" of its tactical nuclear weapons as an urgent, top-priority task regardless of the objections voiced even within a number of Western government circles.

When determining NATO's future in a rapidly changing world, disagreements both between and within the bloc's countries are becoming increasingly obvious. Some—and this is characteristic of predominantly small countries—favor preserving the alliance's excessive military might in response to the Warsaw Pact countries' unilateral initiatives. Others somewhat cynically propose taking things in a leisurely fashion, stating that centrifugal forces within the Warsaw Pact will do their work anyway. A third group thinks about maintaining the balance of forces in Europe within the CSCE framework, while maintaining the North Atlantic alliance as it is, with the U.S. military presence on the continent, and rapidly advancing West European political and military integration along the same path.

The approach to the problem of relations between the military-political alliances varies. This is particularly marked in the United States, where many people, notably within the Congress, are concerned that the country's vast military expenditure (approximately $300 billion a year) is due to a considerable extent to its leading role in NATO. Americans realize that this expenditure can only be cut if the situation in Europe and throughout the world improves—something for which the peoples of the entire planet are striving.

Incidentally, the steps taken over the last few months to establish frank, constructive dialogue between the two alliances are of considerable significance here. I am referring to the first visit paid by USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries' foreign ministers to NATO headquarters to discuss such problems as, for instance, East-West relations, the reduction of the level of military confrontation in Europe, and the unification of the two German states with consideration for the interests of all countries in the region; the participation of Soviet parliamentary delegations in the work of North Atlantic Assembly sessions; the Vienna seminar on the two alliances' military doctrines; and the first phase of the recent "open skies" conference in Ottawa involving 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, along with a number of other events.

Presumably U.S. Democratic Congressman A. Cranston took these positive trends into account when he said that he does not even rule out a merger of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the future. However, another extremely influential man, General C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, cleaves to a different opinion. "Even if the entire Soviet Army pulls out of East Europe and even if all the East European armies disappear or pose no danger at all, we will nevertheless remain a superpower in the world arena," he said. "We head two great alliances—in the Atlantic and the Pacific." The people in Washington who determine the country's military policy currently seem to yield to precisely this viewpoint.

The future of both alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—will presumably be discussed at this year's CSCE summit meeting. I believe that, despite the increasing doubts regarding the advisability of their continued existence, both alliances will remain a reality in the foreseeable future in a greater or lesser degree of transformation. Under these conditions, particular significance attaches to efforts aimed at turning them from military-political into political alliances and establishing business contacts and practical cooperation between them, replacing the balance of strength with a balance of interests in the spirit of the new thinking. It is not on a confrontational, bloc basis but within the framework of the process of European rapprochement, which is gaining momentum and vigor, that the most reliable solution to the problem of security on our continent may be found.

Franco-Polish Stance on German Border Noted

PM1203121390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "France Supports Poland"]

[Text] Paris—The Polish leaders—President W. Jaruzelski, Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki, and Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski—have been in France on a visit. The talks, to which both sides attached great importance, focused on questions of the unification of the two German states and European security and its future organization, as well as bilateral relations.

France gave Poland full support in two important spheres—the inviolability of the existing borders in Europe, and Poland's participation in the work of the mechanism for discussing the German question according to the "two plus four" formula—in other words, with the FRG, the GDR, the USSR, the United States, France, and Britain. "France has always been on our side in difficult times," W. Jaruzelski said, summing up the meeting that took place.

France considers the Oder-Neisse border—that is, the present GDR-Polish border—to be inviolable, President F. Mitterrand stressed at a press conference. It supports Poland's demand that it be declared inviolable and enshrined in an international legal act.

"Talks aimed at concluding such a legal act should start as soon as possible, and at any event before the unification of the two German states," F. Mitterrand went on to say. Poland must participate in all talks that concern its own borders, the French president pointed out, and particularly in the work of the mechanism for discussing the German question.

The French president, LE FIGARO writes, has an understanding attitude toward the Poles' fears, which the latest statements of FRG Chancellor Kohl and the resolution on the inviolability of the postwar borders recently adopted by the Bundestag failed to fully allay. That is why F. Mitterrand stressed specifically: Any statement in which the principle of the inviolability of the borders is not clearly set out is inadequate, and therefore certain aspects of the Bundestag resolution must be made more precise.

Speaking at the press conference, W. Jaruzelski said that Poland's opinion must be taken into account in the resolution of the German question. The Poles, he pointed out, support the German people's right to self-determination and, if the unification of the two German states does not violate the existing balance on the European continent or threaten security but proceeds in parallel with the construction of the common European home, then this unification will prove to be a constructive step and will lead to the strengthening of the whole of Europe.

The Soviet Union, the Polish president stressed, is our ally, our main trade and economic partner, and the guarantor of the Oder-Neisse border. We find the USSR's position on the German question quite satisfactory. And we welcome the fact that France too has now adopted this stance.

For his part, T. Mazowiecki stressed the need to sign a peace agreement between the two German states and the World War II victorious countries which will definitively enshrine the postwar borders before German unification.

At the Paris talks, an agreement was also reached on holding regular meetings between French and Polish foreign ministers in order to discuss problems connected with the creation of a European East-West confederation at the earliest possible date, on the initiative of Paris. This confederation, F. Mitterrand pointed out at the press conference, will assist in the resolution of the urgent question of preserving the balance in Europe.

United States & Canada

Bush Cited on Perestroyka, Lithuania, Nicaragua

LD1303233990 Moscow TASS in English 2246 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Washington March 14 TASS—U.S. President George Bush said the United States supports perestroyka in the Soviet Union and wishes its success. Giving a news conference in the White House on Tuesday he described relations with the Soviet Union as a whole and his relations with Mikhail Gorbachev in particular as good, respectful relations and said he intends to develop them.

The President was asked how the creation of effective Presidency in the Soviet Union can affect the state and development of American-Soviet relations. He said he does not interfere in internal affairs and debates in the Soviet Union. It is living through a process of reforms which the United States supports in a generalised way. The United States supports the process of glasnost—openness.

He said it would be out of place for a United States president to start making asessment of the progress of perestroyka, democratisation.

The chief of the U.S. Administration said that nobody, including Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, believes that the Soviet system will return where it was before the eighties, but he noted that reliable defences should be preserved in the rapidly changing world.

Asked to state his opinion about the proposal of House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt to grant loans and food aid to the Soviet Union, the chief of the White House said he does not regard this as a good idea.

He said there were no requests for food supplies from the Soviet Union. Bush said that the United States can assist the Soviet Union most effectively in the implementation of perestroyka and economic reforms by granting it technical assistance and sharing technology.

The President was asked about the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to restore an independent Lithuanian state and about the possibility of the United States recognising Lithuania.

Bush answered that the United States wants to see peaceful resolution to this question.

He said that the United States never has regarded Lithuania as incorporated into the Soviet Union and that the United States is happy with the freedom of expression granted Lithuanians.

"In terms of recognition, there is a standard of control of one's territory that I've been advised should guide this," the President said.

Bush announced at the news conference the lifting of the commercial and economic embargo on Nicaragua imposed on May 1, 1985 and the administration's intention to grant Nicaragua economic aid to a sum of 300 million dollars. 500 million dollars is to be appropriated for Panama. According to the information of leading Panamanian specialists, that has been published, the damage to Panama from the U.S. aggression amounts to at least 1,500 million dollars.

The President said he was concerned over the unwillingness of Nicaraguan contras to disband their units and over some military actions of Sandinista in Nicaragua.

However, he said he was encouraged by the results of the recent meeting between Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and U.S. Vice-President Dan Quayle. During that meeting the Nicaraguan leader confirmed his intention to promote a smooth transition of power to the new government elected at the February 25 general elections in Nicaragua.

'Ambiguity' of U.S. Stance on USSR Changes Noted

PM1303141790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan report: "Various Assessments"]

[Text] Washington—The Bush administration is now in a situation in which, observers here agree, the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing.

And with good reason. On the one hand, all the country's most competent intelligence organs—virtually for the first time—are demonstrating publicly that the "Soviet threat" no longer exists, that the political reforms in the USSR are probably already irreversible, and the United States has no grounds to fear "major confrontations" with the USSR.

On the other hand, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, implicitly expressing the president's opinion, is trying to insist that in spite of all the objective facts our country still "conceals" a military threat. And so, he says, the Americans "must be ready to continue the long-term rivalry."

The Pentagon chief's "particular" view was set out last week in the U.S. Congress, where there were debates on the question of significant cuts in the military budget.

Generally a sober politician, Cheney painstakingly pretended that the winds of change had not reached the Pentagon. The legislators once again had occasion to listen to essentially the entire collection of Pentagon stereotypes about "Soviet intrigues," "threats," and "machinations." All this, consequently, was regarded as obsolete. Especially as, simultaneously with Cheney, CIA Director W. Webster said precisely the opposite in his testimonies on Capitol Hill. Proceeding from U.S. intelligence reports, he claimed that "the Soviet military threat is decreasing, and, by all accounts, will not reemerge."

Differences between the Pentagon and the CIA do not occur so often, because both these departments by virtue of their specific nature tend, as it is expressed here, "without fail to look for the coffin beneath the flowers." This time, however, Cheney was completely alone. His condemnation of Webster's statements did not simply fall on deaf ears. Literally a couple of days later, the Pentagon's own intelligence administration expressed disagreement with its chief in his assessment of the "Soviet threat." According to Congressman L. Aspin's testimony, the administration shares the CIA director's view.

So what is the Bush administration's position? As if hurrying to put an end to the obvious contradictions, prominent White House spokesmen let journalists know that in principle the administration "agrees" with Webster's conclusions. At the same time it does not object to statements by Defense Secretary Cheney which, they say, are directed exclusively at defending Bush's budget request, and in no measure at hindering the two great powers' diplomatic interaction, which is gathering momentum.

In other words, take it however you like. And if the ambiguity puzzles anyone, then, as they say, it is for him to decide.

Baker Defends Funding for East Europe Changes

PM0203111790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report under the general heading: "From the Flood of News"]

[Text] 1 Mar—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker addressed the Senate Budget Committee, substantiating the administration's request for appropriations of $20.8 billion for "international affairs" for the next fiscal year. "We believe that these funds are necessary to ensure the U.S. lead and guarantee our opportunity to influence the course of world events," he said. J. Baker described the reuest for the allocation of $300 million "to support the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe" as an important new initiative envisaged in the draft budget. According to him, these funds are destined to help develop democratic institutions in these countries, for training programs, technical aid, and environmental protection.

Comment on Upcoming Shevardnadze-Baker Talks

LD1303034990 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] As it has been announced in Moscow and in Washington, the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker will meet in Washington between 4th and 6th April. Vladislav Kozyakov has this comment.

Experience shows that meetings of this kind make it possible to resolve major issues. Over the past year the two ministers had negotiations in Vienna, Paris, Wyoming, Ottawa, and met in Moscow twice. Each time the result of the talks was meaningful. The forthcoming round will be no exception, of course. This time Shnevardnadze and Baker will concentrate their attention on the preparation of a summit due to take place, according to a preliminary agreement, in June. Since little time is left the two ministers will have to work very intensively. Fortunately enough the current atmosphere is favorable for such work. The steps taken by the sides to meet each other halfway have led to a situation when the program for the preparation of agreement, coordinated by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush during the meeting in Malta, now looks quite feasible.

The protocols to the treaties limiting nuclear testing are ready for signing. The work is nearing completion on the agreement that will provide for the elimination of a considerable part of the chemical weapons stocks of the two countries. This has been reported from Geneva where another round of talks on the issue has just ended. The reasonably coordinated levels of Soviet and American troops in central Europe have paved the way for the signing of an agreement on reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Moreover, one can hear more and more often today that the agreement on a 50 percent in strategic offensive weapons may be signed during the summit meeting in June.

The prospect of signing major disarmament agreements this very year puts the opportunity to acquire some peace dividends, as they say, on a practical plane. Members of the American Congress and People's Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have every reason to ask: Why should we spend so much money on new weapons if the disramament program becomes feasible? According to the just published Congressional study, a treaty to reduce strategic weapons would produce annual federal savings from 3 to 12 billion dollars. This country could save a lot from the disarmament program, too. The preparation is in full swing of a Soviet-American trade agreement which is to be signed, as the two leaders decided on Malta, during their summit meeting in June.

In his speech at the House Appropriations Sub-Committee on 7th March James Baker noted that the United States should support reform efforts of the Soviet Union through moves such as liberalized trade, the lifting of restrictions on credit and credit guarantees. Trade with the Soviet Union through moves such as liberalized trade, the lifting of restrictions on credit and credit gurantees. Trade with the Soviet Union will be very beneficial for the United States as well. As Eduard Shevardnadze declared, the development of our economic contacts could lead in the future to a mutually advantageous economic integration between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is true Soviet-American relations still run into many difficulties and complications. To remove the obstacles set up over decades of confrontation is not an easy job. It's important therefore to ensure the success of the forthcoming meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. The

April meeting of the two foreign ministers is expected to make a contribution to that.

Baker Statement on Loan to Israel Praised

LD0603224290 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Dear listeners, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman made a statement which included:

James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, recently announced that U.S. Administration will not support a draft law giving Israel a loan of $400 million if this money is going to be spent on building settlements in the occupied Arab territories, as this is considered an obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

In our opinion, this stance by the U.S. Administration indicates a high sense of responsibility and realism.

It is noteworthy that the issue of settlements in the occupied Arab territories was actively discussed at the meeting between Shevardnadze and Baker in Moscow. The Soviet side stressed the necessity of adopting all necesary measures to stop the building of the Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories and housing the emigrants there. However, at that time, the U.S. side did not agree to issuing a joint statement about this matter, in spite of the fact that it did not approve of these Israeli actions. It seems that the wave of resentment and discontent in the Arab countries, which was caused by the well-known statement by Shamir about establishing Greater Israel to house the emigrants there, has greatly affected the stance of the U.S. Administration. This is because it is very difficult to disreagrd the indisputable reality that the Israeli actions could harm the chances of settlement in the Middle East, especially the efforts to hold an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, to which the United States contributes.

However, the U.S. Administration has not yet issued a resolution in which it assesses the Israei actions from the point of view of the international bases, as the Carter administration did when it announced that the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are illegitimate.

We welcome the development in the U.S. stance which widens the available chances for joint action by the international community to advance the peace process in the Midde East and avoid the creation of any new obstacles in its way. We hope that the realism of the U.S. stance will be clearly apparent during the discussions of the illegitimate Israeli actions in the occupied territories at the UN Security Council at the initiative of the Soviet Union.

U.S. Debate on Merits of Stealth Bomber Viewed

PM0703160390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy dispatch: "It Is Easier To Change the 'Counting Procedures.' Dispute Over the Stealth Aircraft"]

[Text] New York, 6 Mar—The new strategic bomber developed using Stealth technology has recently become with increasing frequency the center of disputes between the supporters and opponents of the project. Let us dwell on the arguments put forward by both sides; it is up to the reader to decide whose arguments are more convincing.

Thus, from the very outset when the possibility of creating a Stealth bomber had only just "appeared on the horizon," a great deal was said about the fact that the Stealth bomber would have the unique ability to destroy fast-moving targets and—which is particularly important—intercontinental missile launchers. People forgot about this argument straightaway as soon as it became known that there was no technical possibility of supplying the bomber with extremely prompt information regarding the location of a particular target or launcher.

Then the following argument appeared: Since it is invisible on radar screens, the Stealth will be able to freely overcome the enemy's air defense system and inflict massive bombing strikes on facilities in the heartland. Stop, the enemies of "Stealth" began to object reasonably, why then do we need all these countless intercontinental and cruise missiles if the Stealth bomber will penetrate the enemy's air defense system first of all? One or the other, since after an exchange of nuclear missile strikes the Stealth bomber will not have to infiltrate air defenses since they will simply no longer exist....

Then the following argument saw the light of day: This equipment is extremely necessary for "nuclear deterrence" against the enemy. Since no one wants to agree that the "Trident" and MX missiles and the B-1 bomber can no longer serve the purpose of "nuclear deterrence" the argument fell by the wayside on its own.

The most original argument was that the Stealth aircraft may be indispensable when carrying out air strikes on states which advocate "international terrorism." But several questions arose here. Does the United States really need 132 of these bombers for these purposes? How did they get by without them until now? And what kind of air defenses do the ill-starred "terrorist states" have if they have to be overcome using Stealth bombers?

The most recent argument must be deemed the most resourceful. Pentagon strategists claim that this aircraft will not come within the special "counting procedures" on which a future U.S.-Soviet agreement on a 50-percent cut in strategic arms is based since it is equipped with bombs not missiles. Thus, according to the bomber's supporters, the United States should have it in the arsenal since the terms of a future U.S.-Soviet agreement will not conflict with this. If that is the case, it is necessary to "rigidly" insist on these conditions because the U.S. Air Force dearly wants to have this aircraft at its disposal.

But would it not be simpler, Democratic Congressman Martin Olav Sao from Minnesota asks, not to "tailor the terms of a future agreement to fit Air Force ambitions but, on the contrary, change the 'counting procedures' and not create a new fleet of Stealth bombers that would have to be cut back sooner or later...?"

U.S. Conducts First Nuclear Test of 1990

LD1103053190 Moscow TASS in English 0519 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] New York March 11 TASS—The United States conducted this year's first nuclear test code named Metropolis at the Nevada test site on Saturday.

According to a Pentagon spokesman, the yield of the nuclear detonation carried out at a depth of about 450 meters was from 20 to 150 kilotons.

Agreement With U.S. Noted on Expanding Air Lines

LD0903044190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1831 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Washington, 8 March—TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

The warming of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has enabled them to earnestly approach the solution of yet another difficult problem—in the field of air links. In London the other day, preliminary agreement was reached on considerable expansion of the scale of air traffic between the two countries, the implementation of which will help to eliminate problems that are so painful to passengers.

"The air market on both sides of the Atlantic will develop at an extremely rapid pace," said Pan American representative Pamela (Hanlon) commenting on that fact. In accordance with the agreement, U.S. airlines will not only increase the number of flights to Moscow and Leningrad, but will, for the first time, be enabled to effect the conveyance of passengers by direct flights to other towns in the Soviet Union. According to a U.S. State Department spokesman, these towns will be Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Tbilisi, Khabarovsk, and Magadan. The matter has to be finally decided on by the airlines following consideration of the expediency of flights to these destinations, bearing in mind the number of passengers.

Airlines in both of our countries will be able to increase both the quantity of weekly flights and the number of companies operating them.

According to Pamela (Hanlon) from Pan American—so far the only company to operate direct flights to Moscow—it is planned to increase them next year from the present five per week to seven.

The TASS correspondent was informed by Vladimir Pismennyy, the Aeroflot regional representative in North America, that the Soviet airline will get an opportunity to considerably expand its transportation of passengers from Moscow to Washington and New York and back. As early as this summer there will be every week five joint flights with Pan Am between Moscow and New York and five flights by Aeroflot aircraft, as well as three flights each between Moscow and Washington. In addition to this, Aeroflot aircraft will be able to make direct flights to other U.S. cities as well. Now, for instance, there is talk of a start to Aeroflot flights to San Francisco with an intermediate stopover at Anchorage, Alaska, Chicago, Miami, Seattle, Washington, and Los Angeles.

In addition, an understanding has been reached on the possibility of organizing additionally about 100 charter flights annually. Vladimir Pismennyy stressed that the preliminary agreement is extremely flexible and provides for the possibility of not only an increase in the flights if need be and by the mutual agreement of the airlines, but also the participation in the transportation of new Soviet airlines that may be set up in the future. He noted that the increase in flights will be in stages and it is as yet difficult to speak of specific figures for flights next year.

The third and final found of talks on air services will be held in London this April.

Trade, Jewish Emigration Link Reported

PM1303105190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unidentified correspondent: "History Repeats Itself"]

[Text] New York—To all appearances, history is beginning to repeat itself. At any rate the history of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

This amendment, adopted in 1974 and depriving us of most favored nation status in trade with the United States, substantially delayed trade exchange between our countries. It is true that recently matters have gotten to the point where this amendment will be repealed in the spring and summer of this year. The aim for which the late Senator Henry Jackson and Charles Vanik, who is in good health but who, it is true, for a long time now has not been a member of the House of Representatives, pushed the amendment through would seem to have been achieved. I recall that this aim was to ensure the possibility of the broad emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. According to Israel's calculations, cited by THE NEW YORK TIMES, last year nearly 72,000 Jews left the Soviet Union—20,000 more than in the "peak" year of 1979.

But as the date of the possible repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment approaches (it was proposed that this will be done in the context of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting) there are increasingly marked and active efforts from those who believe that trade should continue to remain a primarily political instrument. An instrument for pressure and if necessary blackmail.

Once again, trade matters are linked to the question of Jews' emigration from the Soviet Union. On Sunday in New York, a city with an impressive Jewish stratum, a joint press conference was held by the Zionist Organization of America and the Association of Russian Jews of America, who issued something like an ultimatum to the Soviet authorities. The key element of the ultimatum is: Either you ensure the immediate evacuation—not exit, not emigration, but evacuation—of all Jews who want to leave the USSR or else we, together with other organizations in collaboration with senators and congressmen, will seek to ensure that "no improvement is allowed in bilateral relations" and that "the possible use is not ruled out" of other economic sanctions against the USSR. We, it was stated at the press conference, will then make every effort to ensure that the USSR "is not seen as a normal and civilized state with which it is possible to deal."

I must say that this is no empty promise. THE WASHINGTON POST recently wrote, citing sources in Congress, that "efforts aimed at preserving the restrictions in Soviet-U.S. trade" may be made on the Capitol Hill. The Zionist lobby is the most powerful in U.S. Congress. Incidentally, the participants in the press conference included two congressmen—Ted Weiss and Bill Green—and also former New York district attorney Rudolph Giuliani who, it is said, has ambitions to become governor of New York State.

The demand for the "evacuation from the Soviet Union" is not the only one heard on Sunday. It was also demanded—most peremptorily—of the Soviet Government, parliament, and legal authorities that they take immediate and resolute steps against those who preach and practise anti-semitism in the USSR where, as the Zionist Organization of America statement said, events are beginning to be "reminiscent of the holocaust"—that is the death of 6 million Jews in the last war. That was precisely the word used: reminiscent.

Anti-semitism should be stopped. There can be no two opinions on that score. But why do people in America believe that they can and must talk the language of demands and ultimatums to us? Perhaps we should adopt the same pose and demand the eradication of anti-semitism in the United States which, incidentally, is active and sinister, and accompany our demands by the refusal to embark on accords in those fields where the Americans are particularly in need of accords?

That is a purely rhetorical proposal made exclusively to illustrate the fact that the exchange of mutual complaints and ultimatums is, first, futile and, second, counterproductive.

Bessmertnykh Receives U.S. Ambassador

PM1303140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 10 March A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, at the latter's request. During the talk there was a discussion of questions concerning international aspects of an Afghan settlement and of other problems of mutual interest.

China

Soviet, Chinese Delegations Discuss Trade Reform

Payments Protocal Signed

OW1403061290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Announcer-read report by Beijing correspondent Kulikov]

[Text] A Soviet Government delegation led by Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Katushev is currently touring Beijing. The following is a report by Kulikov, our station's Beijing correspondent:

The economic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and China have gained new momentum since a Soviet-Chinese summit was held in May 1989. Development of these relations has been upward all the way since then, which can be proved by the Soviet Government delegation's current visit. The visit marks the first visit to China in nearly 30 years by a Soviet minister of foreign economic relations.

At a Beijing meeting, Katushev and Zheng Tuobin, the Chinese representative to the meeting and minister of foreign economic relations and trade, signed the 1990 Soviet-Chinese goods exchange and payments protocol. Zheng Toubin spoke of the main direction for the development of Soviet-Chinese cooperation on a long-term basis of governmental negotiations.

The volume of trade between the two nations reached (?1.1 billion rubles) last year, up 30 percent from 1988. It is expected that two-way economic and trade cooperation will further expand this year.

On 6 March, the Soviet delegation met with Chinese Premier Li Peng at Zhongnanhai, the center for China's party and government organizations. During the meeting, the two sides discussed the issues of further expanding and intensifying economic cooperation and stable trends for such cooperation. Also discussed were increases in bilateral trade, new situations concerning economic contacts, the fact that more and more Soviets and Chinese are undertaking cooperation projects, and increases in the amount of technological equipment China buys from the Soviet Union, as well as the quantity of consumer goods China exports to the Soviet Union. The friendly talks between Katushev and Li Peng disclosed that a promising prospect for the development of Soviet-Chinese trade contacts and economic cooperation has emerged in recent years. Both gave a positive assessment of the developments in this connection.

Soviet Delegation Departs

LD1303121190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0630 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Beijing, 13 Mar (TASS)—Talks between Soviet and Chinese Government delegations ended here today with the signing of an intergovernmental protocol on trade and payments between the USSR and the PRC for 1990.

The document provides for a further increase in the volume of mutual goods supplies. Fifty-five percent of Soviet exports to the PRC consist of machinery and equipment, including civilian aircraft and aircraft parts.

According to the protocol, 80 percent of the supplies of Chinese goods to the USSR will consist of industrial goods and foodstuffs, consumer goods, and raw materials for producing them. Among these are items of clothing and knitwear, cotton and silk fibers, fur and leather garments, items made from down, footwear, sports items, and meat. Supplies of household radio electronic equipment will also occupy a significant position among Chinese exports to the Soviet Union.

The protocol was signed on the Soviet side by Konstantin Katushev, head of the Soviet Government delegation and USSR minister of foreign economic relations; it was signed on the Chinese side by Zheng Tuobin, head of the Chinese Government delegation and PRC minister of foreign economic relations and trade.

The Soviet Government delegation today left Beijing for home upon completion of its visit to China.

Sino-Soviet Symposium on Economic Reform Held

Chinese Delegates Interviewed

OW2202120890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Dear friends, we have already reported the first Sino-Soviet symposium on economic reform held in Moscow. A quite representative Chinese delegation, led by Liu Guoguang, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attended the meeting. The participants on the Soviet side included Titarenko, a famous sinologist and director of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Professor (Miyasenikov); Academician (Lujinov), a famous Soviet economist; Academician (Yayanmenktonsin); and Academician Aganbegyan. Since Academician Aganbegyan is considered one of the theorists for Soviet economic reform, the conferees listened with great interest to his report on the present situation of economic reform in the Soviet Union and the basic direction of its development.

After the symposium was over, our station reporter (Afdamov) interviewed several academicians and asked them about the prospects for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation.

Academician Aganbegyan said: [Begin recording in Russian, fading to announcer's Mandarin translation] Our cooperation has very good prospects. Economists of both countries are no doubt greatly interested in discussing problems concerning economic reform. Those problems were the central topic of the symposium. Since both countries are in a transition from an economic management system of administrative mandates to a new economic system of market regulation, it is very important for us to exchange experience. Our problems are very complex, and neither country has so far had the experience of accomplishing the transition. We have to draw on both our own experience and our neighbor's experience, both positive and negative, in economic reform. To reconsider the question of socialist development and socialist economic theories is of significance, not only in theory but also in practice. We are exploring such questions as how to avoid mistakes and how to accelerate economic reform.

Academician Aganbegyan added: The USSR Academy of Sciences and Academy of Social Sciences are increasing contacts with their Chinese counterparts. The cooperation is promoted through direct contacts between research institutes of the two countries. I think we should put on our daily agenda joint Sino-Soviet economic research, and publish special works on it. This is only the beginning. During my visit to China not long ago, I enthusiastically familiarized myself with China's experience in economic reform.

In conclusion, Academician Aganbegyan said: I think both myself and other Soviet economists should constantly pay attention to those experiences.

Chinese experts also expressed their views on the symposium.

Liu Guoguang, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told our station reporter: [Begin recording] The symposium was the first meeting for Chinese and Soviet economists to exchange experience, particularly that of reform. It was of great significance both in theory and practice. It has enabled economists of both countries to know more about each other's reform, learn from each other's good experience, and draw on each other's bitter experience and lessons. [end recording]

Our station reporter also interviewed (Dai Yuanquan), a scientist of the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

[Begin (Dai Yuanquan) recording] I think the Sino-Soviet symposium on economic reform was very necessary, because China's old economic system was patterned after that of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Our two countries had many things in common in the economic system. In the course of reform, both countries have encountered many similar problems. For this reason, it is very useful for the two countries to exchange experience and lessons in economic reform. Of course, the two countries are not completely the same in conditions, and each has its own salient features. So, while we exchange experience, we are not supposed to mechanically copy each other's experience. Instead, we may compare notes and learn from each other's useful experience. [end recording]

Our reporter asked him: As an expert in economic management, what questions are you most interested in?

[Begin (Dai Yuanquan) recording] This is my first visit to the Soviet Union. After I heard Professor Aganbegyan's report here, I feel that both Soviet Union and China are encountering many similar problems in economic reform, such as lack of macro-control, financial deficits, inflation, and capital shortage. I think it is very helpful for us economists to find out how these problems happened in the Soviet Union and how the Soviet Union proceeds to solve them. [end recording]

The first Sino-Soviet symposium on economic reform has come to a close. According to the conferees, the views exchanged and discussed were very meaningful. Soviet and Chinese economists plan to hold more such meetings in the future.

Shatalin Interviewed

90UI0389A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Academician S.S. Shatalin, acting academic secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economic Branch, by TASS correspondent S. Turanov; place and date not given: "Successes and Miscalculations of the Reform"]

[Text] The first Sino-Soviet symposium on problems of economic reforms in the PRC and the USSR was held last week in Moscow. A TASS correspondent interviewed Academician S.S. Shatalin, leader of the Soviet delegation and acting academic secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Branch.

[Turanov] Stanislav Sergeyevich, economic reform in the PRC began 10 years ago. There have in this time certainly been both correct decisions and mistakes. Was it ascertained at the symposium of what of China's experience in economic transformations we might avail ourselves?

[Shatalin] The first stage of the reform, which transformed the economic system in the countryside, was a success for our neighbors. The family contract linking pay with the end results of production came to be introduced everywhere. Such measures made it possible to achieve substantial results in the development of agriculture. This is one further argument in support of the fact that we need not fear leasing the land to enterprising people, the less so in that, unfortunately, there are few of them left in the countryside.

We must also take advantage of our Chinese comrades' positive experience in the sphere of the creation of an open economic system. The reform afforded the country an opportunity to change the "self- reliance is the main thing" policy and gradually switch to an open-type economy. A number of special economic zones was created, Western capital was attracted, a strategy of the economic development of coastal regions was determined simultaneously, and their openeness to the outside world was widened. As a result total export-import transactions in the decade grew fivefold, exceeding $100 billion!

As far as the reforms in the sphere of industry are concerned, here also there have been certain successes. More than 90 percent of state enterprises now employ a contract system and are utilizing such forms of operation as leasing and the joint-stock form of activity. But serious macroeconomic miscalculations, which were a principal cause of the crisis situation in the economy, were made also at the time of the "transfer" of the reform to the city.

[Turanov] What were the miscalculations?

[Shatalin] These were described in detail in his report by Liu Guoguang, leader of the Chinese delegation and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the mid-eighties, when the center of the reform had begun to shift to the cities, the transition to market relations came to be effected unjustifiably rapidly. This led to considerable inflation. In 1988 the price index reached double digits. As a consequence, the "overheating" of the economy and the mass buying-up of commodities on the market. Elements of this condition are being observed currently with us.

[Turanov] The well-known Western economist J. Galbraith has spoken about the fact that at the end of the 20th century it would be madness to introduce a purely market economy, as some Soviet scholars are proposing....

[Galbraith] The example of China confirms the soundness of this statement. I respect J. Galbraith and believe that he gives economists a timely warning against certain illusions and exaggerated possibilities of the market system. Nothing is resolved automatically following the emergence of a market. This is indicated by both the Chinese experience and the course of reforms in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary.

Careful preparation is needed for the creation of a market in the Soviet Union, in a country with an inadequately developed infrastructure and with different principles of management and thinking. Lacking a market in producer goods and a consumer market, a uniform tax policy, a system of social protection, and tax indexing, we cannot "rush into the whirlwind". Figuratively speaking, the principle of "jettisoning everything and shouting: sauve qui peut" has a positive outcome only if there is appreciable economic process stock. Only then is it possible to socially protect the workers of the enterprises which would inevitably go bankrupt.

[Turanov] Was not the introduction last year of special measures in the PRC economy connected precisely with the fact that control over the market had weakened?

[Shatalin] To a considerable extent. The Chinese comrades are now tackling problems of regulation of the market and the creation of macro-proportions, employing, in particular, strict planning methods. But it has to be mentioned here that the imposition of special measures both in China and with us does not mean that the reform has come to an end. We and our colleagues from the Chinese delegation were of the unanimous opinion that it is necessary to escape from the current situation by utilizing not only planning and command but also market methods. Otherwise we would simply destroy the economy in a system of special measures, and everything would just be going round in circles. Our government program is as yet taking insufficient account of this, incidentally, in my opinion.

[Turanov] Could we use the legislative experience in the implementation of the Chinese economic reform?

[Shatalin] It is not only a question of laws but of the "climate" which is created locally for enterprising people. I know that the Chinese comrades are doing much to ensure for them propitious conditions for their activity. With us, on the other hand, the situation is the reverse. And this is currently a central problem of our reform: creating in the people a "climate" which prompts people to innovations, a search for new solutions and enterprise—there is such a word, almost forgotten, in Russian. Otherwise society has no future.

[Turanov] Did you at the symposium broach problems of the development of foreign economic Sino-Soviet cooperation?

[Shatalin] There was a lively discussion on this topic. The sectoral structures of our countries, which are mutually complementary, facilitate the development of relations. One further aspect is the use on contract of workers from the PRC here in our country, particularly in the Far East, where there is an acute manpower shortage.

Summit Results Noted

OW1403031490 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] PRAVDA today carries an article devoted to the discussion of Sino-Soviet relations. The article stresses that an opportunity for the two great nations to build multilateral relations on the basis of mutual trust, openness, and understanding of the shared benefits of such relations has emerged.

The article points out that while the Sino-Soviet summit put an end to the disagreeable past in their bilateral relations, the two nations, under the current circumstances, obviously have no intention of resuming their military alliance from the 1950s. The article states that the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations between the 1960s and 1970s is inconsistent with modern times. Between any two civilized nations, especially socialist countries, such a pattern of bilateral relations is unacceptable.

The paper says that today the Soviet Union and China share a similar attitude on how to solve many social problems and how to consolidate and revitalize socialism on the path of reform. The progress that has been made on easing military confrontation and building normal cooperation mechanisms between the two nations is evident. Improvement is also being made between the communist parties of the two nations on normalizing relations and expanding contacts.

CPC Leader Calls for Cadre Certification

PM2302111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Certification of Cadre Workers"]

[Text] Beijing, 19 Feb—CPC Central Committee General Secretary Jiang Zemin has called for the CPC's leading components to be strengthened and for a universal certification of cadre workers to be conducted. He met last Sunday [18 February] with the organizational department heads of the country's provincial and city party committees.

The leadership in the party and the state at all levels must be firmly retained in the hands of people dedicated to Marxism, the speaker emphasized. This conclusion, he said, follows from the lessons of the disturbances and the antigovernment revolt in April-June of last year.

The Chinese communists' leader advanced as the priority task that of restoring and strengthening "the CPC's intimate ties with the people's masses." This way of formulating the question, he pointed out, has not lost its topicality even today, just as in the first years of the new China's existence, when the Central Committee and Chairman Mao demanded that the party leaders not lose touch with the masses but maintain vigilance with regard to bourgeois "sugarcoated artillery shells."

The success of party building is regarded by China's mass media as one of the basic conditions for ensuring social stability, the national economy's ongoing development, and legislative and democratic building. Describing today a tour of inspection of the northern Hebei Province by another party leader—Qiao Shi, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee—the central press singles out the idea expressed by him of the importance of restoring and developing the party's glorious traditions and work style, on which, according to him, the state of affairs in the whole of society to a considerable degree depends.

Northeast Asia

Eighth Plenum of MPRP Central Committee Held

Restructuring, Renewal Discussed

LD1303191490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Video report from Ulaanbaatar by correspondent T. Lordkipanidre; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Following the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the winds of change have stirred things up in distant Mongolia, which even recently seemed serenely peaceful.

There, too, informal organizations have cropped up and heated debates have broken out, and it appears there has even been a demand for the resignation of the republic's party leadership. This is being discussed at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, [MPRP] which is now being held in Ulaanbaatar.

[Begin T. Lordkipanidze recording, identified by caption] The main issue under debate at the plenum is the current political situation in the country. Also on the agenda is the proposal that an extraordinary congress of the MPRP be held on 10 April of this year. The participants in the plenum will be voicing their views on amendments to the provisions in the country's Constitution on the leading role of the party.

The plenum participants have said that the events of the past three months confirm that the party has failed to cope with the perestroyka it itself declared, forfeiting it instead to other organizations. Most of those taking part feel that life itself demands renewal in the party, and that the numerous failings that have accumulated in party work over a lengthy period are having an adverse affect on its authority. Sharp criticism was levelled against cadres policy, parochialism, and protectionism conducted openly for all to see. This has sapped faith in the party and state leadership, resulting in the demand for the resignation of the MPRP Politburo and Secretariat.

The opinion was expressed that there is nothing more important now than accelerating perestroyka and renewal in society. Time demands that democracy be correctly combined with discipline and good organization, and that the unity and cohesion of the people be enhanced. [video shows meeting in progress; series of interviews (no voice) with unidentified persons] [end recording]

New Party Formation Announced

LD1403001490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] A principled, frank discussion on the pressing issues of the political situation in Mongolia has unfolded at the regular MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Plenum that opened yesterday. [passage omitted]

During the same day, at a news conference that took place here, it was announced that one more party—the Mongolian National Progress Party (MNPP) has been formed. According to its leader, (D. Hanbolda) lecturer of the MPRP Central Committee Suhbaatar High Party School, members of the MNPP advocate economic changes in Mongolia on the basis of using international progressive achievements. During this news conference it was also announced to the journalists that the Mongolian Union of Non-Party Members was formed, which is called upon to ensure all forms of participation for the working people who have not yet determined their party allegiances in the democratic transformation of Mongolian society.

TASS Reports Plenum Discussions

LD1303161690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1002 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 13 Mar (TASS)—The routine Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee Plenum that began here yesterday is continuing today. A debate is underway on the report delivered by Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee.

The plenum agenda is centered around issues connected with the convening of an extraordinary MPRP congress, the resignation of the present Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat line-up, and the renunciation of the constitutional enshrinement of the MPRP's leading and directing role in society, the MONTSAME agency reports.

The communists and all the working people of Mongolia hope that the plenum will adopt sensible decisions that correspond to the fundamental interests of the people, said B. Eldev-Ochir, first secretary of the Tov Aymag party committee. He noted that the renewal of the MPRP is becoming the most vital problem. The errors and failings that have piled up over many years in the party's guiding and organizational work have caused a decline in its authority.

B. Eldev-Ochir criticized certain extremist trends that have been observed of late in the activities of the Mongolian Democratic Union.

B. Luvsantseren, chairman of the Central Council of Mongolian Trade Unions, supported the proposal on the resignation of the present MPRP Central Committee Politburo, submitted for the plenum's consideration by J. Batmonh. Underlining the trade union movement's crucial role in a genuine accomplishment of the tasks of perestroyka and renewal in the country, he noted that Mongolia's trade unions are willing to develop equal cooperation with all political democratic forces in the country.

Ts. Enhtor, the leader of the Ubsunuur Aymag party organization, agreed with the proposal that the MPRP Central Committee Politburo should resign, saying at the same time that one must not ascribe all the distortions and errors committed in the country to one party alone. In this connection, he noted the need for a decisive renewal of the apparatus of the bodies of state power. He took a negative view of the attempts by informal associations and organizations to speak on behalf of the entire people, the agency notes.

Extraordinary Congress Set for 10 Apr

LD1403115190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0957 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] [No dateline as received] The TASS correspondents at the plenum press center have been informed that it has been decided to convene an extraordinary congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] on 10 April. On the agenda are a political report to the congress and organizational matters. A decision to set up an expanded commission to prepare and conduct the extraordinary congress of the MPRP was also adopted.

At the same time, the norm for representation was determined: In large towns, one delegate for every 140 party members, in rural areas one delegate from the party organizations of every somon. Thus 940 delegates will be elected to the forthcoming congress.

The press center also announced that it has been decided to abolish the resolution of the extraordinary 1984 plenum of the MPRP Central Committee on J. Tsedenbal's services to the party and motherland.

The plenum of the MPRP Central Committee is continuing its work.

Mongolian Leader on Referendum, Congress Plans

PM1303093190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Nabatchikov dispatch: "J. Batmonh: 'We Have Refrained from Gambling on Force'"]

[Text] Ulaan Baatar—The public outburst which occurred in the very center of the Mongolian capital and threatened to assume unpredictable forms, scale, and consequences was quickly quelled in an organized fashion late on Friday night. J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the People's Great Hural Presidium, addressed the people of the Mongolian People's Republic on national radio and television.

He announced that it had been decided to include the questions of the resignation of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo and the convocation of an extraordinary MPRP congress on the agenda of the MPRP Central Committee Plenum scheduled to open 12 March. A nationwide referendum is to be held on the fate of the current composition of the Mongolian People's Republic People's Great Hural so that the people will be able to decide themselves whether to give the Hural their vote of confidence or not, J. Batmonh said.

Welcoming this decision, representatives of opposition forces taking part in the latest round of "roundtable" talks in Government House described it as "a wise step aimed at preserving national unity," while one of the leaders of the informals from the Mongolian Democratic Union described the wholesale resignation of the Politburo which they demand as, basically, a foregone conclusion.

It has also been announced that the question of the convocation of an extraordinary party congress as a matter of urgency—a question which has been categorically raised by the opposition's leaders more than once—will be discussed at the plenum. Conceding this possibility in connection with the exacerbating situation in the country, J. Batmonh explained however that, since it is a question of the renewal of not just the party leadership but the entire MPRP, a certain amount of preparation for the congress will be necessary, with rank-and-file communists taking a direct part.

Since a section of the working people is currently demanding the resignation of the body of deputies of the People's Great Hural, the Mongolian leader said, it has been decided to hold a nationwide referendum on a vote of confidence, because this is exclusively within the competence of the people themselves. All the country's major sociopolitical formations will take part in the preparations and holding of the referendum, with equal access to the state mass media.

The opposition forces have agreed to postpone their demand for the creation of a provisional people's hural until the results of the referendum are known. They will renew this demand only if the current People's Great Hural fails to win the people's support.

Assessing the past events, J. Batmonh noted that, although many working people demanded decisive measures to cut short the antigovernment actions and demonstrations, "we have refrained from gambling on force because we believe that we are entirely capable of resolving our problems by peaceful means." The Mongolian leader called on all the country's citizens to spare no effort to safeguard the country's unity, display responsibility for the sake of its welfare, remain calm, and observe order and discipline. "We must focus our attention on political dialogue and mutual understanding," he declared.

Commentary Views Mongolian Democratic Party

OW0603044790 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 20 Feb 90

[(Bulatov) commentary; from the "World Today" program]

[Text] A new political organization, named the Mongolian Democratic Party [MDP], was formally established in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar last Sunday. Station observer (Bulatov) has the following comment:

The MDP's formation was the natural outcome of active efforts by people from all walks of life in that country's current process of reform and renewal. Present developments in Mongolia indicate that this Asian socialist country does not stay on the sidelines when sweeping democratic changes and radical reforms are taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As in the Soviet Union, the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] gave the green light to carrying out broad democratic changes at a plenary session of its Central Committee more than a year ago. A social organization called the Mongolian Democratic Alliance was formed last autumn, and the MDP's creation was declared at the party's first congress in Ulaanbaatar on 18 February.

According to the party's charter, the MDP is headed by a nine-member political consultative center. A member of the center said that the MDP plans to hold constructive dialogue with the MPRP on all major issues, including social, economic, political, and cultural matters. New practical initiatives to remove the MPRP's monopoly on the country's political power have emerged in Mongolia's social and political life. Foreign observers believe that the plenary session of the MPRP Central Committee, scheduled to open in Ulaanbaatar on 20 March, will have a significant impact on the country's democratic prospects. At the meeting, the ruling party is expected to abolish its constitutionally guaranteed right to monopolize political power in favor of a multiparty system.

While only the future can tell us about the prospects of Mongolia's democratic process, the MPRP obviously cannot ignore the pressing needs of the current developments in social and political democratization, if it wants to show respect for its political rival. Facts have shown that without democratization, there can be no economic development and no improvement in the people's livelihood.

Commentary on Conclusion of Kaifu-Bush Talks

OW0803011090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1000 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] Radio Moscow commentator Dmitriyev has commented on the outcome of the talks between Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu and U.S. President Bush which have just concluded, as follows:

The accord reached between the two sides on promoting a harmonious trilateral dialogue, aimed at resolving global political and economic problems, seems to have been the most conspicuous outcome of the recent talks. It can be taken as the concretization of the concept of global partnership between the two nations, which has come to the fore in the recent relations between Japan and the United States. This new concept, in fact, indicates that the U.S. Government has come to place its relations with Japan at the same level as those with West Europe. However, it cannot but give one the impression that the United States is trying to hide the apparent failure of the negotiations in defusing the economic frictions between the two nations, the major issue pending between them.

Representatives of the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan have welcomed the accord reached between Prime Minister Kaifu and President Bush on readjusting the current situation in the foreign exchange market. Despite this accord, however, the dollar was sold at a higher rate on 5 March, and KYODO News Service reported that experts believe that the two leaders' clamor on this issue has achieved no effect at all.

At the same time, judging from all aspects, those problems that were the main reasons for holding the summit talks have not been settled. The fact is that they have failed to reach an accord on the talks on economic structures aimed at correcting the trade imbalance existing between the two nations. In the end, President Bush called on Prime Minister Kaifu to bring his political skills into full play to make the structural talks a success.

However, the Japanese press writes that it is rather unusual for the President of the United States to directly call on the head of the Japanese Government to settle concrete economic problems. This point in itself indicates the seriousness of the situation which has so far been created. And since the head of the Japanese Government restricted himself to only promising that special attention would be given to the issue of trade imbalance, there remains a very wide gap between the two sides.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Kaifu's vague promise has aroused criticism among opposition parties in Japan. The opposition parties are focusing their attention on the fact that the government does not have any practical program to carry out responsibilities imposed on the prime minister. It is observed that Prime Minister Kaifu's influence within the Liberal Democratic Party is not strong enough to change the Japanese economic structure in accordance with U.S. demands. The problem lies in the fact that the interests of Japan's influential circles are closely linked to the current situation, and that it is not easy for the Kaifu administration to counter these interests.

Thus, despite the Kaifu-Bush talks, the two nations have failed to eliminate the danger of intensifying the trade and economic frictions between them. Therefore, there appear to be no prospects for the difficulties to be overcome. Under such circumstances, what can be expected is that the Japanese Government will only take roundabout measures to prevent the deterioration of Japanese-U.S. relations.

As a precautionary measure, at the talks in California, Prime Minister Kaifu agreed to meet the demand for increasing the Japanese Government's share of bearing the cost of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. In this connection YOMIURI SHIMBUN writes that the trade issue has become so intensified that it cannot be easily handled even by all cooperative efforts in other fields combined. This can be regarded as a correct evaluation because the value of Japanese loyalty in the military field has apparently depreciated under the situation where tensions have been defused. Furthermore, there is no way for Japan to avoid increasing its share of bearing the cost of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, although Japanese public opinion does not seem to welcome this decision.

Well then, is Japan's position in dealing with the U.S. demands as weak as is claimed? If the Japanese Government should fail to appease U.S. congressmen, would there be no way to avoid strict measures being taken against Japan? Whenever talks are held on this theme, the [words indistinct] seem to be a little exaggerated. If unilateral economic sanctions should be taken, there would be no hope for [words indistinct] and there would never be any substantial settlement either.

For example, the United States once resorted to restricting imports of Japanese semiconductors, but this did not resolve the trade deficit issue at all for the United States. On the contrary, it only served to worsen the friendly relations. Many U.S. congressmen should understand that any other sanctions would also prove ineffective. Under the conditions of co-dependence in the global economy, strictly unilateral actions, namely [words indistinct], will have the effect of rebounding on those who take such actions. This is known as the boomerang phenomenon.

This is particularly true in relations between Japan and the United States since the two nations depend on each other to quite a high degree. For example, would consumers in the United States, i.e. eligible voters, welcome restrictions on the import of Japanese commodities which are comparatively cheaper? Since many U.S. companies are buyers of Japanese commodities, they would probably not welcome such measures either.

Sooner or later Japan will have to settle its trade and economic frictions with the United States. However, they will probably be settled through structural changes in Japan. On the other hand, since the United States is also concerned about maintaining normal economic relations with Japan, just as Japan is vice versa, it will have to make some concessions. Anyway, as indicated by the talks held between Prime Minister Kaifu and President Bush, there seems to be no other alternative but to settle economic issues. It would be useless to make new concessions in the military field. In the future, such an attempt would merely go against the global tendency of defusing tensions on an international scale.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Falin Receives Heng Samrin Envoy 11 Mar

BK1303122490 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Comrade Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee's International Policy Commission, on 11 March received in Moscow Comrade Im Chhunlim, alternate Political Bureau member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP] Central Committee and special envoy of Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the State of Cambodia's Council of State.

At the meeting, the Cambodian representative handed over a message from Comrade Heng Samrin addressed to Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. In accordance with his leader's instructions, Comrade Im Chhunlim talked about the new developments in the situation in and around Cambodia. The comrade expressed support for the CPSU policy of perestroyka and of transforming all aspects of Soviet social life.

Rogachev, Australian Envoy Discuss Cambodia

LD0103215690 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—The Australian ambassador to the USSR Charles Robin Ashwin was received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev today at the former's request.

The Cambodian situation and prospects for a settlement were discussed.

Japanese Diplomats Affirm Continued Support

OW0803084590 Beijing XINHUA in English 0706 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Bangkok, March 8 (XINHUA)—Japan will continue to support Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in his efforts for a Cambodian peaceful settlement, a Japanese diplomat said here Wednesday.

A four-member team from the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok told Sihanouk of Japan's support when the team visited him recently at his residence at Phum Sereipheap [placename as received] inside Cambodia, according to Hiroshi Inomata, embassy first secretary.

Inomata said the team led by Charge d'Affaires Tadashi Lkeda held an extensive discussion with Sihanouk during a four-hour meeting.

Inomata said Siahnouk briefed the team on last month's Jakarta informal meeting on Cambodia, which failed to tackle the key issues of power-sharing among the four Cambodian factions and U.N. role in the peace process.

Singapore-U.S. Military Cooperation Talks Cited

BK0403143590 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1500 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Anatoliy Aleksandrov commentary]

[Text] As we already know, last August Singapore announced its decision on the possibility of hosting some U.S. Air Force planes under a short-term agreement, and that Singapore would allow more frequent visits by U.S. naval ships at its bases for repair and maintenance.

The announcement was made at a time when there were strong protests in the Philippines calling for dismantlement of the U.S. bases in that country. On top of that, it was understood that before the Singapore Government's decision was formally announced, U.S. military officials had already visited that country. It was obvious that the United States was getting ready to look for an alternate site to compensate for its strategic losses if it was forced to dismantle its bases in the Philippines. There is no doubt that such an alternative is the most suitable for U.S. interests.

A recent research report compiled by the Rand Corporation for the Pentagon says that the bases in the Philippines could be transferred to Guam and Tinian Islands in the Pacific Ocean, but such a transfer would cost the United States about $7.6 billion. However, this high cost could probably be reduced by several billion dollars if there were agreements on the use of military bases in Singapore, Thailand, Pakistan, and other nearby countries.

Events in recent months have shown that the more active the Filipino protests against U.S. military bases are, the closer Singapore-U.S. military cooperation becomes. According to the weekly AVIATION JOURNAL magazine, F-16 and F-17 jet fighters will be located in Singapore this year. In the coming months, the number of U.S. support personnel will be increased.

A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Singapore has denied any links between the decision on stationing jet fighters and coming talks on the future of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. But that statement is difficult to accept against the background of all of the events taking place in Southeast Asia, including U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's recent visit to the Philippines.

What encouraged Singapore to embark on such a step? As we can see from the explanations of Singapore officials, they were encouraged by a desire to maintain stability in Southeast Asia. But countries in the region do not react unanimously to this issue. Considering that the Soviet Union has begun to reduce its military presence in Cam Ranh Bay and has stated its sincere commitment to dismantle its posts there, the location of U.S. military facilities in Singapore will prevent Southeast Asia from becoming a zone of peace and a zone free from nuclear weapons and a foreign military presence. In the past, this was because the U.S. bases in the Philippines were an irritant in the way of realizing the idea. Now a new situation has emerged. Whether or not the U.S. military bases in the Philippines are dismantled, the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia will be maintained. Such a situation will not contribute constructively to the sovereignty of countries in the region.

U.S. Reduction of Troops in Asia Urged

OW0403092990 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 26 Feb 90

[(Jiaplilov) commentary]

[Text] Dear friends: With a trend of actively promoting cooperation, Asian-Pacific nations have put questions on their daily agenda such as how to reduce military confrontation and ease tension in the region, and how the the Soviet Union and the United States should reduce their military activities in the region. Please listen to a talk by our station observer (Jiaplilov):

The stand of the Soviet Union on this issue is unambiguous. The Soviet Union stands for strengthening security and easing military confrontation in Asia, and has taken action to achieve the goal. As everyone knows, Moscow announced that the Soviet Union will reduce its armed forces in its Asian region by 200,000 men before the end of 1991, including 120,000 men from the Far East. In accordance with the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 436 intermediate-range and short-range missiles and reduced its military presence in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. Now, it is planning to remove 16 warships from its Pacific Fleet and withdraw its troops from Mongolia. Those troops are stationed in Mongolia in accordance with an agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not strengthened its nuclear forces in the Far East since 1984.

Then, have there been any changes in U.S. military policy towards this vast region in the world? U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney's visits to South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan have answered this question to a certain extent. According press reports, Washington plans to make some readjustment in its policy towards the Asian-Pacific region, including reduction of its military presence in the region.

However, Cheney said in an interview with Japanese reporters on his Asia trip: U.S. policy towards the Asian-Pacific region has not changed a bit and the United States does not plan to abandon its military commitment in the region, but it will reduce its military bases there. On the question of how many U.S. troops will be reduced in South Korea and Japan, Cheney said that it will mainly affect auxiliary arms. All these actions will not affect the U.S. forces in the Asian-Pacific region, just as what AFP has pointed out. On the contrary, Washington even plans to ask Seoul and Tokyo to increase their funding to maintain U.S. Armed Forces in the two countries. This is the so-called change in Washington's military policy towards the Asian-Pacific region. When asked about the motives of such U.S. actions, Cheney always says that it is because the Soviet Union is a military power in the Asian-Pacific region.

Indeed, the Soviet Union is a military power in the Asian-Pacific region. However, Moscow has taken several big strides in reducing its military strength in the Asian-Pacific region. Its measures to promote trust and achieve military detente in the region have won the understanding and support of the Asian-Pacific nations.

Arab League Delegation Visit Postponed

LD0503154890 Kuwait KUNA in English 1425 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 5 (KUNA)—A visit to the Soviet Union by an Arab League delegation which was due to be held early this month has been delayed at the request of the Soviet side, informed diplomatic sources said here Monday.

The sources said the Soviet side has asked for postponing the visit due to the preoccupation by the Soviet authorities with the Supreme Soviet session.

The Arab delegation's visit to Moscow is aiming at discussing the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel-occupied Arab territories and other issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Soviet Union had earlier asked for postponing high-ranking official visits, including a visit by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak.

No new date for the visit by the league delegation has been decided yet. The delegation is due to include foreign ministers of Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, Jordan, and the Arab League Secretary General Chadli Klibi.

Near East & South Asia

More Reportage of Afghan Coup Attempt, Aftermath

Tanay Cited on Soviet Role in Coup

LD1403073290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] The UP agency reports that [S.] Tanay, former minister of defense of Afghanistan, who headed the recent attempted coup and who fled to Pakistan after it failed, has alleged that Soviet aircraft took part in suppressing the coup. However, according the agency, his fabrications have been refuted by many Western diplomats in Kabul, who have declared that there is no evidence for such allegations.

Najibullah Sends Message to Former King

NC1303165490 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Najibullah, president of Afghanistan, has sent a message to former Afghan King Zaher Shah, who lives in exile in Italy. The government spokesman in Kabul reported that the message refers to the need for new efforts to find ways for political normalization in Afghanistan. In his message, he emphasizes Kabul's support for the national reconciliation policy.

Afghan Diplomat Recounts Coup Events

LD1403114290 Moscow TASS in English 1045 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—"The people of Afghanistan denounce the counterrevolutionary attempt by former Afghan Defence Minister Shahnawaz tanay," Afghan charge d'affaires in the Soviet Union Sayed Murtaza told TASS.

The Afghan people regard the action as a counterrevolutionary plot designed to seize political power and as an attempt to question the gains of the april revolution and reverse the natural course of historic development, Murtaza said.

The Afghan diplomat said more than 200 civilians were killed and about 500 wounded in the coup attempt.

Having conspired with the Afghan air defence commander, Shahnawaz Tanay ordered four combat planes in the air, which then bombed Kabul's residential areas, he said.

Aiming to kill members of the Afghan Democratic People's Party politburo, who held a meeting of the Coordination Council at noon on March 6, Tanay tried to order into the air planes stationed at an air force base in Bagram, he said.

The coup attempt was quashed by the Kabul garrison and three of the four rebel planes were shot down, the diplomat said.

"It has been established that the former defence minister entered into a criminal conspiracy with Afghan opposition leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar," Murtaza said.

It is no coincidence that Hekmatyar gave refuge to the rebels. The investigation has revealed that several other politburo members took part in the plot, including Nazar Muhammad and Neyaz Mohmand, and Supreme Defence Council member Abdol Qadir.

Analyst Condemns Involved Outsiders

LD1303154790 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 13 Mar 90

[By TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS—There are now to many "players" on the domestic and foreign political scene of Afghanistan, the TEHRAN TIMES newspaper observed recently.

There are many such "players" who do not care in the least about the needs and suffering of the Afghan people but pursue their own selfish interests, nurture strategic designs and seek their realisation notwithstanding the death of innocent people.

This observation by the Iranian newspaper could be supplemented with remarks by the London-based FINANCIAL TIMES which pointed out that a whole number of countries—primarily Pakistan, as well as the United States and Saudi Arabia—manipulated the rebels in their own interest throughout the conflict in Afghanistan and particularly in recent months, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Those countries pursued different interests but they had one thing in common: Their interests not only failed to accord with those of the Afghan people but ran counter to them, too.

Herein is the main cause of the defeats suffered by the rebels, backed by those countries, in the fight against the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, including the failure of the latest coup attempt made in Afghanistan with direct support from abroad.

Two thirds of field commanders that were previously in opposition to Kabul discontinued combat operations, refusing to fight for alien interests.

Captured rebels that were involved in the bombardments of Kabul and other cities and residential areas of Afghanistan maintain that no one wants to fight and that they launched missiles only because they were forced to do so by advisers from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it became clear to many that the war was no longer a "jihad"—a "holy war" between Moslems and "infidels", as the opposition earlier portrayed it.

In this war Moslems are now killing one another in the name of the interests and ambitions of their leaders and those who patronise them and direct their actions from abroad.

It was reported, for example, that combat operations near Jalalabad alone involved more than 26,000 Pakistanis and about 2,000 Arabs.

Reporting the presence of foreign specialists and advisers among rebel forces, AL-SIYASAH newspaper, published in Kuwait, pointed out that there were hundreds of Americans, Pakistanis, Frenchmen, Germans, Britons, Belgians, Arabs and members of other nationalities among them.

A war is a war. Arabs fighting on the side of the Afghan opposition lost 185 men since April 1988. One can only imagine the casualties suffered by other forces fighting the Afghan government.

No one has ever succeeded in imposing one's own choice upon another people by means of war. The foreign "players" on the Afghan political scene have not managed to do this either.

The Afghans will have to determine their future themselves. They should be helped to do this at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

Video Emphasizes Human Cost of Coup

LD1303191290

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 13 March in its "Vremya" newscast carries a 2.5-minute video report from Kabul in which correspondent Aleksandr Shkirando reports on the human cost of the revolt led by Shahnawaz Tanay on 6 and 7 March. He begins by noting that the damage done to Kabul during the brief period of fighting "exceeded in scale all the destruction inflicted by the armed opposition during the past few years." As the video shows a slightly damaged and unmanned T-55 tank outside the Ministry of Defense building, with small sections of its roof missing and scorch marks on the exterior wall, Shkirando notes that this building served as the "plotter's headquarters."

Shkirando then reports from the Central Military Hospital where the corridors and halls are being used to accommodate the wounded; all beds were full even before the recent events. Civilians and hospital workers are providing blood for the wounded. Video shows the exterior of the hospital, followed by pictures of people standing with crutches or lying in hospital beds, and of a nurse giving blood. Major-General A.W. Qayumi, chief doctor at the hospital who is identified by screen caption, tells the correspondent that over 200 dead and wounded were recorded at this hospital alone. He condemns the Shahnawaz Tanay plot.

Against clips of an airport building with a sign saying "Kabul", a Soviet Aeroflot Il-76 transport plane is shown taxiing on a runway, and sacks marked "Gift of the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies" are shown being unloaded from an aircraft, Shkirando reports that an aircraft carrying Soviet medical aid and needed items had arrived at Kabul International Airport today.

Background to Coup Attempt Reported

PM1203174590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy report under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Coup in Kabul: What Actually Happened"]

[Text] Some time after midday on 6 March two knife-sharp white lines appeared in the bright-blue sky above Kabul—jet aircraft vapor trails. A few seconds later a deafening explosion shook the city center, and then another. This is how the March events in Kabul—which have been dubbed the "Tanay-Gulbuddin coup" by Afghans—began.

Allow me to introduce the protagonists of this drama. Shahnawaz Tanay, by now former minister of national defense of the Republic of Afghanistan and member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] Central Committee Politburo, unofficial leader of one of the "wings" of the party—the Khalq (Masses). A combat general and capable military leader, but also an extremely ambitious and capricious politician. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ringleader of the most active and best organized grouping of the Afghan political emigration which has entrenched itself in Peshawar (Pakistan), and until recently member of the "Alliance of Seven," from which he withdrew, unable to find a common language with his former "associates." He is a representative of a clearly defined wing of Islamic fundamentalists, devoid of any principles in political struggle, and notorious for his extremely brutal treatment of opponents and allies alike.

Two men occupying positions at opposite ends of Afghan society's political spectrum. What brought them together?

Let us begin with Kabul. The roots of the current crisis events lie deep in the history of the establishment of the PDPA, which was formed as a result of a merger of the two "wings" - the aforementioned "Khalq" and the "Parcham" (Flag). There were no substantial differences in ideological terms between the two factions. Strictly speaking, it was the unity of their political platform which made possible their unification within the framework of the PDPA. At the same time, acute intraparty contradictions of a "secondary" nature—or so it was thought—remained. They included interethnic friction (Pushtuns predominated in the "Khalq" membership, while "Parcham" was more "liberal" in this context, with Tajiks and representatives of other small nationalities playing an active part in it), and also tribal ties, and—probably most tragic of all—personal ambitions among the PDPA leadership. While during the notorious first stage of the April revolution, when Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin were in power, the Khalqis were most influential and set about diligently "weeding out" their Parcham allies from the party and state apparatus—until the tables were turned with the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in late December 1979 when power passed into the hands of the Parchamis in the person of Babrak Karmal, and the Khalqis were reduced to playing "second fiddle."

With the advent to power of Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, it seemed that the conditions had been created for achieving a real breakthrough in this respect, because he attached paramount importance to the practical rather than the notional achievement of the party's monolithic unity. The policy of national reconciliation was proclaimed—the only sensible way to achieve peace in Afghanistan's complex conditions. However, as became increasingly obvious, the contradictions had not been eliminated but merely swept under the carpet.

Afghanistan is a country of paradoxes. It would seem that the unity of the party's ranks should have been strengthened by the government forces' military successes on the battlefields at Jalalabad, Khowst, Qandahar, and Herat, the political bankruptcy of the Peshawar rebel ringleaders, and the tangible successes of the policy of national reconciliation, which had become an instrument for gradually winning over detachments from the bloc of opposition forces whose leaders had not lost their common sense and concern for the future of Afghanistan. And, strictly speaking, this is what happened. However, this did not suit a group of top-level army officers and a number of civilians in the Afghan leadership. Tanay and his associates perceived the policy of national reconciliation as a direct threat to their privileged position in wartime condition to put it bluntly. The prospect of the formation in the future of a broadly based government involving forces opposed to the regime spelled a decline in the role of the military and their fellow travelers. These people were afraid of losing their influential positions.

They continued to gamble on military might even in the new conditions which demanded greater flexibility. It is thought that hostility toward the peaceful method of untangling the Afghan knot became the very point of contact which brought together the extremists from Kabul and Peshawar. History is full of such examples.

Was Tanay "Hekmatyar's man?" I do not think so. However, the logic of the development of events in Afghanistan, which he found "unacceptable," his wounded pride, and his Bonapartist propensities induced him to switch to the side of those whom he himself regarded as the worst enemies of Afghanistan. And what is more, a man of unquestionable personal courage, he fled from his office in the Ministry of National Defense during the daytime hours of 6 March, abandoning his supporters to their fate.

I was near the Defense Ministry building after midday on the following day. We, a group of journalists, were not allowed very near—it was too dangerous. Bullets were whistling down Dar-ul-Aman, and you could hear the chatter of large-caliber machineguns and the explosion of shells. Subunits of government forces were quelling the putschists' last seats of resistance. Yet only the day before around this grand and somewhat somber building a real battle was being waged involving all sorts of heavy weapons, and tanks with assault troops aloft were rolling down Dar-ul-Aman. The defenders of "Tanay's citadel" were firing back indiscriminately, spraying the surroundings with shells, missiles, and mortars which fell on residential areas.

According to preliminary data, some 90 people were killed during the storming of the Ministry of Defense. Now it is all over, but there were moments when the situation in the city was critical. There is no doubt that Tanay and the top brass loyal to him were acting in accordance with a preconceived plan for a military coup and that Abdul Qadir Aqa, commander of the Afghan Air Force, played a prominent role in this venture. Airmen from the Bagram Air Base located some 70 km from Kabul who took part in the coup—some of them under duress—acted on his orders when they bombed the city center, dropping 34 high-explosive bombs. Neither Arg—the presidential palace—nor the radio and television complex sustained direct hits, but 56 civilians were killed and more than 200 wounded as a result of this senseless operation.

An important role in suppressing the mutiny in Bagram was played by tribal formations which blockaded the air base and issued an ultimatum demanding a halt to the raids on Kabul. Two fighter-bombers which ignored the warning were shot down during takeoff, and four were destroyed above Kabul by air defense systems. Toward the morning of 8 March, after a massive artillery barrage and missile strikes, troops loyal to the regime regained control of Bagram. Another air base in Shindand in the west of the country was blockaded by units of the 4th Corps, and its aircraft did not take part in the raids on Kabul. Mazar-e Sharif remained loyal to its duty. The situation on the ground was more complex. Tanay had clearly acted in a hurry; he seemed to have been very pressed for time. Therefore he was unable to make full use of the potential which was undoubtedly at his disposal. Nonetheless, more than 20 tanks were dispatched from Pol-e Charkhi, on the outskirts of Kabul, and a similar column was moving toward Kabul from the disposition of the 8th Division on the Paghman salient. They were countered by Ministry of Interior troops who in the course of the fighting were able to halt the armored advance. The mutineers lost a total of around 30 tanks, which largely determined the outcome of the coup.

Many people were concerned about how the situation would develop in the Afghan provinces, what impact the suppression of the coup would have on the general military-political situation. On the whole, the incoming reports can only inspire optimism—practically nowhere has the provincial military leadership denied Kabul its support. You get the impression that the Khalqis at local level have proved equal to the situation and have refused to support Tanay's ambitions.

And in Peshawar? The time factor also left its mark on the opposition armed formations' delayed reaction to the events in Kabul. The rebel leaders obviously proved unready for such a sharp turn of events. The latest, relatively large offensive of the armed gangs was rebuffed in Nangarhar Province 7 March, but there appears to have been no direct link between this offensive and Tanay's action. In other parts of the country a relatively stable situation prevails. Only the situation around Khowst is causing concern. About 10 days ago the rebels succeeded in capturing the commanding heights around the city and its airport, which have been under siege for many years, and this has considerably exacerbated the problems of getting supplies through to the defenders of this regional center. Aircraft losses sustained in putting down the coup are obviously also likely to impair the effectiveness of the bombing raids launched against advancing extremists. In short, Khowst has been placed in a most difficult situation, and the further development of events there is unpredictable. According to some reports, after fleeing to Pakistan Tanay is heading for the Khowst area, near where the tribe from which he originated is living. However, the question arises: What is the fugitive general going to command? It is doubtful that the leaders of the Peshawar parties will entrust the contingents of their fighters to him, especially since only Hekmatyar expressed support for Tanay, while the others decided to distance themselves from the leader of the failed coup.

Nonetheless, everything seems to support the assumption that Khowst, on whose capture the extremists have spent so much effort during the past year, will be at the focus of the development of events. The city's attraction is its airport, which could, even if only nominally, become the springboard for air raids against government troop positions and Afghan cities. The rebels have aircraft at their disposal and also pilots who have been trained in Arab countries. All they were lacking up to now was a "legitimate" bridgehead, since even Islamabad officials could not permit "mujahidin aviation" to take off from Pakistani airfields. Khowst airfield would provide them with this facility, even if it proves necessary to use Pakistani airstrips: After all, it is extremely difficult to prove where a specific aircraft on a bombing raid has taken off from.

If Tanay's action—futile though it was in terms of his own plans, and especially in terms of undermining the regime from within—nonetheless reflects differences in the political line of the party and its leadership, it has by no means smoothed over the contradictions in the camp of the Peshawar emigration but has, on the contrary, exacerbated them. The extremist circles of the opposition regard the former general as much of a "communist" as the other members of the Afghan leadership and believe that it is impossible to turn them into "good" Muslims, in their comprehension of the term. In their eyes Tanay is no more than a conspirator who has suffered a crushing defeat and who has no sphere of influence. As for the support offered him by Hekmatyar, it is a gesture which is, first, one-sided and, second, nominal and cannot be translated into anything substantive. There is no doubt about the fact that Tanay treacherously stabbed the party and all patriotic forces in the back at a moment when hopes for peace had begun to emerge. But was this coup capable of significantly affecting the prevailing balance of forces? The immediate future will tell, but I believe that the opposition will not be able to reap the fruits it was hoping for.

For two days the Afghan capital has been healing the wounds inflicted by the putschists. On 7 March I traveled down the avenues which run past the presidential palace and the radio and television complex. Churned-up asphalt, huge craters in the roadway, sidewalks littered with the branches of shrapnel-ravaged age-old plane trees—this is the picture the journalists saw. Today bulldozers and road rollers are out in the streets and repair work is under way on buildings damaged in the explosions. And wherever no damage is visible, life is taking its normal course. The streets are crowded with people, the street-corner stalls are doing a brisk trade in fruit and unwanted clothes, institutions and offices are working. The Orient remains the Orient.

Moscow Views Coup Repercussions

NC1203212890 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, reports reaching us from Afghanistan state that in the wake of the abortive military coup, the situation is gradually returning to normal. The government has complete control over the situation in the capital and in other provincial centers in Afghanistan.

Nearly a week ago, former Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanay attempted to stage an armed mutiny in Kabul. During those days fraught with tension in Afghanistan, the fate of the present Afghan leadership and its political policy was in fact decided. Today, when the first agonies of the (?rebellion) are over, we can calmly assess events in retrospect and draw conclusions.

It is obvious that the armed mutiny in Kabul was an acid test for the Dr. Najibullah government. This uprising was staged by the organized units of the armed forces led by their officers, and therefore their plot was terribly dangerous. The Air Force, some tanks, and some communications forces accompanied the rebels. In spite of this, the plot was unsuccessful, and its leader was forced to flee abroad. The strength of Dr. Najibullah's regime was once again certified.

Of course it cannot be said that this uprising served to strengthen the Kabul regime's stance. The contradictions between the Khalq and Parcham factions within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] were once again extraordinarily accentuated, and Kabul military facilities were appreciably harmed. We must not ignore all this. These are the facts today in Afghanistan.

In my opinion, however, the general results of Shahnawaz Tanay's plot were different. During the course of the uprising, the policy of exacerbating civil strife in the country more than before and creating rifts in the party and the Armed forces was defeated. It is absolutely clear that the former defense minister's coup would have culminated in abandoning the national reconciliation policy and extraordinarily escalating military operations in Afghanistan.

The PDPA and the country's Armed Forces were not prepared to support such a course of action. It is interesting to note that today, telegrams from military units, party, and social organizations are being sent to President Najibullah from all corners of the country. Those sending these telegrams condemn the plotters' criminal operations. In addition, the PDPA committee in Kabul had mobilized more than 4,000 of its members during the course of the abortive coup to maintain law and order in the city.

In my opinion, all these facts constitute eloquent testimony. The condition of the present Afghanistan regime is apparently quite durable from the political and military point of view. The quelling of the Shahnawaz Tanay coup was not without some repercussions for the opposition. Two days after the defeat of the plotters, two groups of armed opponents from Balkh and Laghman Provinces joined the government ranks.

The coup by the former defense minister elicited a different reaction in Peshawar. Even the extremists' ringleaders admitted they could not gain any benefit from this uprising to further their own ends. In general, the country's politico-military condition did not change. The president reiterated his policy of stopping bloodshed and initiating overall talks and national reconciliation.

As we know, Dr. Najibullah sent a message to Muhammad Zahir Shah, the former king, who had emigrated to Italy. In this message, it was stated that efforts should be made anew to seek a political solution to resolve differences in Afghanistan. The defeat of the Shahnawaz Tanay coup once again proved that any other path is futile.

Iranian Reaction to Attempt Noted

NC1203222090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The Iranian mass media have paid great attention to the events pertaining to the foiling of the attempted coup d'etat in Afghanistan. Several newspapers consider the coup attempt as a so-called proof of the lack of credibility and popularity of the present Afghanistan regime and even label the government as the fifth column. Our commentator writes in this regard:

In my opinion, the convening of free elections under UN supervision would be the best way of ascertaining the popularity of the interim government ruling over the political forces in Afghanistan. The regime of Dr. Najibullah, which is pursuing the national reconciliation policy and seeking to create conditions conducive to a broadbased coalition government, is also ready for this.

However, the irreconcilable opposition of Afghanistan insists, as before, on the usurping of the government by the use of force. The Afghan opposition is thus impeding efforts to find out who is more popular in Afghanistan, the interim government or the opposition. Wise judgement dictates that it is the politicians who command the support of the people and have bowed down to the wishes of the masses and are opposed to bloodshed and destruction. Let us say a few words about the fifth column. The opponents of Dr. Najibullah's government embarked on bestowing such labels on the Government of Afghanistan. Prior to the departure of the Soviet armed contingents, they succeeded, by conferring such titles, in misleading most of the people in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the extremists who were in the service of the Pakistani militarists and certain Western powers managed to disguise the antinational nature of their policy.

In the present circumstances, the use of such appellations seems inappropriate. In the course of more than a year, the Afghanistan regime has displayed its durability and strength in combating internal and external plots. In any case, certain facts have been divulged which reveal the presence of expansionist programs of the Pakistani militarists. For the attainment of these programs a prominent role has been allocated to the armed opposition. I am referring to a report by the director general of the Pakistani intelligence organization dated 1988, which fell into the hands of Afghanistan Government officials and was published in the KABUL TIMES newspaper.

In this report it was claimed that a vacuum had been created by the departure of the Soviet armed contingents from Afghanistan, and that this vacuum should be filled by Pakistan. The wishful thinkers of that country were imagining that this vacuum could be filled by toppling the present Afghanistan Government and installing a government in Kabul which would be prepared to agree to a confederation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The authors of this report assumed that Iran would be able to support such a confederation. Meanwhile, they expect the Soviet Union to concur with such a confederation in order to forge (?relations) with it. What can be said about the Soviet Union in connection with the emergence of such a (?situation) is that these calculations are absolutely baseless. The Soviet side has categorically backed the rights of the Afghans to forge their own destinies and rejects every proposal from abroad to swallow up Afghanistan.

However, Soviet social circles have found Iran's attitude in the face of all these phenomena to be an interesting one. How far are the hopes of the Pakistani militarists for Iranian support for their anti-Afghan plan justified? It appears that the present Iranian policy on Afghanistan's affairs may not justify the optimism of the Pakistani extremists. I hope that this policy will continue thus in the future as well.

UN Consultations on Afghan Settlement End

LD0803114590 Moscow TASS in English 1113 GMT 8 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations March 8 TASS—Two-day expert consultations on a settlement in Afghanistan ended at the United Nations Headquarters. They were attended by high-ranking UN officials as well as by a Soviet delegation led by Ambassador at Large N.I. Kozyrev.

During the consultations, the sides exchanged opinions on key aspects of an Afghan settlement, including an inter-Afghan dialogue, specific measures to be taken during a transition period, international consensus and an end to arms supplies to Afghanistan.

The discussion concentrated on a search for specific ways and mechanisms to stop the bloodshed and to establish peace on Afghan soil.

The sides agreed to continue consultations in April after an expert meeting between Soviet and American representatives on this problem.

The sides held the third round of consultations in New York. The first two were held in Moscow in December and January. They are being held in the context of the U.N. secretary-general's efforts to fulfil the U.N. General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan.

The secretary general's spokeswoman told journalists that Benon Sevan, Perez de Cuellar's personal representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan, will depart for Kabul late next week. He will make a stopover in Islamabad en route to Afghanistan.

Shevardnadze Fence-Mending Mideast Tour Mooted

PM1203132590 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 9 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Diplomatic Sources Tell AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Shevardnadze To Go on Arab Tour To Discuss Jewish Emigration"]

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Informed diplomatic sources in Cairo have told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the Soviet Union is currently considering the appointment of a roving ambassador in the Middle East, as part of efforts to intensify Soviet activity in view of the negative effects of Soviet Jewish migration to Israel on Soviet-Arab relations.

The sources said that over the past few weeks the Soviet leadership has received several reports from its ambassadors in Middle East countries on Arab reaction to the decision to allow the emigration of Soviet Jews and on the emergence of a trend advocating Moscow's exclusion from the peace process.

The sources added that Moscow is currently considering a number of decisions on Soviet moves to contain the effects of the emigration decision, including sending a Supreme Soviet delegation to the Arab states and sending Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on a tour of the Arab states in May.

Meanwhile, Washington has held some contacts with Moscow to enlist its support for the U.S. plan for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue and to ask it to urge the PLO to drop its demands regarding representation in return for international supervision of the expected dialogue through the two superpowers instead of just U.S. supervision, with senior officials from both states attending the opening session of the dialogue. This matter, the sources said, will be raised during Shevardnadze's visit to Washington next week.

USSR Protests Occupied Territories' Settlement

LD1303124790 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS—Arye Devin, head of the Israeli consular group in Moscow, on Monday was summoned to the Soviet Foreign Ministry where an official representation was made to him in connection with Israeli authorities' plans to use immigrants, including those from the Soviet Union, to populate the occupied Arab territories and to set up new settlements on them.

The recent statements by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir about Israel's interest in an increase in the number of east Jerusalem residents as a result of an influx of immigrants, and remarks by Housing Construction Minister David Levy about the preparation of 4,000 houses and apartments for immigrants in the West Bank of the Jordan are viewed in Moscow as a new confirmation that certain circles in Israel are deliberately violating the norms of international law and setting obstacles to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union urged the Israeli Government to immediately discontinue the policy and practice of populating the occupied territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip and to make explicit assurances that it will not use immigrants arriving in the country, including those from the Soviet Union, for these purposes.

'Arafat Cited on Soviet Resettlers in Israel

PM0803113190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Not a Step Backward"]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 7 Mar—We will oppose the Israeli occupation, despite the enormous and varied help given to Tel Aviv by the United States, Y. 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, stated Tuesday at a press conference in the Malaysian capital.

The PLO opposes any mass resettlements in Israel until the Near East conflict is settled, the PLO Executive Committee chairman stressed. The Palestinians are particularly concerned about the Israeli Administration's plans to settle immigrants in the occupied territories, particularly immigrants from the USSR. "When people talk about Jews' right to return," Y. 'Arafat pointed out, "they forget that Palestinians forcibly driven from their native land have the same right. Jews are entitled to emigrate, but we cannot allow them all to pour into Palestine, driving our the last Palestinians."

Palestinian Ambassador to USSR Interviewed

PM0903150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

["IZVESTIYA Interview" with Nabil 'Amr, Palestinian ambassador to the USSR, by A. Ostalskiy: "Palestinian Ambassador: 'We Are an Occupied Country'"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A few days ago Nabil 'Amr, Palestinian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, presented his credentials to A.I. Lukyanov. This was unusual in that Nabil 'Amr has been the head of the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Moscow for several years but his status has now been raised to ambassador level. Another unusual fact is that Nabil 'Amr is the only ambassador accredited in Moscow who represents a state that is not to be found on the world map...

[Ostalskiy] First, allow me to congratulate you on your new status as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the State of Palestine in the USSR. Do you believe that this has cleared up once and for all the question of the Soviet Union's recognition of the Palestinian state—after all, there was at one time considerable argument as to whether it is possible to recognize a state that has not yet been created...

['Amr] Thank you for your congratulations. The elevation of our diplomatic mission in the USSR to embassy level is not merely an event that relates to the sphere of diplomatic protocol; it is a step that brings the creation of a Palestinian state on Palestinians' native soil nearer. After all the Soviet Union is a great power which plays a special role in international life. I will not hide the fact that I am proud that I have become the Palestinian state's first ambassador to the USSR.

I believe the fact that you have given our mission in Moscow embassy status attests without any doubt to your full unequivocal recognition of the Palestinian state. It may not exist physically but the state's territory exists, as do the people, and the necessary elements of state structures have also been created. So, we are an enemy-occupied state.

[Ostalskiy] Many people are now saying that Soviet-Arab relations are experiencing difficulties; moreover they attribute this to one thing—the increase in the number of emigres leaving the USSR for permanent residence in Israel. Do you not think that, notwithstanding the reality of this problem for our relations, the problem nonetheless lies elsewhere, in the Arabs' suspicious attitude toward the changes in our country as a whole?

['Amr] In principle the entire problem is linked with the interpretation which Israeli Prime Minister I. Shamir put on the increased Jewish migration from the USSR. He proclaimed that "a larger Israel is needed for larger emigration," that is, he regards Jews from the USSR above all as "cannon fodder" for future wars, as an instrument for colonizing the Arab territories. Under these conditions naturally several "clouds" have appeared in Soviet-Arab relations. Both sides must find ways to overcome these disagreements.

As for general misgivings in the Arab world regarding the changes in your country, they may in fact exist. But this is above all linked with uncertainty over the essence of these changes as far as Arab public opinion is concerned. I think that there is a lack of complete clarity on this subject worldwide. But I want to stress in any case that these processes concern the Soviet Union itself and your country's people are naturally entitled to make their own choice. We would like most sincerely to wish the USSR success in this matter. What we Palestinians need is to find ways to address all strata of the Soviet people in order to explain the importance of the Near East for the USSR and this region's proximity to you—geographically, culturally, and so on. I believe that we have reached a qualitatively new level of mutual understanding recently. If disagreements emerge or something crops up that would damage our relations, we can always clear up and settle these problems via the appropriate channels. The idea of a delegation of Arab ministers visiting the Soviet Union has now been mooted, and in my opinion this is a constructive idea. After all this would not be an official or familiarization visit. It would create a new foundation for mutual understanding and the development of relations. But I also have another comment to make: I believe that the Soviet mass media should make greater efforts to explain the purpose of perestroyka and its aims abroad.

[Ostalskiy] As is well known, a government crisis has now blown up in Israel based on disagreements regarding the possibility of dialogue with the Palestinians. Do you reckon that the creation of a new government headed by S. Peres could be a step toward peace in the Near East?

['Amr] The Israeli Government is trying to play for time. There is a struggle between two ways of solving the problem of the intifadah—military and political. Many people in Israel are talking of the need to seek a political solution. However, I think that these are "words for export." Events on the occupied territories show that the emphasis in practice is still on military force. Israel's position and changes in it still depend mainly on the United States. If Washington does not exert serious pressure on Israel in favor of a peaceful solution, the Israeli Government, whoever leads it, Shamir or Peres, will not embark on the path of peace. We will continue to submit peace initiatives, but we will also continue the struggle against the occupation.

[Ostalskiy] My next question is a personal one. Tell us about yourself, please. How did you come to enter the Palestinian movement? What interests do you have apart from politics? Or are you a "man of iron?"

['Amr] I am 42 years old. I was born in the village of Dura near the city of Al Khalil on the West Bank of the Jordan. I received a higher legal education in Damascus. I entered the Palestinian resistance and spent time in prison for "political propaganda" in an Arab country. In prison I received further "political education" and joined the Palestinian revolution for good. I worked mainly in the field of culture, propaganda, and information. I entered the Secretariat of the Union of Palestinian Literary People and Journalists Secretariat. I have five children, who live and study in Jordan. During my free time I like to read, mainly Arab and Russian fiction. I like watching soccer matches and I myself engage in physical exercise. I love the movies. One that particularly stuck in my mind of late is the Egyptian movie "River of Fear." This is a talented production, which shows that fear is something that twists life, ruins creativity, and kills ideas.

TASS Cites Syria's President on Friendship

LD2802135290 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Damascus February 28 (TASS)—Our relations with the Soviet Union continue to develop in the established spirit of traditional friendship and stable cooperation, said President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, addressing deputies of parliament at the end of its current session. Nothing has changed in Soviet-Syrian relations, and all attempts to distort this fact will fail, he stressed.

Speaking about relations with socialist countries, the Syrian leader expressed hope that contacts with them would continue to be friendly and strong.

Syria's National Day Highlighted in Moscow

LD0803061190 Moscow TASS in English 2001 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—The Syrian March 1963 revolution under the guidance of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party has laid the beginning to radical social and economic transformations in Syria. This was said at a public meeting held in Moscow today to mark the national day of the Syrian Arab Republic—the Revolution Day.

It was noted that Syria has won international respect due to its principled stand in the fight against Zionism and reaction and its policy of peaceful settlement of the Middle East problems.

Syria's Ambassador in the USSR M.I. al-Na'ib made a speech at the meeting which was also attended by heads of a number of diplomatic missions accredited in the USSR.

Supreme Soviet Congratulates Iranian President

LD0203190590 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has sent a telegram to president Ali 'Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, congratulating him and his government on Iranian revolution day, a national holiday.

The telegram sends best wishes to the Iranian people and expresses confidence in the further development of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between the two countries.

In a reply telegram Hashemi-Rafsanjani expressed gratitude for the telegram and sent wishes for wellbeing and prosperity to the Soviet people.

Iranian-Syrian Coordination on Hostages Viewed

NC0803120790 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Our talk today is about the hostages issue or, more precisely, the problem of the hostages in Lebanon and, moreover, about the fact that this problem has now turned into a topic of discussion between Syria and Iran. These talks were carried out by Faruq al-Shar', Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq, and Mahmud Hashemi, a reliable envoy and the brother of the Iranian president.

Syrian official sources report that the discussions concerned coordinating efforts to free all the hostages who were taken by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon at various times. There are now 18 such hostages, eight Americans and the remainder from various West European countries, including neutral Switzerland. Many of them were plunged into their tragic situation several years ago, and there are facts in hand that cause doubts about whether they are alive or not.

The names and titles of various groups show that these groups are suprarevolutionary. But the issue is not one of names and titles. Everyone knows that these groups are supported by fundamentalist Islamic organizations which have greatly multiplied in the Arab world with Tehran's assistance. By stating with each assassination attempt against or murder of an American professor or an Italian doctor they are inflicting a heavy blow on imperialism and Zionism, these groups term their objectives extremely revolutionary. Thus, the continuous grounds for the use of violence are created—something which is seen in Lebanon more than anything else.

Even if we ignore the completely moral aspects of this issue, the situation continues to be one that permits the most reactionary forces in Israel, the United States, and Europe to capitalize on it. It seems that the fundamentalists are intentionally giving pretexts for aggression and attack and for fanning the flames of chauvinism in Israel and in other places.

The other side of the coin is the discrediting of Islamic thought. Throughout the world extremists and terrorists are described with Islamic adjectives. Because of what they are fed by the mass media, ordinary Americans and Europeans link Islam with violence. They do not know—and they are not willing to realize—the fact that Islam is one of the most tolerant of religions in the world, that Muslims have lived next to Christians, Jews, and Buddhists for years, and that Muslims have respected their religions and mode of life. It seems that a bunch of terrorists think that they can block the sun with their palm.

Finally, the pro-Iranian extremist forces apparently consider their main political duty to be the constant destabilization of the situation in Lebanon. This stems from the theory of exporting the Islamic Revolution. It is interesting to note that these forces completely ignore the fact that half the population in Lebanon is Christian. Incidentally, the Israeli leadership is also precisely involved, to the same extent, in destabilizing the situation in Lebanon. Thus, the two conflicting sides are acting in the same way; it is because of this that the remarks by some Iranian officials on the need to coordinate efforts for the release of the hostages appear to be surprising to a certain extent.

Soviet-Iranian Border Situation Examined

NC0803162990 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Review of the January incidents on the Soviet-Iranian border]

[Text] The situation in this area continues to be complicated. Despite decisions to facilitate border travel formalities, there are many cases of illegal crossings by Iranians into the Soviet Union and by Soviet Azerbaijanis. According to estimates, since January 1990 more than 100,000 Soviet citizens entered Islamic Republic territory illegally and more than 70,000 Iranians crossed the Soviet Azerbaijan border.

Most of these people crossed the borders for three reason: to meet with relatives, to see what life is like on the other side, and to make money by smuggling. All these people returned to their homes after a few days.

There are also people who fled in order to avoid punishment for crimes they committed. In late January, Mohammad Bayramov, head of the Dzhalilabad Branch of the National Front of Azerbaijan, fled to Iran with 2.4 million rubles that he had stolen from the residents. Some extremists and local mafia are also ensconced on

Iranian territory. Meanwhile, according to reports by the Dzhalalabad military command, there are still several thousand Iranians on Soviet territory.

What is usually taken across the border? Gold, cosmetics, perfume, Marlboro cigarettes, watches, and tape recorders are taken into Soviet territory. Tapes and watches cost 1 ruble in Iran. After the destruction of border posts, the Soviet ruble is being widely used in Iran's border villages and towns. Possessing Soviet money, the Iranians crossed the borders in groups and purchased many items in shops in Dzhalalabad, Pushkin, and other cities and villages of Soviet Azerbaijan. They bought large quantities of chemical consumer goods, electrical equipment, fabric, axes, sickles, rakes, buckets, and pots. Also, large quantities of foodstuff was purchased. As Iranians who have been arrested have explained, tools, plates, chemical consumer products, and fabric are extremely rare and expensive in the Islamic Republic because of the many years of war which harmed the country's economy.

Cannot Iranians understand what upsets their Soviet neighbors? The Iranians living on the border tell their Soviet neighbors in unison: You are living like khans. Border officials say that none of the Soviet Azerbaijan residents who have returned from Iran wanted to live in the Islamic Republic, even though their relatives insisted that they stay and promised to find them jobs. But the Iranians who entered the Soviet Union often requested the border officials to let them stay in our country.

All of these incidents have yet another side. Today, even the most essential goods cannot be purchased in the Pushkin and Dzhalalabad shops. Prices have risen sharply, all because of the illogical destruction of border systems. Recently, persistent requests are being heard that the border obstacles be revived and that order be established on the borders.

Drasokhov Receives Lebanon's Junblatt

LD1702164890 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Aleksandr Drasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Relations Committee, has received Walid Junblatt, leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party and prominent state and social figure in the Republic of Lebanon, who is paying a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

During the talks, Walid Junblatt explained the situation in Lebanon, and views were exchanged on the prospects of a settlement in the Middle East. Walid Junblatt was briefed on the USSR Supreme Soviet's activity and on the duties of the International Relations Committee.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ethiopian Students Hold Mass Demonstration 9 Mar

Appeal to Soviet Embassy

LD0903215390 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Addis Ababa March 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valentin Krukov:

A mass demonstration and a rally of students from Addis Ababa University was held outside the building of the Soviet Embassy here today.

The participants called upon President Mikhail Gorbachev to use all his international influence to help achieve a peace settlement to the internal problem of Ethiopia and help secure its independent and democratic future.

Students handed over a message to the Soviet Embassy, addressd to the Soviet president. It says that the republic faces a host of problems, including those generated by the destructive war and drought.

"Opposition groups, which are armed and encouraged by the well-known external enemies of Ethiopia, put the country on the brink of division," the message says. "The war has claimed thousands of lives and left a still larger number of citizens homeless."

"The economic infrastructure, which was build by enormous efforts over many years, is totally detroyed. The actions by spliter groups aim to undermine the Ethiopian Government's peace initiative."

"We call upon you as the leader of a great friendly country to use all your influence in order to put an end to the Ethiopian people's suffering," the message points out.

Students urged Gorbachev to influence the governments of those countries which, in their selfish interests, encourage, give backing to and arm opposition groups to wage war in Ethiopia.

Demonstrators carried posters reading "We support the Soviet Union's policy", "We need peace and a single country", "Hands off Ethiopia" and "Down with anti-popular groups which are responsible for the country's suffering".

Students from Addis Ababa University also marched past the embassies of the United States, Britain and several other countries, calling them to help Ethiopia put an end to the war.

Economic, Political Reforms

EA1203171690 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Last Thursday [8 March], Addis Ababa University students handed to the United States, USSR, and British Embassies letters in which they called upon these countries to intervene to end the civil war in Ethiopia. More details have been prepared by Maksim Yevgenyev:

Peace is of paramount importance to Ethiopians, especially in these days when disturbing news is being reported from the battlefields. In fierce fighting between the forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the government, Mitsiwa Port was destroyed and the Eritrean capital, Asmera, was cut off and besieged by the secessionists. Meanwhile, the Tigray People's Liberation Front is continuing its thrust towards the northern regions of Welo and Gonder, and has captured such towns as Debre Tabor and Adis Zemen.

Following the recent rebel attacks on the town of Asosa, in the west of the country, many peaceful people perished and a lot of damage was inflicted. The war is still causing grave effects to the country's economy. The civil war in northern Ethiopia has become an untold catastrophe to the whole nation. At the battlefields, people of the same nation get killed, and in the drought-affected areas people have died of hunger because food aid cannot reach them due to war.

Hopes for achieving national reconciliation were boosted after the public announcement of the outcome of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee session. The session approved a new economic order and reforms within the party itself, in addition to discussing security and development. The fundamental thing in the upcoming political adjustments is the plan which provides for the launching of a new party, namely the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party. The aim of this measure is to unite all patriotic and democratic forces in the country. Those who oppose the government can join the new party. These are the steps needed for the creation of a coalition government which could spearhead reconciliation efforts in the country. These steps mean inviting the opposition to talks and cooperation.

Discussions on a new economic order occupied most of the time of the WPE Central Committee session. This trend means a shift towards a mixed economy with different principles of ownership. It also emphasizes the importance of the market economy and entrepreneurship.

Workers and private enterprises, especially in agriculture, will be given rights and more chances. The political and economic changes which the government plans to carry out have been supported by the citizens. The new trends give fresh hopes for economic progress and the raising of the people's living standards. Nevertheless, these hopes can only work positively when durable peace is restored in Ethiopia.

Ethiopian Party's Reform Plans, New Aims Noted

PM1203101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent S. Demidov report: "Policy Changes"]

[Text] Addis Ababa—The 11th Plenum of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee has taken place. The plenum renewed an insistent demand that opposition groupings and forces respond to the authorities' appeals by ending the confrontation, bloodshed, and destruction and settling the conflict which is tearing the nation apart by peaceful political means around the negotiating table. The document says that "respect for the unity and territorial integrity" of Ethiopia remains the main guarantee of realizing society's expectations of well-being and prosperity.

A significant part of the resolution is devoted to economic and social problems. It is emphasized that "henceforth the country's social development will be based on a mixed economy," providing for the existence of a state and a private sector and a cooperative movement. State enterprises are to acquire management independence. All restrictions on the amounts of private and foreign capital invested in particular spheres of production are removed. Any Ethiopian citizen is permitted to participate, either individually or in association with others, in all areas of economic activity. As for cooperatives, they may be formed only on strictly voluntary, democratic principles.

One section of the document passed at the WPE Central Committee plenum is entirely devoted to the party itself. The document indicates that the party's "mission and functions" will be altered in response to the objective realities currently prevailing in the country. It will be renamed the Party of Democratic Unity of Ethiopia. It will adopt a doctrine whose aim will be "the creation of a new people's party embracing all Ethiopians irrespective of creed, sex, nationality, or class origin." It goes on to say that "opposition groups could be allowed to participate in the new Party of Democratic Unity of Ethiopia if they begin peace talks and if the Ethiopian people approve the talks' results."

Potovskiy Urges ANC To Slow Down Developments

MB0303161590 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Commentary by Igor Potovskiy on ANC National Executive Committee meeting in Lusaka 1-2 March—read by announcer]

[Text] The range of issues considered in Lusaka was rather wide.

The ANC national executive has decided to transfer its headquarters as soon as possible to Johannesburg.

General Secretary Alfred Nzo said the ANC will seek contact with Pretoria, with a view to organize the first direct meeting with President de Klerk.

It is yet unclear whether the ANC delegation to that meeting will be led by Nelson Mandela. Although Mr. Mandela has been elected vice president of the ANC, he says he will not necessarily perform as the delegation head. He observed, however, that, on the whole, the ANC's legal status is not the sole condition for the planned talks to be a success. The National Executive Committee reaffirmed that there is a number of such conditions.

International news agencies have called attention to the fact that the ANC's statement summing up the Executive Committee's session fails to define the organization's stand on the problem of armed struggle. Nelson Mandela maintains it all boils down to apartheid, rather than the armed struggle.

For the time being, the situation seems to be rather complex and contradictory. As it has repeatedly been noted, the ANC should either accept the pace of transformation in the country proposed by President de Klerk or lose the race.

However, judging by Nelson Mandela's statement in Lusaka, his stand remains to be tough: Until the reforms are made irreversible and until all conditions put forward by the ANC for talks about a new constitution are accepted, there should be no concessions to the government.

Practically, that amounts to a demand to preserve the sanctions and to adhere to a policy of an armed struggle and to be firm in evaluations of the future of the South African economy. Explaining his position, Mr. Mandela said that by placing trust in President de Klerk they should not think that the government as a whole is ready to accept the changes suggested by the president. All that requires pressure and not concessions.

This stands to reason, but there is always the reverse of the matter, and in this case it amounts to the following:

Many analysts believe that practically new measures could have influenced the conservative minded circles of the white population, apprehensive for their future. But, speedy relaxation in the current tensions, both inside the country and from the world community, would have been essential for (?them). The problem is serious not to be ignored. [sentence as heard]

That is why the president is interested in the fast development of events. He is still facing the task of reserving for himself the support of the white electorate. As a matter of fact, the ANC will not stand to gain either if the conservatives, who are critical of De Klerk, take the upper hand among the white population.

But, the circumstances have it that the ANC should not speed up the developments in the country at the present date, but on the contrary, it should slow them down. Time is needed to attain unity among the numerous black political organizations to determine and consolidate their position, otherwise talks with the government, in which not only the ANC is to take part, will be senseless.

The circumstances are shaping out in such a way that neither the government is now in a position to lift the state of emergency nor the ANC to reject the armed struggle, no matter how great the wish is to do it as soon as possible.

The only real way towards overcoming the contradictions (?tentatively) are talks, which, besides other things, will make it possible to fill the inevitable political vacuum.

Central Committee Greets Burkinabe Congress

PM0203105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greets Burkina Faso Party Congress]

[Text] To the First Congress of the Burkina Faso Popular Front

We greet the delegates to the First Popular Front Congress

We follow with interest your efforts aimed at consolidating national independence and the country's economic and social development. We advocate the strengthening of Soviet-Burkinabe cooperation and ties between the CPSU and the Popular Front.

We wish the congress fruitful work for the good of the Burkinabe people.
CPSU Central Committee

Tsirolov Previews Shevardnadze's African Tour

MB1103112290 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Mikhail Tsirolov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is to begin an African tour this month.

This trip is of great significance to African-Soviet relations.

He will meet with the leaders of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other countries on current African issues and bilateral relations.

The African tour follows an invitation to Namibia's 21 March independence celebrations. The Soviet Union played a role in attaining independence for Namibia under the UN settlement plan. The plan's success demonstrates the international community's interest in unity of purpose and cooperation in resolving regional problems. Diplomatic and political alternatives are preferred to military solutions.

Resolving the Namibian question, as well as South Africa's move away from hard line apartheid and efforts to adjust to the changing world situation, also help ease southern African tension. The positive change in international politics and Namibia's impending independence have affected some of the area states positively.

There are renewed hopes, though dim, for political settlements in Angola and Mozambique. The Soviet Union could play a part in encouraging national reconciliation in these countries but will not, in the process, look to benefit from that. The Soviet Union does not have vested interests in these countries or the region; all that it wishes to do is contribute to the forging of stability and trust for the benefit of the African Continent.

The South African situation might be one of the topics addressed on the tour. The Soviet Foreign Ministry is closely following the changes in South Africa, the minister said in Moscow. Nelson Mandela's release, the unbanning of antiapartheid organizations, and planned discussions between the government and these movements have radically changed the situation. The complete eradication of apartheid is still a priority issue, but reason indicates that this will not take place all at once.

The Soviet Union supports the ANC's quest for a democratic, nonracial, and free South Africa. The favored path toward this is political negotiation. More on Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Africa will be gleened through reports from on-the-spot Soviet correspondents based in Africa.

East Europe

'Enthusiasm' Greets Soviet Pullout From Hungary

PM1303154390 Moscow TRUD in Russian
13 Mar 90 p 3

[Correspondent A. Komrakov dispatch: "Troop Withdrawal Has Begun"]

[Text] Budapest, 12 Mar—Receiving and dispatching trains loaded with Soviet military hardware is nothing new for the Hungarian railroad station of Hajmasker. It is here, in the region of Veszprem, the site of a huge firing range, that military hardware was brought from all over Hungary for use in firing practice. But the 27 infantry combat vehicles loaded here today will be unloaded in a few days' time on platforms on Soviet territory. The first 130 servicemen of the motorized rifle batallion of the Guards' Budapest-Nikolayevsk Division are also leaving. The withdrawal of the Soviet units from Hungary began today.

The news of this event was received with great enthusiasm in the country. It is no secret that the presence of our troops here was one of the sources of tension in society. Opposition forces made use of this factor to pressure the government. There were also those who exploited it to inflame anti-Soviet feelings. As E. Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, said when signing the treaty on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary, perhaps we were somewhat late in concluding this agreement. But the treaty fully meets the two countries' interests and, in particular, accords with the Soviet Union's new defense doctrine and our country's desire not to have a single soldier on foreign territory.

The withdrawal of our troops from Hungary is planned in three stages: By the end of this year only 30 percent of the present 50,000 military servicemen will remain here; Offensive armament will be reduced first. At the beginning of next year there will be around 5,000 soldiers left, mainly employed in loading the vast stocks of equipment. That work is due to be completed before the end of June 1991.

Logistics of Pullout From Hungary Examined

PM1203122990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch under general heading "Flagged 'Urgent'": "Work to Agree the 'Mechanism' for Troops' Withdrawal"]

[Text] Budapest—The Soviet-Hungarian talks on complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary's territory, which have begun in Moscow, are widely covered by the Hungarian mass media.

Representatives of three parties—the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Union of Free Democrats, and the Union of Young Democrats—have been given observer status at the talks.

A series of newspaper articles describe the scale of transport operations which will have to be carried out between now and the summer of next year. The Hungarian side proposes that it should all be completed by 30 June 1991. It has already been announced that, in order to prevent bringing Chop Station "to a standstill," the freight will be transferred onto the wide-gauge track at Hungary's Zahony station. Almost 50,000 servicemen and 50,000 family members will have to be moved. The Soviet Southern Group of Forces, in contrast with the grouping in Czechoslovakia, has much more in the way of material backup. According to press reports, there are now 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled vehicles, and 1,500 infantry combat vehicles in Hungary. Materiel stockpiles (ammunition, fuel, and so on) amount to 560,000 tonnes. It will be necessary to organize 950 freight trains, 300 container trains, and 100 passenger trains. This means that between 20 and 26 different trains will be assigned and loaded daily.

Painstaking planning of transportation, high discipline, precision, a steady work pace, and coordination must right away be built in and provided for in the "mechanism" for the troop contingent's withdrawal. It will also be necessary to ensure the uninterrupted flow of "civilian" freight between the USSR and the Hungarian Republic. How can this be achieved? After all, Chop and Lvov Junction are also "flooded" by the flow from Czechoslovakia.

Poland's Miller on 'Political Score-Settling'

PM0903150890 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Campaign of Hostility"]

[Text] Referring to warnings from primary social democratic organizations in the Polish Republic, L. Miller, general secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, has reported on instances of civil rights violations against Poles who hold views and convictions differing from those professed by the dominant political forces and groupings.

He points out in a statement disseminated by the PAP agency that dissidence is increasingly becoming the target of an organized campaign of hostility and an excuse for refusing people jobs. People are labeled enemies of democratic reforms, and these tactics affect not only former members of the Polish United Workers' Party, but also other people who are falling victim to political score-settling. This violates the ethical and legal norms of public life.

L. Miller points out that the young Polish democracy needs every pair of hands and every creative mind. This conviction necessitates an appeal to all freedom-loving forces to unite in opposing the violation of fundamental civil rights and discrimination on political grounds. Assuring those subjected to threats and psychological pressure of his readiness to defend their rights and human dignity, the general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic Central Executive Committee declares the intention of the party of which he is one of the leaders, with this end in view, to take all necessary action to record such cases, to inform the public and international human rights organizations of them, and also to render all available assistance to victims.

Polish Concerns in German Unification Cited

PM0903120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[L. Toporkov dispatch: "Warsaw: The Border—Not a Subject for Discussion"]

[Excerpts] Warsaw—The Polish press is publishing a great number of comments from readers on the processes preceding the unification of the two Germanies. These are causing great unease here. [passage omitted]

This is what J. Onyszkiewicz, Polish Sejm deputy and chairman of the Citizens Parliamentary Club Foreign Affairs Commission, says in this connection:

"The process of the unification of Germany is simultaneously the process of European unification, and in this context it must be welcomed with hope. But it is the kind of hope that is accompanied by well-known misgivings. Will the process of unification be successful? Will it not damage our national interests? Hence our proposal on participating in the discussions on unification, so that our voice is also heard and taken into account during the discussions. This is not a problem of our national ambitions, but of our concrete national interests. Because the question of borders cannot fail to be raised. We hope that it will be taken off the agenda and that the nature of our present borders is not questioned. There must be a totally clear political declaration on this subject by the German governments or parliaments, which will become a testimony to the recognition of these borders.

"The next thing," J. Onyszkiewicz continued, "is the future presence of Soviet troops in East Germany. This directly concerns us, as the transport routes connected with them will cross Polish territory, where units serving them will consequently be stationed. This question must also be solved with our participation. Finally extensive economic cooperation exists between Poland and the GDR. How can it be allowed to break off? That means that this question cannot be resolved without us either."

The new party of left-wing forces, the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, has also expressed its position. In a special statement it connects questions of peace and security with the inviolability of existing Polish borders. It supports the idea that first of all commitments be made on guaranteeing these borders, and only then will the two Germanies be unified. Normal Polish-German relations require that no ambiguities, reservations, or the dubious burden of the past be involved here.

Full clarity is what the Polish side is aiming for. Meanwhile, successive statements coming from Bonn are perplexing Warsaw. The FRG chancellor is starting to put forward conditions, first returning to the problem of the "German minority" in Poland, on which an agreement was reached in fall 1989, and then to the question of "reparations" which, as is well-known, has not existed since 1953.

The impression of Bonn's position has been somewhat softened by the latest statement by H. Kohl, who was forced, through pressure from realistically-minded activists in the government coalition, to adjust his policy on the Polish borders—verbally for the time being. But Poland would like to know more specifically what will be done concretely to recognize these borders unconditionally.

Leaders' Concern Noted

PM1203144790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Interviews with W. Jaruzelski and T. Mazowiecki"]

[Text] Paris, 9 Mar—In an interview in the newspaper LIBERATION W. Jaruzelski, president of the Republic of Poland, has emphasized the need to find means to ensure collective security in Europe today. The interview was granted on the eve of the visit to France which the Polish head of state and T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers, begin today.

I would like Poland's Western partners to understand that a feeling of threat exists in our part of the continent, he pointed out, touching on the German problem. So we understand the USSR's concern, particularly as the Soviet Union remains the chief guarantor of our security.

In reply to the question "Can the unification of Germany be regarded as a positive fact for Europe as a whole and Poland in particular?" W. Jaruzelski said: "I cannot reply in the affirmative today, because this process is developing in an undesirable way... It has left the process of European integration far behind, with all the ensuing consequences."

According to the president, a distinction must be drawn between the presence of Soviet troops in Poland, on the one hand, and in Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other. Their presence in Poland is a consequence of World War II. In addition, he emphasized, it should not be forgotten that the western borders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are not in question, unlike ours. The Soviet Union is a very important element of Poland's strategic security, he declared.

In an interview in the newspaper LE MONDE the head of the Polish Government advocated the creation of a permanently functioning organization which would include all the CSCE participant countries, including the United States and Canada. Above all, the consequences of Germany's unification for its neighbors would be discussed in negotiations, he said. This question is of special significance for Poland and France. In addition, we expect France to support our desire to participate in the "two-plus-four" talks. Our intention to participate in the discussion of the terms for German unification, T. Mazowiecki emphasized, particularly strengthened after a certain ambiguity regarding our western border emerged in recent weeks.

We do not believe in the possible existence of a neutral Germany in the long term, the head of the Polish Government said. Events after World War I showed that certain obligations imposed on Germany can create animosity in that country.

MOSCOW NEWS Trial Issue Debuts in Berlin

LD0803160890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] A trial issue of the magazine MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI [MOSCOW NEWS] was brought out in German in Berlin today. It has an edition of 100,000 copies, and has been timed to coincide with the opening of the Leipzig fair.

An accord has been reached with GDR publishers to the effect that from 1 May onwards, the newspaper will be published every week.

I would like to remind you that under the GDR's previous leadership, the distribution of this newspaper in the country was banned.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Ends GDR Visit

LD0803121690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1845 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin, 7 Mar (TASS)—The traditions of friendship and cooperation that exist between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic were confirmed today during a conversation between a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation and Harry Ott, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the GDR, at the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The delegation of Soviet parliamentarians headed by Ivan Dyakov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been in the USSR for three days and met with Guenther Maleuda, president of the People's Chamber of the GDR, and with deputies of the People's Chamber. A mutual interest was expressed in the deepening of relations between the parliamentarians of both countries.

The head of the delegation of Soviet parliamentarians noted during a meeting with representatives of the central "roundtable" of the GDR that the the criterion for the Soviet side in the issue of unification of the two German states should be a guarantee that war should never again start on German soil. Therefore one cannot imagine that a united Germany would be integrated into NATO. The expansion of the military structures may give rise to great concern in the peoples of the Soviet Union. I. Dyakov expressed doubt as to whether such a solution could serve the interests of the German people and the implementation of its right to self-determination.

The USSR Supreme Soviet ended its stay in the GDR today.

Problems Raised by Slovene Decisions Viewed

PM1303141190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own Correspondent Ye. Fadeyev report: "Leaving the Federation? One Yugoslav Republic Changes Its Name"]

[Text] Belgrade—As is well known, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consists of six socialist republics and two socialist autonomous provinces. But now Slovenia is removing the word "socialist" from its name—the only one in Yugoslavia to do so.

This decision was unanimously adopted by delegates to the republican assembly (parliament) meeting in Ljubljana.

Generally speaking this was no surprise. The fact is that a similar demand was made by many Slovenian political parties during the election campaign here. Now it has been implemented by the three chambers of the parliament. Even so, this is, of course, just one of the surprises that Ljubljana continues to produce. There were the amendments to the republic's Constitution, which are contrary to the SFRY constitutional structure and upset the balance between the rights and duties of the republics and provinces belonging to the federation. Then there was the Slovenian communists' withdrawal from the LCY after the 14th (extraordinary) congress and the declaration of their own independent political organization with its own program, rules, and new name—the League of Communists-Party of Democratic Renewal. And now the change of the republic's name.

What will happen next? Separation from the Yugoslav federation? The delegates to the republic assembly have at least approved a declaration concerning the breaking off of economic ties with Serbia (PRAVDA has written about this "economic war" between the two Yugoslav republics more than once). It has been decided to independently take measures to ensure the economic protection of their republic irrespective of its commitments under federal laws.

At the same time the document adopted notes that Slovenia is not refusing to meet various commitments toward those republics with which it maintains normal economic ties. The declaration states: The Slovenian people's sovereignty can be strengthened by establishing the confederative status of the republic within the SFRY. Does that mean withdrawal from the federation? So the conflicts and nationalist outbursts in the Kosovo autonomous province, which have been "plaguing" all of Yugoslavia for 10 years now, are being joined by a new one—at the opposite end of the country.

The meeting between the leaders of Slovenia and Serbia, which was recently organized by decision of the SFRY Assembly and at the request of the federal government, has, by all accounts, not produced anything positive. As the mass media here report, in Yugoslavia, which seems to be moving tentatively toward the right path on the road of political and economic reforms, the aggravation of relations between Slovenia, the most industrially developed republic, and Serbia, the largest republic in territory and size of population, is diverting the country from the planned course of reforms. And everyone seems to understand that. Everyone is writing about Yugoslav unity as the main factor in the success of the reforms now being conducted. And now—Slovenia is no longer socialist.

Then what kind of republic is it, many observers are asking. And how is this to be correlated with the existing federal laws and the Constitution operating in the SFRY?

Slovenian Moves Seen Jeopardizing SFRY Unity

PM1303142390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov dispatch: "Slovenia: Confederation Proposed"]

[Text] Belgrade—The SFRY's mass media is once again full of commentaries regarding the future of the Yugoslav federation and whether it is possible to avert the threat that has arisen to the country's integrity as a unified socialist state.

The Socialist Republic of Slovenia's Republic Assembly once again provided food for new, alarming thought. However, the federal republic of that name no longer exists within the SFRY—that was the decision adopted at a joint sitting by all the Slovenian Republic Assembly's three chambers. On behalf of the Slovenian people (but by no means on the basis of a nationwide referendum) the deputies adopted a resolution to remove the word "socialist" from their republic's name forever.

The parliamentary session began with the ratification of new amendments to the republic Constitution and, following the latest change, Slovenia became a state "without ideological definition." All organizations and enterprises were instructed to eliminate from their documents, seals, signs, and so on on the republic's "abrogated" title before 1992. Why precisely this date? Because, local commentators point out, the "common European home" begins to operate in 1992 and an autonomous independent Slovenia wants to enter it with an uncompromising title. The new amendments to the Slovenian Constitution have once again clashed with the existing federal Constitution, moreover with its first two articles—since 1963 the country has been called the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—a voluntary association of peoples and their socialist republics. This association includes among others the Republic of Slovenia, which is also enshrined in the second article of the SFRY Fundamental Law.

But it was not only these amendments that provoked a new wave of alarmed comment within the country but also other decisions adopted by the Slovenian parliament and statements voiced at the session. Thus, deputies approved a declaration which henceforth allows republic bodies to disobey decisions by federal departments and bodies for the purpose of "self-defense of the Slovenian economy" if these decisions clash with republic interests. The Republic Assembly demanded that the SFRY Presidency make the relevant changes to the regulations governing the conduct of military service in order for Slovenian recruits to serve on "their" republic's territory. Deputies empowered the Republic Assembly president to send a memorandum to the leaders of neighboring friendly powers and European associations regarding the Republic of Slovenia's position in Yugoslavia.

The SFRY public are alarmed by the statement delivered by J. Knez, vice president of the Slovenian Republic Assembly, at the session. He proposed that preparation of a draft confederative treaty be begun immediately in order to present it as the basis of a new community in Yugoslavia and, if this proposal is rejected, a newly-convened republic assembly (after the spring elections) should think about further steps (bearing in mind that a decision to leave the SFRY may be adopted on the basis of a referendum)....

But this session also ended extremely unexpectedly—with a rally on the Italian-Austrian-Yugoslav border. The point is that the Slovenes disagree with the federal government's resolution on a new regime for guarding Yugoslavia's state border, saying that it "does not accord with the spirit of the time." The League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Renewal organized the protest rally on the border crossing in the village of Fernetici. At first the protest was voiced in a peculiar way—several hundred people sat down on... wet tarmac (we all saw this on Belgrade Television). They were set an example by Ciril Ribicic, a young man in a long, dark overcoat, who is chairman of the League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Renewal Central Committee. Afterward everyone got up and gathered in front of the microphone. The opinions of the "border orators" fully coincided with the opinion of the orators at the Slovenian Republic Assembly: Since we are all building a common European home, there is no point in reinforcing the state borders.

Karpov Receives Bulgarian Delegation Head

PM1303141390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 12 March V.P. Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, received L. Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation at the Vienna talks, at the latter's request.

Slovak Premier's Party Resignation Reported

PM1303122990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Slovak Head of Government Has Left Communist Party"]

[Text] Bratislava, 12 Mar—Speaking on local television, Academician Milan Cic, chairman of the Slovak government, has announced that he is leaving the ranks of the Communist Party. He gave as the reason for his decision the fact that, since he was recommended for the post of head of government by the Communist Party, he "has not managed to avoid suspicions of blind party obedience and discipline." This step is not connected with any interests or considerations of a careerist nature, M. Cic said, but is aimed at excluding any possibility of political speculations and suspicions.

As head of the Slovak Republic's government of national consensus, he stressed, in this complex period before the election I am fully determined to steer the government ship through all the underwater rocks toward a pluralist democratic society.

CTK news agency recalls that M. Calfa, chairman of the CSSR Government, V. Komarek, first deputy chairman of the government, and V. Dlouhy, deputy chairman of the government, had also previously left the ranks of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Aboimov Speaks on Soviet-East European Ties

90UI0380A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No. 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 5

[Interview with USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Aboimov, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov: "We Are Neighbors and Allies Like Before"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Our correspondent D. Makarov talks with USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Aboimov about problems of our mutual relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

[Makarov] Ivan Pavlovich, how were relations built between the USSR, on the one hand, and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, on the other, during the Stalin-Brezhnev era?

[Aboimov] Immediately following the conclusion of World War II, there was a striving on the part of our country, understandable and justified from the point of view of the criteria of that day, to guarantee its security. The fear that a third world war would break out was too great—American troops continued their presence in Western Europe and the "cold war" era set in. The creation of our own kind of "security belt" therefore satisfied the logic of that time.

[Makarov] In other words, you are saying that the new regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe were formed with our participation?

[Aboimov] Actually, yes. Naturally at that time no national consensus could exist in these countries in favor of a socialist option. And it is not by chance that the initial stage of development of people's democracy in these countries to a certain degree took into account such factors as specific national features and traditions (preservation of elements of private property, a multi-party system, etc.). However, such characteristics were later reduced to practically nothing, and their presence took on an increasingly formal nature. With our influence there was a gradual rejection of national paths of development and a shift to complete uniformity in the methods of building socialism. As a result this led to copying the model of socialist construction which had developed in our country. It is not strange therefore that many saw this as being externally imposed. All traditional ties between the East European countries and the rest of Europe were severed.

[Makarov] What do you see as the main reasons for such a sharp turnabout of events in Eastern Europe in 1989?

[Aboimov] For many countries the selected model of development was alien and did not conform to their specific national features. Additionally, it turned out to be ineffective in a political as well as an economic sense. This in turn led to a divergence between the proclaimed lofty goals of socialism and the quite modest achievements the peoples of these countries were comparing with what they saw in the neighboring West European countries. And, unfortunately, this comparison turned out to be far from favorable to the socialist countries. In economic competition with the West they found themselves among the most poorly developed European countries. Stagnation in economic development, a drop in the standard of living, and the absence of broad democratic freedoms evoked the growing discontent of the population and led to crisis, resolution of which became virtually inevitable.

The qualitative changes occurring with us also exerted a certain influence.

[Makarov] Doesn't it seem to you that the manifestations of anti-Sovietism taking place today in the East European countries are to a significant extent the result of our policies with respect to these countries?

[Aboimov] I don't think it is all that simple. This phenomenon has historical roots as well. If we consider Russia's participation in three partitions of Poland, in suppression of the 1848 revolution in Hungary—all of this could not help but have a certain influence on the historical consciousness of the peoples of these countries.

[Makarov] But wouldn't you agree that that very same Russia liberated Eastern Europe from Fascism?

[Aboimov] Yes, and the gratitude of its peoples for this has been great. But with the passage of time, other emotions became interwoven in our relations along with the feeling of gratitude. Some still keep alive the memory of instances of USSR intervention into the internal affairs of these countries, such as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968; others are thinking about all the economic and other troubles their countries are going through, and how these are directly linked with our country, or with the "coordinated policy" we have pursued. And although today our policy toward these countries is built upon a fundamentally different basis, these phenomena will still apparently make themselves known over the course of time. Unfortunately, the forms they acquire are sometimes extreme. But we make an appropriate assessment in these instances.

[Makarov] It is an amazing thing—our people have been convinced all these years that the East European countries were "getting fat" at their expense, while the people of "the fraternal countries of socialism" were convinced of just the opposite.

[Aboimov] Let me begin with the latter. Indeed, there is the opinion among the population of these countries (and it is widespread, unfortunately) that an economic cooperation based on unequal rights has taken shape between our countries, and that the Soviet Union is allegedly obtaining significantly greater benefit from this cooperation than her partners. Such assertions are more than unfair.

Today, when we have set ourselves the task of shifting to a new system of accounting in foreign trade on the basis of world prices and using freely convertible currency, our partners tell us this is not advantageous to them. A few economists have calculated that the very first year would bring us a gain of at least $10 billion.

[Makarov] Well then, forgive me, but the question arises—have we up until now been engaging in trade at a loss out of "fraternal feelings"?

[Aboimov] Here, too, we must not take such a simplified approach. As you know, trade is never entirely equivalent; nonetheless, it can be considered advantageous. For example, we have received and continue to receive from these countries a great deal of production we require, which we might not always be able to obtain even on the markets of the capitalist countries.

One may even encounter the views that here, as it were, we are shipping exclusively hard-currency goods to Eastern Europe—petroleum, gas, and timber, for example, which could be successfully sold also in the West for better quality production.... To a certain degree, of course, this is so, but I am convinced that were we to suddenly put our raw material products on the capitalist market, selling them would not be all that simple.

[Makarov] All the same, it follows from your response that, although we are not trading with our neighbors at no benefit, we are nonetheless trading at a loss. Could one say that this system of foreign economic ties is explainable by the desire to obtain certain political dividends in return?

[Aboimov] Without a doubt, decisions made in the sphere of foreign economic relations carried with them some degree of political motivation. This cannot be denied. It is for precisely this reason that we are now about to review the practice of economic cooperation within the CEMA framework, and intend to transform its basis to one which is truly mutually beneficial.

[Makarov] The anti-Sovietism of some East Europeans proceeds not only from the feeling that their "big Russian brother" is robbing them, but also from the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of a number of countries. Recently we observed protest demonstrations on this account in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. You are heading negotiations concerning the removal of Soviet troops from these countries. What stage are these negotiations in?

[Aboimov] I would like to emphasize right away that our forces stationed in these countries are not interfering in their internal affairs. The strictest injunctions are in place in this regard. The training exercises and troop movements conducted, however, apparently cause certain problems. Regarding negotiations on the removal of troops, these have begun at the initiative of the governments of these countries, and the Soviet Government has given its consent to this, taking into account the positive processes which are presently underway in Europe and the world in general.

[Makarov] How many troops do we have in Czechoslovakia and Hungary as of 1 January 1990?

[Aboimov] Today we have 73,000 Soviet soldiers and officers in Czechoslovakia, and in Hungary—50,000.

[Makarov] Is there any disagreement between our countries on the matter of withdrawing Soviet forces?

[Aboimov] On major issues, no. The only point of discussion is coming to agreement on an acceptable time framework. The Czechs are seeking withdrawal of Soviet forces by the end of 1990. I will say quite frankly that the time considerations proposed by the Czech Government are extremely tough on us, and difficult to realize in practical terms.

The fact of the matter is that relocation of such a large number of troops requires serious preparatory effort. In addition to organizational-technical measures in this regard, a great role is being played by the social factor related to people's fate. For example, 11,000 families of officers and warrant officers serving in Czechoslovakia do not have housing in the USSR. This requires time. Time is necessary to build homes, schools, and children's facilities, in short—to create the necessary infrastructure.

[Makarov] Who is paying for the presence of our forces in the Eastern European countries?

[Aboimov] The presence of our forces there is being paid for entirely by the Soviet side, on the basis of agreements with these countries currently in effect.

[Makarov] How do you see prospects for the development of future relations with Eastern Europe?

[Aboimov] Our fundamental relationship with them is determined by the fact that they are our neighbors and allies. In the new environment, the focus of our cooperation will apparently be shifting more and more towards the inter-state sphere. Although inter-party relations retain their significance, they are no longer the tuning fork of all our mutual ties.

Respect for sovereignty, and not intervention, taking mutual interests into account, and acknowledging the right of the people of every country to choose their own path of development—these principles must become the determining factors in our relations.

We, for our part, will build relations in such a way that the East European countries can be convinced of what is most important—that relationships as allies of the USSR will not block their path to independent development, and that the Warsaw Pact is not a method of maintaining Soviet hegemony but rather a necessary means of preserving stability in Europe until new structures of security are established there for protecting the common European home.

West Europe

Akhromeyev Warns About Troops on GDR Territory

AU1303130290 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] The Soviet Union does not consider the FRG Government's mere promise not to deploy Bundeswehr troops on the territory of the current GDR after unification sufficient. Marshal Akhromeyev, military adviser to party-state leader Mikhail Gorbachev, said in an interview for the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI today that the USSR would not even get the necessary guarantees if NATO were to make a statement to this effect. Akhromeyev stressed that a unified Germany should neither be a member of NATO nor of the Warsaw Pact. Much rather, a solution would have to be found under which a unified Germany would be integrated into an organization which would be neither an adversary of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, Akhromeyev said.

FRG's Momper Stance on Unity 'Contradictory'

PM0603095790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Ye. Korolev dispatch under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment": "West Berlin: The Mayor's Contradictory Stance"]

[Text] Berlin—West Berlin's Governing Mayor Walter Momper visited the United States this week, where he met with President Bush and a number of other leading politicians. In the course of the visit Momper proposed holding a conference of CSCE countries this year in Berlin.

In Momper's opinion the process of restoring German unity is taking place extremely rapidly. The dynamics of this process, the governing mayor believes, are determined not by politicians or governments but by people in the GDR, the economic and ecological situation in that country, the population's supply situation, and the flood of refugees. The desire for unity is motivated not by national but by socioeconomic factors.

Momper believes that the two German states will reach an agreement very rapidly after the elections to the GDR People's Chamber 18 March on the ways to state, economic, and social unity. He stressed the importance of the accords secured in Ottawa on holding talks on the German problem involving representatives of the four victorious powers and the two German states. Momper sees this as the beginning of partnership on security problems in Europe.

The governing mayor set out his security concept in the United States for the transitional period following the unification of the two German states and prior to the creation of a peaceful all-European order. Momper's plan envisages, in particular, that all the territory of a united Germany would be included in NATO but the North Atlantic bloc must not extend its influence to the territory of the present GDR, where the same number of Soviet troops would remain as there are U.S., British, and French troops on the territory of West Germany and West Berlin.

In his opinion, a conference of CSCE countries in Berlin would be the next "logical step" in resolving the German question. In this connection he criticized the position held by Chancellor Kohl, who is avoiding giving an answer on recognizing the Oder-Neisse border once and for all, which will damage the process of the two German states' unification. The governing mayor reckons that accords guaranteeing current European borders must be secured at a summit conference of CSCE countries.

Momper assigns Berlin a key role in questions of the two German states' unification. However, Berlin elections must, in his opinion, only be held at the final stage of unification.

Momper believes that the political unification of Germany is possible this year.

Despite a whole series of quite reasonable proposals, the contradictory nature of Momper's position is quite obvious. On the one hand, he quite rightly speaks of the European peoples' well-founded misgivings regarding the unification of the two German states, on the other, he advocates the inclusion—although he he has reservations on this score—of a future united Germany in NATO, which would naturally upset the military-political balance in Europe.

Problems of Rapid German Unification Viewed

PM1303155190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Ye. Bovkun dispatch under the "German Question" rubric: "Bonn: Unscheduled Train"]

[Text] Bonn—During the latest Bundestag debate over the German question someone uttered the phrase: "German unity is rolling on like an unscheduled train." By speeding up the process of German unification, history itself may indeed seem to be, as it were, transferring it to different, extra-European dimension and it may indeed seem to be taking on a life of its own. The Germans' subjective and understandably human attitude to the longed-for goal has however come into conflict with the objective precondition—the elimination of the German split must be built into the all-European process.

But a family discussion is one thing: On meeting after a long separation, relatives become oblivious to those around them. It is a different matter in politics: Statesmen must remember their neighbors in all situations. When the words "we (the Germans) have no need of a midwife" escape from the federal chancellor's lips, when a clear guarantee of the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border virtually becomes off-limits for some conservative leaders, when Article 23 of the FRG Constitution—which discusses the extension of its application to other parts of Germany—is proclaimed a crucial legal condition for unification, you begin to think that the pace of the process is more important than the end result for some of the Bonn ruling coalition, at least for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] leadership.

The impression is intensified by the public arguments put forward by one of H. Kohl's advisers: The key to German unity, which used to repose in Moscow, is now in Bonn; the chancellor has brought it there.

People here have thought for a long time that securing Moscow's official agreement is worthwhile—then the way to unity would be open, and somehow we will reach an agreement with the allies. The real situation is much more complex.

The four powers retain collective responsibility for the future of all Germany. People in East and West now have no objection either to the direction which the train of German unity is taking or its destination. There are still prejudices regarding the role of a united Germany (incidentally, they are stronger in Western capitals). But the main thing that alarms its neighbors in the West and in the East is the schedule. They are not indifferent as to how and at what (or whose) expense the Germans are to unite.

People in Bonn are hurrying events along. The Christian Democrats would like to break the finishing tape if not straight after 18 March, when elections are to be held in the GDR, then at least before 2 December, when the Bundestag elections are scheduled to take place.

The supporters of German unification are hoping that obstacles are easier to skirt while accelerating. There are in fact more and more problems: Both in domestic and foreign policy.

Germans from the FRG and the GDR understand one another well in everyday life and display mutual concern. People willingly help out a "Trabant" driver who has lost his way in Bonn's narrow streets. But the thicker the flood of migrants, the more frequently polls record such qualities as "social envy" on the one hand and "conceit" on the other. Some Laender are no longer accepting refugees from the GDR or are restricting payment of grants to them. By the end of the century the number of newcomers will have reached almost 2 million. Where will they live? They are currently being housed in sports halls, swimming baths, and even in prisons. Many are still without work.

It has been estimated that 1.5 million unemployed cost the well-off FRG citizen 10 percent of his annual income, while 3 million will cost him 20 percent. Yet the army of unemployed could number 6 million in a Germany that is united at an accelerated pace.

If the "social alliance" (a package of measures aimed at closing the gap between GDR and FRG social structures) began to operate tomorrow, Bonn would urgently need 9 billion marks (DM) just for the program to combat unemployment in the GDR. Economist P. Z. Martin set the total cost of unification at DM1 trillion.

The difference in the FRG and GDR populations' standard of living is now, according to experts' estimates, 100:40. In order to halt the flood of refugees to the West the ratio must be reduced to just 100:60. This cannot be achieved by social grants. They would cost a fantastic sum of between DM50 billion and DM140 billion. Some DM3 billion would be needed just to raise pensions in the GDR by DM50 a month. In simplified form the Bonn Cabinet's plan looks something like this: fewer benefits for the migrants, more for those who remain in the GDR. But can the social security system be changed retroactively especially in the short term? Sociologists are convinced that it will take several years to marry the systems together.

The recipe for industrial unification is difficult. Setting up joint eterprises is one thing, changing the structures of ownership is another.

Major industrialists are not pushing claims for the return of their former possessions. They are willing to forgo these for the sake of unification. The leadership of the union of lobbyists, which is defending the interests of former private owners in the East, intends to "put a brake" on its members in order "not to destroy the will for unification." This will possibly be successful. Especially since the FRG Government has already paid out DM5.5 billion prior to 1989 for the property they lost on the territory of what is now the GDR.

Major industrial and financial capital and the overwhelming proportion of middling entrepreneurs are reluctant "to create new injustices" in the name of the law. Their high level of prosperity and the prospect of new markets guarantee their honest intentions. But what about those who have neither, who can be distinguished by their egotistical interests, and who have, so to speak, had a "raw deal"?

They are already demanding the return of their former riches. They include craftsmen, peasants, smallholders, impoverished holders of distinguished titles. What role are they to play in the social stratification of a new Germany?

Everything depends on politics. He who wins the Bundestag elections will shoulder the practical tasks of unification. E. Noelle-Neuman, leader of the Allensbach Public Opinion Institute, put forward the following argument: If the desire for social justice prevails among voters, the Social Democrats will win; loyalty to a market economy and to the slogan "Freedom Instead of Socialism" would mean success for the current CDU/CSU-Free Democratic Party (FRG) coalition.

Despite my respect for the experience of people who study public opinion, I cannot believe that the population's sympathies and sentiments will be distributed in this way. According to this selfsame institute's polls, many people in the FRG believe that freedom is possible (43 percent) and a market economy can function effectively under socialism. In other words almost half of the population see no contradiction between the concepts of "freedom" and "socialism." True democracy and socialism are quite compatible in the minds of most of the FRG's inhabitants.

I do not rule out the possibility that Germans in a united Germany will also decide to change the structures of power and intensify the independence of the Laender. The proposal of J. Fischer (Green party) to reinforce the president's power by having him elected on a national basis met with an interested response in various political circles. I would remind you that the president is obliged during his term in office to hold himself aloof from the parties. Considering R. von Weiszaecker's supreme prestige in both parts of Germany, broadening his powers would mean the state power being less dependent on political parties.

R. von Weizsaecker himself, incidentally, does not share the confidence that the authors of the Fundamental Law made provision for Article 23 should unification come about. The constitution was conceived as a temporary document. The preamble also speaks of the arrangement of a state system for the transitional period. The FRG Constitution has undoubted merits. The GDR's inhabitants are entitled to judge this. Yet Bonn is also in a hurry with political unification. Once again an unscheduled train is being dispatched.

What place will a united Germany hold in the life of the continent? What will its foreign policy concepts be like?

The top brass and some of the CDU/CSU leadership object to changes in the military structures of Western Europe. Positions are even tougher on the extreme right wing among the conservatives: They want to leave open the question of Germany's eastern borders. Liberals and Foreign Minister Genscher are in pragmatic mood. H. Kohl must be at the center of the coalition boat to maintain balance. The result is a foreign policy course that provokes criticism among the opposition and concern abroad. Let us just compare the last mentioned facts.

In insisting on a united Germany's membership of NATO, the Christian Democrats are accommodating U.S. wishes but are throwing the U.S. Congress into disarray over the pace of unification. Other allies, reassured by the assurances that Germany does not aspire to the role of an economic colossus, are beginning to grow jumpy owing to the "currency union" with the GDR and the possibility of the prestige of the German mark being undermined.

Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg intends to extend NATO activity to all Germany, including the GDR, and site the FRG's Armed Forces there. He does not believe in new security structures after the close of the Vienna talks. Genscher proposes a compromise: He proposes not extending NATO to the East and not siting NATO or West German units there. The chancellor is not exerting his influence although he does, presumably, share Genscher's views.

The foreign minister is proceeding on the premise that both great powers—the United States and the USSR—decided in Malta to move on from confrontation to cooperation between the military alliances. NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be elements in a future security structure in Europe. Genscher's stance is supported by the liberals' leadership and also meets with understanding from the Social Democrats. CDU/CSU leaders prefer to talk of NATO's stabilizing role in the past.

How is it to be justified in the future? Former defense minister R. Scholz surmises that the danger may emanate from the south, from Iraq. WELT AM SONNTAG names Munich as the possible target of Iraqi missiles. Admiral Wellershoff, general inspector of the Bundeswehr, alluded vaguely during a televised debate to a threat from "other" continents. Which? There was no reply.

Authorities with no links with military duty are freer with their opinions. General Schmueckle, former NATO deputy supreme allied commander Europe, made an interesting proposition in DER SPIEGEL: Create a new Euroatlantic defense system involving the USSR to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He finds it unnatural that both sides' politicians and military men socialize in an unconstrained manner and at the same time belong to antagonistic blocs.

We would agree that the NATO leadership had little time to adapt its policy to the pace of development of inter-German relations. Perhaps that is why the FRG military leadership is in no hurry to support the idea of the transformation of the structures of the Western alliance. The question of the forms of NATO membership is still the subject of disagreement between the government and the opposition.

Progress is the bringing of utopias into being, Oscar Wilde said. If the unification of Germany, which seemed like utopia yesterday, occurs without detriment to its neighbors, that will represent undoubted progress, a common achievement for all Europe. A new Germany may be a model for future East-West relations free from confrontation, enemy images, and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls lists. It is only necessary to ensure that the train of German unity moves toward its destination without deviating from the European schedule.

Solton Comments on German Unification Issue

LD1303040190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] The German question will dominate European affairs this week. Political consultations on all levels are continuing in connection with the prospects of German unification. Sunday the 18th will see general elections in the German Democratic Republic, which will probably determine a new line-up of political forces in the country. The four-plus-two mechanism will start working in Bonn on Wednesday. It will involve experts from the USSR, the USA, Britain and France, members of the anti-Hitler coalition, as well as from the GDR and West Germany. They will discuss the various aspects of German unification, including the issue of security for the neighboring countries. Now what is Moscow's vision of all these problems? Yuriy Solton comments and this is what he writes:

In my view there will be no grounds for concern if German unification helps overcome the division of Europe, not cause confrontation that would blast the positive trends gaining momentum there. It wouldn't be wise to use impudence in such matters, said Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recently. A step-by-step approach is necessary here. The process of German unification should be synchronized with the changes occuring in Europe. It is already clear that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Treaty Organization are likely to preserve their old shape. The transformation of the two military blocs into political alliances is already in progress.

There are reasons to hope for success at the Vienna talks on large-scale cuts in conventional forces in Europe. Besides, many countries have agreed in principle to convene already this year another summit meeting on European cooperation, to be attended by the United States and Canada, where attention will be focused on the problems of European security.

If the process of German unification becomes a part of the process of European rapprochement, this will lift the anxiety of European nations which are feeling concern as to the possible behavior of a unified German state. It would be (? last of all) to state its legal international status, including the borders, in a peace treaty that was never signed after the defeat of the Nazi Germany. [sentence as heard] In the meantime, the responsibility for Germany, for the need to prevent its territory from being a source of the war threat, should be borne by the four powers, as it was determined by the relevant international agreements. This is why it's essential to put into operation as soon as possible the four-plus-two mechanism in whose work the Soviet Union will take the most active part.

Kohl's Campaigning at GDR Election Meetings Hit

PM0803204190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "Behind Their Back or in Front of Their Face?"]

[Text] Berlin—As the elections to the GDR People's Chamber get closer, more and more election rallies and meetings are being held in the country's cities. At these events parties and public groupings are acquainting the population with their programs.

However, voters find it impossible to discern the image of certain parties. Speeches at their events are not being delivered by new GDR politicians but by prominent guests from the FRG who are providing them with support.

This applies above all to the members of the "Union for Germany"—a bloc of three right-wing parties. Using a set phrase, you could say that the West German CDU-CSU [Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union] bloc is behind their back. However, you would immediately have to correct yourself by saying—or rather, in front of their face. The image of the political leaders of the "Union" is obscured by the figure of FRG Chancellor H. Kohl. It is he who features as the main speaker at the election rallies of the GDR right-wing bloc. Reportedly, he intends to do so on at least five occasions.

It is difficult to imagine anywhere else a situation where the head of government of one state interferes so unceremoniously in the election campaign of another state. Especially if these countries have concluded a treaty which recognizes their sovereignty and indpendence and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs.

However, this does not stop the federal chancellor. He does not even deem it necessary to inform the GDR Government about his trips to the country.

In the changed international conditions both German states are steering a course toward unification; however, there is a long way to go before this is achieved. Even the procedure within the framework of which this process will take place has not yet been defined. Yet the head of the federal government seems to think that the treaty on the basic guidelines for relations between the GDR and the FRG can already be ignored. The chancellor is conducting his own election campaign on GDR territory.

In doing so he is flouting the decision banning speeches by West German politicians at election meetings in the country which was adopted by the "roundtable" representing 16 GDR parties and public groupings. The disrespectful attitude toward the pronouncement of the "roundtable" has evoked the indignation of many people in the GDR.

Special caution, circumspection, and tact are required from both German states and their leaders on the unification issue. There is nothing to reproach the GDR with in this context, but the behavior of the FRG chancellor as displayed on the territory of the GDR is hardly compatible with these qualities.

Call to GDR Voters a 'Provocation'

PM1203120390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "Unceremonious Interference"]

[Text] Berlin, 10 Mar—Many people were, to put it bluntly, stunned by the words uttered by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl from the rostrum of an election campaign rally in Rostock. When traveling abroad, eminent statesmen usually strive to make considered and cautious statements. But the West German chancellor evidently decided not to burden himself with superfluous conventionalities.

This was not the first time he had appeared on GDR territory without its government knowing about it and addressed a rally as if he were in one of the federal laender rather than in another independent state. His speeches are not distinguished by restraint or caution. But this time he outdid even himself in Rostock. H. Kohl called on voters to "overthrow the Communist bosses."

It is impossible to perceive the chancellor's call as a serious argument promoting his political views. While on GDR territory, H. Kohl engaged in unconcealed provocation without even trying to observe the proprieties.

The FRG chancellor's statements on questions associated with the unification of the two German states are earning increasingly sharp appraisals in the West. In this context, SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Chairman H.-J. Vogel described H. Kohl as a "risk factor" in politics. It is said that, when it comes to German affairs, the chancellor behaves like a bull in a china shop and has already "smashed a lot of china."

H. Kohl did not earn any higher appraisal following his trip to the United States, either. THE WASHINGTON

POST believes that he has become "the embodiment of all Germans who behave as if World War II had never happened." "The chancellor," the newspaper noted, "ought to go back to school."

H. Kohl could probably learn something from his kindred parties in the GDR. No matter how right-wing the positions they may take, they do not allow any gross provocative attacks on those who do not share their views. Nor do they borrow anything from the neofascist vocabulary.

Latin America & Caribbean

Brazil's Collor Cited on Planned Trade Expansion

PM0503163990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Maintaining Political Dialogue"]

[Text] Brasilia, 4 Mar—Brazil firmly intends to maintain political dialogue with the USSR at the highest level and take every opportunity to impart greater dynamism to bilateral relations. Brazil's newly elected President Fernando Collor indicated this in an interview with a TASS correspondent. He visited the USSR this January-February as the guest of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Fernando Collor assessed his invitation to visit the USSR as "extremely significant and of profound importance." The point is that it is not usual practice for the USSR to receive heads of state before they have taken office, he pointed out. An exception was made for Brazil. "I see this gesture by the Soviet Government as a desire to deepen relations between our two countries and an invitation to embark on a new phase of cooperation, and I am willing to accept it."

Fernando Collor pointed out that his government wants to develop commercial relations with the USSR and intends "as a minimum to triple the volume of trade over the next few years" and implement a number of joint projects both in Brazil, in the USSR, and in third countries.

Senegur, Delegation Off to Brazil Inauguration

LD1203102690 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—A Soviet delegation led by Vice-President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mircha Senegur left Moscow for Brazil today.

It will attend the ceremony of transferring the presidential power.

Zagladin Arrives in Santiago, Comments on Ties

LD1203233790 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Santiago March 12 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Vladimir Shekhovtsev:

A Soviet delegation led by Vadim Zagladin, adviser of the president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, arrived here to take part in the official transfer of power to a civilian government formed by Chilean President Patricio Aylwin.

In his press statement at Santiago International Airport, Zagladin expressed gratitude to the Chilean leadership for their kind invitation to take part in the ceremony. "The Soviet people," he noted, "entertain feelings of profound liking for the Chilean people, highly evaluate their persistent efforts to revive democracy and improve the political climate on the continent. They wish the Chileans success in the solution of their national tasks.

"Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chilean Republic have deep roots. They were always based on principles of mutual respect and equitable cooperation. The Soviet leadership hopes to restore, further and deepen the constructive dialogue with your country, which will promote better understanding and strengthen positive tendencies in the life of the world community."

"It is precisely with these feelings and designs," Zagladin said, "that we have come to these celebrations. I am convinced that friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Chile meet fully the interests of the peoples of our two countries and, at the same time, the interests of strengthening peace, international security and international cooperation."

A protocol on the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Chile was officially signed on the same day in La Moneda Presidential Palace. The document stresses the traditional relations of friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Chile, their reciprocal interest in expanding interaction to stimulate cooperation within international organisations for the sake of peace and to promote economic relations and cultural exchanges. The protocol to restore diplomatic relations was signed by Chilean Foreign Minister Enrique Silva and Vadim Zagladin.

After the signing ceremony, Silva told journalists that the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was an important step showing that President Patricio Aylwin was honouring his electoral commitments to the Chilean people. "We have promised the people that Chile would be a state opened to all the world. We can be proud of the fact that this ceremony has taken place on the day when the democratically elected Chilean president took office," Silva noted.

'Special Interest' in Soviet Presence

PM1303112590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 44

[Dispatch by APN special correspondent A. Karmen and IZVESTIYA special correspondent Yu. Smirnov: "Chile: Return of Democracy"]

[Excerpts] Santiago—Last Sunday General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, who came to power in September 1973 as a result of the bloodiest military coup in the continent's history, resigned from the presidency. This took place at a ceremony handing over power to a civilian government held in the National Congress building which has just been constructed in Valparaiso City. Patricio Aylwin, a 71-year-old lawyer and leader of the Christian Democratic Party, has become Chile's constitutional president. [passage omitted]

The odious nature of the departed regime determined the composition of the foreign participants in the ceremony to hand over power. Many delegations deliberately delayed their arrival in Santiago in order not to render protocol honors to Pinochet. All, including the heads of state and government of countries like Spain, Peru, Paraguay, Italy, Nicaragua, and others, made up the category of so-called "specially invited" guests of Patricio Aylwin. They also included the delegation from the Soviet Union headed by V. Zagladin, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

This was the first official Soviet delegation in the past 16 and ½ years and its arrival in Santiago generated special interest. The heightened attention toward the Soviet guests is explained not only by the fact of their presence here but also by the fact that on that Sunday of note for Chile a protocol was signed in the La Moneda palace on the restoration of diplomatic relations between our states. As is well known, they were suspended immediately after the military coup and the two countries between which, as Patricio Aylwin told us, "there exist ties of sympathy and friendship" were for a long time separated from each other. The republic's president assessed highly the Soviet people's solidarity with the Chileans' struggle against the military dictatorship, calling the fact of the restoration of relations between our states "a notable and joyful event." [passage omitted]

Chilean Senator Views Return to Democracy

PM1303152190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Senator Andres Zaldivar, chairman of Chile's Christian Democratic Party, by special correspondent Ye. Umerenkov in Santiago; date of interview not specified: "Chile: While We Are United, We Are Invincible"—first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] The dates 11 September 1973 and 11 March 1990 will go down in Chilean history as watershed events. The first threw a country with long-established democratic traditions into the darkness of political repressions, illegality, and military tyranny. A darkness that lasted 16 and ½ years. The second marks a return to democracy which was difficult and was gained through tremendous efforts and at the cost of countless sacrifices by the people. General Pinochet took off the presidential sash at 1315 hours last Sunday [11 March]. A few moments later, a new sash was handed over to Patricio Aylwin, Chile's new president, who was freely elected by Chileans for the first time since 1970.

Chile's Christian Democratic Party [PDC], in parallel with the Socialists, plays a leading role in the Coalition of Parties for Democracy—an alliance of the country's democratic forces. The day before Christian Democrat Aylwin took office as the country's constitutionally elected president, PDC Chairman Senator Andres Zaldivar gave an interview especially for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

[Umerenkov] Don Andres, the Christian Democrats did not back the Government of National Unity. Now you are acting jointly with political forces which belonged to it....

[Zaldivar] I think that a return to the past is impossible in Chile. Of course, at that time we committed major mistakes and made life easier for those who were against democracy and were preparing the coup. The past years and the experience of joint struggle against the dictatorship helped us to find forms of cooperation with the left wing and to realize that by being hostile we were weakening democracy. Of course, differences and rivalry remain. But rivalry ought to take civilized, democratic forms. Furthermore, we and the leftwing parties are united by the desire to eradicate social injustice and to work jointly on an economic plan which would combine economic growth with social development. A broad spectrum of political forces could cooperate in this.

[Umerenkov] The experience of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy is in many respects unique, insofar as this is the first time in Latin America's modern history that we are witnessing a transition from dictatorship to democracy by political means.

[Zaldivar] I am convinced that many people still fail to grasp the importance of what is happening. Some two years ago I asked myself: Could it be possible for Pinochet to hand over power to a lawfully elected president? All this became reality because the leadership of Chile's political parties demonstrated the will to attain common goals within the framework of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy. Following this political consensus, we have to achieve consensus between civilians and the military. Not in order to maintain the status quo but in order to enable everyone to do his job. It is necessary to achieve this in the least painful form.

[Umerenkov] Pinochet is departing from the position of president. But he will remain commander of the country's Armed Forces. Is there any danger of "surprises" by him?

[Zaldivar] Yes, Pinochet is vacating the presidency. Even though the danger of another coup attempt exists in theory, I do not think that he would attempt it. No, he and his people think that we will be defeated through being unable to meet the Chilean people's demands. And he expects to return to power in four years' time, but by using democratic means. This must be borne in mind: Pinochet wants to come back.

[Umerenkov] Over the next four years, therefore, the democratic process should create certain guarantees to ensure that a recurrence of the past is impossible. How will you effect the transition from structures created by the dictatorship to democracy?

[Zaldivar] The will of the majority of Chileans was clearly expressed in the plebiscite and the elections: The country must return to democratic rule. But the dictatorship regime is handing over power to the new government subject to a multitude of conditions set by the current Constitution and a whole network of laws passed by the outgoing government. How will changes be effected? I think that the only way is to seek a political consensus of democratic forces, so as to achieve political and legislative changes. This is necessary in order to repeal all antidemocratic articles in the Constitution, to put an end to the special status of the Armed Forces commander, and to give parliament an opportunity to become a truly democratic organ expressing the people's interests.

As regards the military, complications could of course arise with them. They will carefully watch out for all our mistakes so as to take advantage of them. But we must not lose our cool. Nobody intends to insult their commander, General Pinochet. But he must be firmly told: He can retain his position in the Army only provided he performs his professional duties. And nothing more.

[Umerenkov] How do you appraise the prospects for Chilean-Soviet relations?

[Zaldivar] I am a great admirer of perestroyka in your country. I am convinced that relations between our countries should develop in different spheres—the political, economic, and cultural spheres—on the basis of mutual respect, equality, and each country's self-determination.

Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev Gives Opening Remarks 13 March

LD1303192190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1600 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Opening remarks by M.S. Gorbachev at the 3d Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin on 13 March—recorded]

[Text] [Gorbachev] Please get your cards ready to register. Let us carry out the registration of the deputies by name. I now announce the registration. How many, Nikolay?

[Unidentified man] There are 1,986 present.

[Gorbachev] One thousand nine hundred and eighty-six deputies are present. I declare the morning session of the congress open. Comrades by 1900 on 12 March, 288 applications had been made to speak. Nineteen deputies spoke at the sessions on 12 March. Before we begin, perhaps we should return to what we agreed on, that is, to decide this morning how we will proceed today. There is a proposal—I heard it made here yesterday—to continue the debates until 1200. Are there are any objections? [Voices from the hall: "No"] There aren't any. [Gorbachev adresses someone who wishes to speak from the audience] Yes, if you please, the third microphone.

[Unidentified deputy] Mikhail Sergeyevich, we would like to hear information on Lithuania. We arrived late yesterday and know almost nothing. If possible, could you please provide some information, at least in brief.

[Gorbachev] The information will still be preliminary for now, since official documents will reach us later. It is as follows: The address to the congress and the Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the government that have been adopted at the Sejm, at the Supreme Soviet session, they have now renamed the Supreme Soviet the Sejm, and in which they are informing us that they confirm—I am trying to convey this the way I can present it at this moment today—that on the basis of the juridical assessment of events of 1940 and the whole process of Lithuania becoming part of the USSR, they believe that that was carried out under conditions of occupation and that that prevented the people from expressing their will. And thus they believe that the decisions of that time are not valid [Nedeystvitelnyy]. The conclusion that follows is that...[Gorbachev changes thought] The following steps have been taken: the 1938 Constitution, the bourgeois Constitution has been restored.

A comrade from Lithuania is posing a question. Are they our comrades? [laughter in the audience; Gorbachev pauses] Yes, I think he is our comrade. Perhaps there is a different group of people there. But what we are talking about is the representatives of the other nationalities residing there. I think all these are unlawful [Nepravomernyy] and incomplete [nepravomochnyy] decisions. [someone shouts from the audience: "Correct"] But I do not wish to anticipate anything now. You and I have instructed the Supreme Soviet and the government; this work is already being carried out. And I think we should divide this work into stages. Already at the first stage we must make a political and juridicial assessment of what has happened. Incidentally, the telegrams that are coming in... here is one of them, here is one of them. [Gorbachev reads out telegram] Moscow, to the 3d Congress of USSR People's Deputies. We demand that this be made public at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies on behalf of the meeting of the Vilnius Oktyabrskiy rayon party aktiv. We wish to state our protest and disagreement with the decisions of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania as being antipopular and failing to express the interests of all residents of the republic. We are appealing to all the people's deputies of the USSR with the demand that they protect USSR citizens living in Lithuania from moral terror and that they provide social and judicial protection. On the instruction of the party aktiv meeting, signed by the first secretary. At the meeting 196 people were present.

There are telegrams from Great Fatherland War veterans here; there are 1,899 of them in all. There is a telegram from a Kaunas plant. There are telegrams from the military, from military servicemen and their families. There are telegrams from plants, etc. I think that in this situation we must simply act vigorously. This morning we held a conversation. The commission headed by Comrade Ryzhkov has already started this work from the government angle. From the Supreme Soviet angle, I believe that similar work is now already going on in the chamber. And the main thing of all is to submit this issue to the Supreme Soviet immediately after the congress concludes. You will have noticed that the Lithuanians—and representatives of Estonian and Latvia are joining them in this—are proposing that we conduct talks with them. I think there can be no question of any talks. Talks are something we conduct with foreign states. Until the whole situation is clarified...[applause] Until the whole situation is clarified jointly within the framework of the Supreme Soviet, the Nationalities Chamber, and the government and it has all been assessed, we shall continue to work as we work now. We welcome the fact that there are deputies from all republics, including Lithuania, too, present here. And I will let you have your say. I shall let you have your say. Yes. So, there you have it.

[Unidentified deputy, interrupting] Mikhail Sergeyevich...

[Gorbachev] Well, I think, comrades, that we should not begin a debate.

[Unidentified deputy, interrupting] No, but I want, I want to clarify..

[Gorbachev] Let us not begin a debate.

[Unidentified speaker] Switch on the microphone.

[Gorbachev] In that case, I ask you to take your seats. Comrades, we will now continue the debate. I have said that within the framework of the Supreme Soviet and the government we shall now act vigorously, with this whole situation, so as to investigate it from principled positions, as is fitting, and everything will be reported.

[Unidentified deputy] [words inaudible; microphone switched off]...recognition of Lithuania's independence. As of today, it has already been recognized by Australia and, according to some reports, by Czechoslovakia. What measures are being taken through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to neutralize these processes?

[Gorbachev] I think...I think that our position—our position, which will be determined in the nearest time—will be made known to the Union, the Soviet Union and the whole world, and I think that will have its significance for all states.

[Unidentified deputy] The process may assume an avalanche-like character, and later on we will again be trying to catch up.

[Gorbachev] Right. [Gorbachev pauses, addresses deputies trying to speak] Please sit down, comrades. Comrade Kogan, sit down. We shall now...[noise in the hall, interrupting] We shan't...

[Unidentified deputy] Mikhail Sergeyevich!

[Gorbachev] Right. [Inaudible remark from audience] Right. Right.

We will move on, comrades, to the debate, the continuation of the debate, according to the agenda. So, the list of speakers has been prepared. The principle that we agreed on yesterday has been employed: representatives of the republics and, in addition, other comrades in turn. The floor is given to Comrade Khodzhakov—to Deputy Khodzhakov, first secretary of the Tashauz Obkom of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. The next to speak will be Deputy Plotnieks.

Speaks Prior to Presidency Vote

LD1303155190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 March—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

Speaking today at the evening session before the voting on adoption of the draft law on introducing changes and additions to the USSR Constitution and the establishment of the post of president, Mikhail Gorbachev said that this was "an important step in favor of democracy and the defense of democracy."

The Soviet leader noted that in the course of the discussions at the Congress "understanding of the need for such a very major constitutional step as the introduction of the institution of a Presidency" had been deepened.

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that presidential power in the country should, as its main task, bring about "the development and transformation of the federation in the interests of all peoples, in the interests of the prosperity of our multiethnic state."

The Soviet leader stressed: "I am with those who support perestroyka, the success of perestroyka in the interests of all Soviet people and all peoples. I am with those who support the introduction of the post of a presidency in our country."

Mikhail Gorbachev further reported that a group of USSR people's deputies from Estonia had conveyed to the Congress Presidium a statement that poses the question of talks "with the aim of defining a new state status for an independent republic." He recalled that the Congress had instructed the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed instructing the USSR Supreme Soviet to start discussing in the next day or two the entire complex of questions connected with the decisions of Lithuania and Estonia.

Mikhail Gorbachev reported that the statement by Estonian deputies says that since the introduction of a presidential post may change the current status of the republic, this hinders their participation in voting. But in connection with the fact that at the suggestion of deputies from the Baltic region and certain other republics, an addition has been adopted to the draft law on founding the post of president, which says that the founding of a presidential post will not entail a change in the legal situation of the republics, this removes the obstacle to participation by Estonian deputies "in the resolution of questions of a historical significance for the fate of our country, the fate of perestroyka."

Then article-by-article voting on the draft law began. As has already been reported, by an overwhelming majority of votes (1817 for, 133 against, 61 abstentions) the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies has founded the post of president of the country.

Leads Congressional Vote on Presidency

LD1403025990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2034 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Procedural discussion on the vote on the question of establishing a presidency; from the 13 March Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Gorbachev] First of all, it is necessary to create the institution of the president.

And so, as we have agreed, section one of the draft law on the establishment of the post of president of the USSR. This is our shortest section.

One moment please. In view of the fact that it is very short, I can read it out. Or do you have it in your hands? [voices from hall: "yes"] You have got it all? Good. [passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] I invite the senior member of the Lithuanian delegation to come to the presidium. [passage omitted on voting procedures]

[Gorbachev] Today we have a unique situation that we may not have foreseen—and quite understandably so. The deputies from the Lithuanian Republic said today that they were here as observers. I don't think that we can agree with this and immediately exclude them without listening to the assessments and conclusions of the commission that we gave to the Supreme Soviet and the government. That is still in process and so I would not like to initiate already our excluding our comrades and deputies from Lithuania from the roll. But, on the other hand, we shall calculate the two-thirds from the roll composition. I think it was Comrade Aytmatov who raised the matter at our Editorial Commission and asked for the Congress itself to settle the matter, so that we would know how to act in that case. What proposals are there on that? [noise] No, here there is.... There is here...Comrade Boldyrev, please. There is the experience of the Supreme Soviet. Well, I don't know what Deputy Boldyrev will say, but I'll say something later. Please.

[Boldyrev] Esteemed deputies, the main argument for introducing presidential rule is that we want legality to be observed within the country. But if we want legality to be observed within the country, we must clearly begin with ourselves. No one within the country will observe the laws unless we observe them. Accordingly, I think that, in accordance with the Constitution, a decision can only be adopted if two-thirds of the deputies holding mandates have voted for it. Accordingly, until such time as the deputies of a particular republic are deprived of their mandates, they have all the same rights as we do.

[Gorbachev] One moment. I think that that coincides with what I said—that we keep them, and the Congress does not remove their powers. But, at the same time, there is a reality: They have declared that they are here as observers and are not using their powers. The Congress has the right, since there is no one higher than the Congress—there are only the voters. But today they have entrusted us with resolving all questions, and we can settle that question.

Anyone who is, perhaps, inclined to undermine these two thirds, will, perhaps, decide to do this. But we who are in favor of introducing...[changes thought] we are interested in having this disposition of forces really reflected. One feels that there is a game of cat and mouse going on. And they are concealing it by general arguments about legality. I think that what Congress establishes will be the law. Therefore, one can leave things as they are and not do anything and in this way not give even a hint to our Lithuanian comrades and to the people of Lithuania that we put them in doubt. So, if one is to say, putting my hand on my heart, I am more inclined to that and not because of what Comrade Boldyrev said. If the Congress finds it necessary to decide otherwise that is a matter for the Congress. Thus, there [illegible] the first proposal, to be guided by the standing orders on the basis that today we regard as included in the list of deputies the deputies from the Lithuanian Republic, our republic in the USSR. How about that, comrades? [voices from hall: "that is correct"] So, is it necessary to discuss other options? [voices from hall: "no"] Then we have regulated that question. [passage omitted]

Views Chechen-Ingush ASSR Situation

LD1303190390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] And once again, the long and difficult sitting of the congress. Deputy Khadzhiyev literally insisted on speaking on behalf of a large group of deputies from autonomous republics. He is from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]. The deputy recalled the potentially explosive situation in his republic and asked that the attention of the congress be drawn to the fact that just before every congress yet another seat of tension is created with obvious...enviable regularity. He believes this is not by chance but thinks it is a firmly thought-out step. Somebody really wants to hinder the democratic transformations in the country. Somebody really wants to hinder the approval of the institute of presidential power now. Deputy Khadzhiyev said that his voters are awaiting attention to be given to their problems at the congress. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev took the floor.

[Begin Gorbachev recording] The Russian Federation of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Russian Federation government are dealing with that problem, with Checheno-Ingusghetiya concerns. Recently, a group of responsible comrades, headed by comrade Zakharov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, were there on the instructions of the leadership of the republic.

It must be said that the situation is not a simple one. It has brought into motion in particular two republics, and so far no real improvements have occured. Therefore, Comrades Vorotnikov and Vlasov have sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee and to the USSR Supreme Soviet in which they point out at the end that, taking account of the fact that the situation which has evolved in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR is highly complex, and will obviously require deeper examination, we consider it advisable to immediately create a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of nationalities in order to examine the question on the spot.

We also consider it essential at the present time...these questions...in the press...before the clarification of all the..of the whole situation...not to get discussion of them under way in the press. Probably that is correct. We have already come up against that on more than one occasion. Let us express the instructions from the Congress and let's convey that we support that request of the republic's leadership and, really, let the Supreme Soviet and in the first place, the Chamber of the Soviet of Nationalities, find without delay—and the whole Supreme Soviet is working—find without delay, the time to form that commission, a competent one and out of respected deputies, and send them to study the real situation and to introduce proposals to the Supreme Soviet. [end recording]

Summarizes Presidency Debate

LD1303231390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2018 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Speech by President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev summarizing the debate on the presidency from the 12 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] I have the impression that you feel that we've already gotten through the work, but it's still all ahead of us. So we must actually now make a start on adopting the law on the question under discussion—on introducing the post of USSR president and on making amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution.

I have the impression that during the discussion at the congress, we have deepened our understanding of the need for this major constitutional step—that is, the introduction of the institution of president. The step that we are implementing, or must implement—and it seems to me in this respect that a mood has formed among the deputies in the interests of defending democracy, which I have clearly detected in the speeches of all comrades who have touched on this subject here - and what is this step, a step in the direction of democracy or away from democracy?

I think that the discussion which we have conducted here indeed helps us to arrive at a firm conclusion: that this is an important, major step in favor of democracy and in defense of democracy; further, that this is a major step in the interests of the success of all perestroyka. And I think that we can say that this can also help us radicalize reforms that are being conducted within the framework of the policy of perestroyka and speed up the conducting of them.

And finally, I think the fact that the subject of the president and the federal state, the president and the republics, and the union and autonomous formation was discussed here in very great detail, thoroughly, and I would say with a special emphasis, anxiety, and responsibility. I think that this topic, which deserves to be discussed, was subjected to painstaking analysis here.

As shown by the result of this discussion and the work of the drafting commission, as a result of this, we have come to a pretty important deepening of the draft and improvement of the draft so that nobody should have doubts. And the main thing is that whoever may turn out to be in that post should not even have the temptation to try to ignore what is already today the property of perestroyka and to which we are especially striving tomorrow within the framework of revolutionary transformatins to our federation, and namely the main task of that presidential power should be the development and transformation of the federation in the interests of all peoples, in the interests of the prosperity of our multinational state.

I would say that we are standing before the adoption of a most important fateful decision in the history of our state; and moreover it is taking place at such a stage of the development of perestroyka processes when we feel that we are now on a wide road. But at the same time we still have a great deal to do in order to remove all the obstacles that complicate movement for us along that path of perestroyka. I am with those who are in favor of perestroyka, for the success of perestroyka in the interests of all Soviet people and all peoples, and I am with those who are in favor of introducing this post of president in our country. That's the first thing.

Second, a group of USSR people's deputies from the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] conveyed to the congress presidium a statement which poses the question of talks with the aim of defining—I stress, talks—with the aim of defining a new state status for an independent republic. As you remember, we instructed the Supreme Soviet yesterday, in particular the Soviet of Nationalities and its commissions, and the government to consider questions connected with the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Evidently, we can, taking into account the appeal of the Estonian delegation, the deputies form Estonia, give instructions also on the proposal of the Estonian deputies, so that the questions put by them can be considered comprehensively, the more so because this subject is on our agenda. Evidently we must now speak out so that in having resumed its work, the USSR Supreme Soviet should immediately, in the next day or two, start—well, to the extent of its readiness, so to speak—discussing all of this complex of questions. That's the first thing. Second, the statement by the Estonian comrades expresses support as a whole for perestroyka, for our political line. At the same time it says that because the introduction of the presidential post may change the present status of the republic, it prevents them from participating in voting. Evidently this argument has been dropped, after we adopted, at the suggestion of deputies from the Baltic republics and certain other republics, and addition to the draft law on establishing the post of president, which was mentioned by Comrade Vladimir Nikolayevich Kudryavtsev, chairman of our drafting commission.

In the first point, which contains the proposal to establish the post of president, it says that this will not entail a change to the legal position of republics or limitations of their prerogatives as enshrined in the constitutions of union and autonomous republics and the constitution of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. I also want to stress that we have all agreed on the necessity for urgent work on a new union treaty. In my view this has also become clear here at this congress. I assume that all of this removes obstacles for the Estonian deputies to take part, like representatives of other republics, in the resolving questions of historic significance for the fate of our country and the fate of perestroyka.

I think these are important observations: First, I imagine you would like to hear my attitude toward the debate, if only in a nutshell, and second toward this very important appeal from the Estonian delegation, and this ties in with some individual...[changes thought] since there have been proposals if not letters—I'm thinking here of the Georgian delegation, the Azerbaijani delegation and indeed other republics too—so I think that as a result of the work we have done we are arriving at this understanding.

Right comrades, it's time to adopt the law. Allow me to put the following points to you before we get down to work.

As you can see the draft consists of four sections. The first section is about the establishment of the post of president. The second section is on making alterations and additions to the USSR Constitution. The third section is the procedure for the election of the first president of the USSR and on the presidential oath. And the fourth section is on putting the law into effect from the moment it is adopted.

Proposals have already been coming in during the course of the discussion from a number of deputies, including—I have just read the ideas expressed by Deputy Stankevich—and from a group of deputies, on the procedure for adopting this law and, in particular, the comrades—they ask to have their say—Comrade Stankevich proposes that we vote on sections two and three by a two thirds requirement and the rest, so to say, within the framework of the normal procedure. But,—either, I have not understood this correctly, although I have the text in front of me—but it seems to me that, comrades, in all cases, apart from putting the law into efect from the moment it is adopted, all the others—section one on the establishment of the institution of president, section two on making alterations and additions to the Constitution and section three on the procedures for the election of the first president—these are all constitutional issues and therefore, they must all receive two thirds of the votes. Is this completely clear? [voices from hall: "yes"] Because we are laying down in the changes that voting is by universal secret ballot and when we alter the procedure in section three, as it is, this means it concerns the Constitution and, therefore, there must also be two thirds.

[(?Lukyanov)] interjects: "The voting should be by name."]

Well, in general, of course, each of us is voting for ourselves, our names should be there—yes.

Comrades, do we share these ideas? [voices from hall: "yes"]

Good.

Moscow TV Carries Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev Chairs Session

LD1303180790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 13 March begins carrying a recorded relay of the 13 March Congress of People's Deputies proceedings in Moscow.

Gorbachev begins by calling for registration by name. There are 1,986 deputies present. Gorbachev announces the morning sitting open; he suggests that debates continue until 1200.

At 1606 GMT an unidentified deputy asks for information on Lithuania. Gorbachev reads out some telegrams from some inhabitants in Lithuania calling for protection against the recent decisions on independence. He says that discussions have been conducted on this matter and suggests that the matter be dealt with by the USSR Supreme Soviet after the Congress. He says we only conduct talks with foreign states. Applause is heard.

At 1611 GMT there are calls for the microphone to be switched on. An unidentified speaker calls for the recognition of the independence of Lithuania; Australia has already done so. This deputy is identified by Gorbachev as Kogan. Gorbachev says they will come to everything in its proper order.

Speakers Begin Debates

LD1303181990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television service in Russian at 1614 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Gorbachev hands the floor to Khodzhakov from Turkemenia who speaks about the Communist Party, rejecting the idea that it will end up on the sidelines after its leading role is removed from constitution. He says that there is an urgent need today for a stabilization of the situation, one of the main reasons for the institution of the post of president. He supports the establishment of a federal council, envisaged in the draft. He believes that the first president sould be elected by the congress. He agrees with the nomination of Gorbachev as a candidate. His voters want a president to be elected as soon as possible. He looks at Article 27 suggesting amendments. In conclussion, he says socioeconomic difficulties can be solved if people right up to president level do their work properly.

At 1622 GMT Gorbachev calls Deputy Plotnieks from Latvia. He says that they are creating history and history will judge them. Some people see it as the only hope; others are alarmed by it. We need a compromise, he says so far we have only paradoxes. He says that we will now have two top leaders, chairman of the Supreme Soviet and president of the country. He criticizes the Law on

Ownership from the point of view of republics. He also criticizes the Council of Minsters for the lack of real economic independence for the Baltic republics despite the law being passed. He is concerned that the republics will not be heard and that the presidency will make this situation even worse. He calls for the President's Council to contain leaders from republics, proposing amendments to the draft on this matter. He criticizes other points in Article 127 for being ambiguous. Point 15 undermines republic authority. The point of the imposition of state of emergency should be precise on what conditions require such imposition. A state of emergency should only be imposed with the consent of the republic involved. There should be more precise and significant reasons for dissolving parliament than envisaged by the draft. He says the status of Latvia is not yet clear, but talks with the parliament must be fair. He hands over a declaration.

At 1634 GMT Deputy Korshunov asks whether the post of president is really needed. Has history not shown that this is not a good idea, he asks? Will it not lead to movement backwards, to stagnation? He is alarmed by the situation in the country. He believes that deputies will reach a wise decision. However, after some thought, he believes that the establishment of the post is a logical continuation of perestroyka. He says that society will no longer allow a return to the past. The parliament is becoming more and more mature. Most deputies are developing well as parliamentarians. He lists some of these. They are a guarantee that the institution of the post of president will not lead to totalitarianism. It would undoubtedly be better for the whole people to elect the president, but we have no time. The situation demands immediacy in this matter. We must leave behind anonymous power. We need to see where responsibility ultimately lies. If the congress adopts a president, he wants Gorbachev in the post.

People are beginning to lack confidence in the future and in perestroyka and Gorbachev is also partially to blame for not being seen to carry things through. We will elect him but we can also recall him from the post of president. He is confident of Gorbachev, he concludes.

Lithuanian Deputy Voices Opinion

LD1303183590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1644 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Deputy Akayev from Kirghizia supports the idea of instituting the post of president. He says that the country now has the most qualified parliament for decades. The new Constitution should lay out more clearly and precisely the status of republics within the federation. He proposes changes to certain articles of the draft. On Article 127, he thinks that the removal of the President's Council should be defined more clearly. He agrees that there should be a vice president. It is very important who becomes the first president. He looks to France and its Constitution, and to the United States. He believes Gorbachev is the best candidate. He says that other candidates should be of equal worth. We are not just electing the first president, we are establishing a standard, he says, he says we need an opposition, but we need a constructive one. He refers to Afanasyev.

At 1651 GMT Deputy Antanaytis from Lithuania says every republic has the right to express views on the presidency. He has been entrusted by the Lithuanian delegation and Supreme Soviet to speak. The Lithuanian delegation reiterates that Lithuania was brought into the USSR through Stalinism. He reads out an excerpt from the act of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on the restoration of Lithuanian independence, on the emblem. The republic will be known as the Lithuanian Republic. He also reads an excerpt on the restoration of the previous constitution on Lithuania. The deputies from Lithuania do not regard themselves as authorized to participate in voting for the presidency and president. They are observers. However they hope for the progress of perestroyka. The Lithuanian delegates want talks with the USSR and good-neighbor relations. Gorbachev makes a joke and everyone laughs. Antanaytis thanks the congress for their pleasant approach. He says that yesterday the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a letter to Gorbachev and he hopes he will read it out. Gorbachev says it will be distributed.

At 1658 GMT Deputy Arutyunyan says that the process of law-making is taking too long and they are only being put into force with difficulty. He says there is a power vacuum. It is only too easy for ethnic crises, pogroms and blockades to take place. Perestroyka is under threat. More than ever before we need effective executive power, he says. The Presidency is being instituted at a difficult time and the president needs special powers, but this is not the most important reason for the Presidency. It will be a guarantee of federal unity and stability in society. In his view, sufficient measures are included in the draft to prevent the abuse of power. He says that it should be possible to remove the president from power if he violates the constitution or laws, or carries out his duties incompetently. He believes it is expedient to give the president special powers to act in cases of natural disasters or large-scale accidents. The situation in Armenia requires nationwide effort and measures. He does not believe that the part of the law dealing with the correlation between the president and republican organs has been sufficiently thoroughly worked out; the status of the Federal Council should be enhanced, he believes.

He then continues saying that there is an open struggle for power between different parties in the republics. There should be a president in each republic, he says. The matter of secession, he believes should not just be the prerogative of the president of the USSR. This matter needs further work. He supports the institution of the presidency.

At 1709 GMT there is a 15-minute break in the recorded relay.

Deputy Defends Republic Rights

LD1303185490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1724 GMT on 13 March resumes its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Deputy Dabizha from Moldavia says that many deputies are here thanks to Gorbachev. Many conservatives have busts of Stalin hidden in the cellar. We need a czar, whatever he is called. However, a lack of constitutional guarantees could lead to the presidency swallowing up perestroyka. He proposes the creation of 15 vice presidents from the republics to protect their interests. The fate of the republics should be decided in the republics. There is no law so far on the demarcation of rights of the center and union republics. The history of the country shows that treaties with the union republics were not without defects.

Dabizha then says that the presidency must be introduced with clear regard for the position of the republics. He enumerates the conditions of the Presidency. An election with alternative candidates should be held. The same person should not be both general secretary and president, he concludes.

At 1731 GMT Makhkamov from Tajikikstan says that a strong authoritive lead is needed to stop the chain of tragedies. He cannot understand how opponents of the presidency are contradictory in their arguments. The argument is put that the presidency will limit republican sovereignty. Limiting measures are a guarantee against this, he believes. The majority of Tajik deputies are for the election of the first president at this congress.

This decision cannot be put off, he asserts since the country is on the edge of an abyss. Destructive forces are active, exploiting our mistakes and the cumbersome decision-making system. The rallies of the past few days demonstrate that there is one force behind them—adventurists, careerists and extremists. The acts of these extremists are coordinated. He cites the example of recent events in Dushanbe.

At 1736 GMT Makhkamov continues by enumerating the tragic consequences of extremist actions in Dushanbe. The extremists ignore political attempts to settle the situation. They take weak political power to be a green light for any destructive acts. Makhkamov apologizes to Armenian deputies for the made-up so-called Armenian question in Tajikistan. He calls on Armenians living in Tajikistan not to leave the country because of provacative rumors. For his part, he will do all possible to remove this problem, he says. The time bell rings, but Makhkamov continues. Serious mistakes were made in the past in resolving ethnic development he says. Time, understanding and tolerance are needed. The time bell rings again. Makhkamov goes on saying a powerful republican economic plan is needed. The deputies start clapping. Makhkamov concludes by saying that he will be voting for the institution of the presidency.

Deputy Polozkov Favors Presidency

LD1303191390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television service in Russian at 1743 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Deputy Blokhin, from Moldavia, says that he cannot avoid the topic of Lithuania. He calls it a tragedy in our common home. The Soyuz deputies' group asks for the situation to be discussed at the congress, to adopt a law on adoption of measures and for the Baltic events to be given adequate press coverage. Many subjects have been discussed at this platform with various arguments, however there is a consensus that the president should be elected at this congress, he says. This is the opinion of the Soyuz deputies' group. They would like a more clear framework of the president's activity and his relation to other organs of power.

At 1747 GMT he states that Paragraph 127 should be amended to delimit the president's sphere of activity and to change the time limit from five to four years to avoid a power vacuum during the election. It is necessary for the president to give up all other posts on acceptance. He believes that in addition, the president should be removed if he fails to carry out his functions. The president's decrees should be suspended on the recommendation of the constitutional supervision committee and Congress of People's Deputies. Yesterday Bakatin, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov were named as possible candidates.

Gorbachev interrupts to say that deputies have never heard of the Soyuz group. Blokhin says he will distribute a list of members.

At 1754 GMT Deputy Polozkov says that he has recently met many voters. They are very interested in the state of the country and the fall in workers' living standards. Why are the organs of power so irresolute, they ask? They demand more responsibility and activity. Some laws are not fully developed. Others are not respected. In any case they don't work properly. The state, as it were, doesn't belong to anyone. The party organs have washed their hands of it. The new state organs have not found their feet in the interim. Much of the problem is that there is no head of state, he opines. We need a conductor, a counterweight to decentralization. He says it is pointless copying other countries' presidencies, since the USSR is different from any other country. The issue of the presidency will not wait. He dwells on the case of an individual cooperative which is selling off rare metals abroad. He is not talking of cooperatives in general, but the Central Committee and the People's Control Committee have not offered any help in stopping this practice, he says. Only exposure in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has improved the situation, thanks to the editor of this journal.

At 1800 GMT Polozkov asks how such criminal cooperatives spring up? They compare with Brezhnev's extortioners. They are not breaking the law and not culpable before the law. He assures us that this relevant. Why does MOSCKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI support them? The deputies applause. He calls such cooperatives a "Mafia" and says they should not have protection in our new state.

Gorbachev gives him one minute more. The deputy can't believe this and asks for two.

At 1804 GMT Polozkov continues. He says that none at present can react rapidly enough to the negative aspects being thrown up by perestroyka, and that the dirt appearing now will be as bad as that during the period of stagnation. If the legislature continues in this way, it will end badly, he believes. Republican leaders are heavy-handed in their demands and everything is going to the republics to the detriment of other areas such as the Kuban. Many communists will not reject communist ideology, as Afanasyev suggests. Many will not hop from one party to another. He appeals to fellow Russians. Russia is being badly treated, without any defense of its own. Deputies are silent on this. Who will defend Russia and the Russians? He calls on everyone to vote for presidential power.

War Veterans Support Gorbachev

LD1303195290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television service in Russian at 1809 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Gorbachev offers the alternative of just listening to two more deputies or a large group. An unidentified deputy from Ingushetia interrupts and asks to discuss the problems of Ingushetia.

Gorbachev enumerates others who want to speak. Gorbachev suggests extending the debate to 1300 instead of 1200. The deputies vote on this. Voting takes some time.

At 1815 GMT Gorbachev announces that the deputies have voted for just two more speakers to appear.

At 1816 GMT Marshal of Aviation Kozhedub starts speaking. He recounts a recent reunion of veterans, heroes of the Soviet Union, in World War II. He recalls how people were united behind the party in defense of the fatherland. He rolls off statistics of enemy planes which he himself shot down. He recounts how he transfered from propellered planes to jets. At the reunion his comrades asked him to express in their name suport for the presidential form of government. The marshal shares their view. They suport Gorbachev for this post. He reads out the text agreed at the reunion. It is becoming more and more obvious that the mass disorders are being orchestrated by those who are hungary for power. These are antipopular forces. It is time to go on the attack against counterrevolutionary forces, he assets. Kozhedub goes on to say that there are antimilitary concepts being banded in the press. We cannot agree with such arguments, having won World War II, ofter sustaining injuries and conquering space. Youth is being exposed to immoral examples, he retorts. He calls for a renaissance of literature and the salvation of Soviet youth. The time bell rings. He condemns attempts to drive a wedge between the Army and the people, including dividing the Army amongst the union republics. Despite numerous calls to ethnic strife, he says, the Army remains a school of internationalism. Today, society is unconcerned about the security of the USSR. NATO is increasing its military potential. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the strategic situation is changing, he opines. Lenin said anyone who forgets about the danger of imperialism forgets about our state of labor.

At 1833 GMT Kozhdub holds up the frontline book with which he conquered the enemy, and starts quoting martial verses, to rapturous applause. He ends with the words, "We are Russians, we will overcome everything."

Deputy Describes Presidential Qualities

LD1303201990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1836 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Deputy Drunina describes the qualities of a good president: He must be a person capable of holding his own in the center of the stage, Gorbachev is just such a man. He has reduced the nuclear threat throughout the world. He has improved the foreign image of the USSR immensely. She concludes by saying that she wishes to retire as a deputy.

At 1840 GMT Gorbachev says that the debate is now at an end. He tells Sobchak that he will let him speak later. An unidentified deputy quotes standing orders to prove that he should be allowed to speak, since he is from an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Gorbachev is dubious, but then allows him to speak. He turns out to be deputy Khadzhiyev.

At 1842 GMT Khadzhiyev puts in a plea for consideration for the plight of Ingushetia. He adds that ethnic unrest is fomented deliberately in the republics to denigrate perestroyka before occasions such as the congress. He goes on to describe the merits of his constituents in Groznyy. Their problems must be solved. If autonomous areas have to fight continually for their rights, perhaps they would do better to try to leave the union and become full Soviet Socialist Republic's. He appeals for objective consideration of the problems of autonomous areas. Will a strong presidency help to resolve these problems? It is hard to argue in favor of the presidency when so many people see their rights trampled on even now. He then presents a list of demands which would have the effect of improving the status of people living in autonomous areas. He wishes Gorbachev all the best if he becomes president.

At 1852 GMT Gorbachev reads out part of a report from the commission looking into events in Checheno-Ingushetia. The recommendation is that further study of the question should be carried out. He urges that the congress should support the report and urge further action. The constitutional commission will shortly be presenting its proposals for a new constitution.

At 1855 GMT Lukyanov comes to the rostrum to answer the written questions that have been submitted. Deputy Kuznetsov asks whether universal suffrage is suitable for a federal state. Lukyanov leaves the question open, saying that study must be made of both the theory and the practice. Other deputies raise questions about the status of the Constitutional Review Commission; the center and the localities;

Presidential, Constitutional Debates End

LD1303205190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1938 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

The session resumes with registration: There are 1,988 deputies present. Gorbachev says he is concerned about the discrepancy in figures between earlier registration and the present one. He declares the session open.

At 1942 GMT Kudryavtsev takes the floor to answer questions. Deputy Petrushenko asks about the wording of the president's title. Kudryavtsev says the name of the country should be included Petrushenko also asks about the Presidents Council and Federal Council and whether they duplicate each other's functions. Kudryavtsev rejects the notion that their functions are the same. The Defense Council is being abolished and there is a need for another body to carry out the Defense Councils functions, he explains. Gorbachev calls for brevity.

At 1946 GMT an unidentified deputy says that Article 2 of the Constitution should be abolished if the presidency is instituted. The same goes for Article 3. Kudryavtsev says that the Constitution does of course need to be radically altered but this is not the moment. Shapovalenko asks why his and other requests have been ignored. Answers have not been given to the proposals of many deputies. Kudryavtsev apologizes to Shapovalenko for overlooking to mention this. The president can be chairman of a party as long as he is unpaid. Deputy Tsyplyayev suggests amendments to the Constitution. Kudryavtsev agrees that such amendments are needed. The Editorial Commission has not done this because of present work on other relevant legislation.

At 1953 GMT other deputies ask questions. Deputy Podberezkin asks that the Supreme Soviet should be able to veto presidential decrees by a two-thirds vote. Deputy Boyars asks about the introduction of state of emergency with consent of republics. He asks for greater clarity. Kudryavtsev reminds Boyars that presidential rule will not be imposed without the relevant law. Rapid questions continue from the floor, proposing different formulations for the sake of clarity. Kudryavtsev defends the guarantees in the draft. Solntsev questions the age limits for presidents.

At 2000 GMT Kirillov asks a question about the leading role of the Communist Party. Deputy Fomenko asks whether the procurator-general and supreme court can oversee the president if they are dependent on him. Desyatov ask how the Presidential Council will fit in with an article of the Constitution. Lubenchenko ask a question about Ligachev. Another deputy asks why the appointment of the supreme commander of Army is being taken out of the hands of the Supreme Soviet. Other questions follow in rapid succession.

At 2007 GMT Deputy Minulin from Tatariya asks about the status of autonomous formations. He criticizes the formulation of a point concerning autonomous regions. There is another question on the dissolving of the Supreme Soviet and about the recall of the president by the congress. Kozyrev asks like many others about Article 127, Point 8 on the removal of the president and the reasons for this. A deputy asks Gorbachev a question about previous discussion of the matter of presidency, in which the idea of the election of a temporary president was raised. He asks Kudryavtsev whether after a three month period of temporary president, a nationwide vote could be carried out. Kudryavtsev does not think this idea is expedient. A military man asks about the point in the draft which states that the president can hand over the post of supreme commander to another person under conditions of war. He insists that this be examined. Gorbachev asks for a show of hands for ending the debates. There is an absolute majority.

Vote Begins on Presidency Draft

LD1303214990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2018 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Gorbachev says that the congress must vote on the draft. He says the congress has deepened its understanding of the institution of presidency. Concern has been voiced about the situation in the country and about the need to advance democracy and perestroyka. The institution of a presidency will ensure this. One of the main tasks of president is to ensure the economic, political and social development of the country.

He goes on to speak about the Lithuanian issue, and the need for this matter to be discussed by the Supreme

Soviet immediately. The Estonians have said that the draft does not allow them to take part in the voting, but Gorbachev suggests that this is no longer the case, owing to changes just made to the draft. Gorbachev asserts the need stressed here about the need for a union treaty on the relationship between union and republics.

At 2026 GMT before beginning the vote, Gorbachev sums up the draft and its four sections. He asserts that a two-thirds majority is required in all sections. Stankevich says something inaudible from the floor.

At 2029 GMT voting commences on first section: Sazonov and Boldyrev ask for each section to be voted on by name so that the people know who is responsible for what. Shapovalenko calls for voting article by article. Gorbachev says there is no time to do this and asks for a vote on the proosal for a vote by name.

At 2034 GMT it is clear that there is a majority in favor of a vote by name. Gorbachev reminds the Congress that Lithuanian deputies have said they will not take part, but Gorbachev says that they will not be refused participation, though the two-thirds majority will be calculated without them. Boldyrev reminds deputies that the institution of presidency is intended to ensure legality in the country. We must set an example and allow the Lithuanian deputies full participation. Gorbachev says that the Lithuanians have entrusted the congress with deciding this matter so we can go ahead. Why play this game of cat and mouse? If the congress decides otherwise, that is a different matter. He puts the first section of the draft law to the vote. Someone reminds him that registration is needed first. The deputies register: there are 2,021 present.

Voting on section one takes place: On the institution of the post of president of the USSR: For 1,817, against 133, abstentions 61. Gorbachev congratulates the congress.

At 2048 GMT Gorbachev moves onto section two. Voting: For 1771, against 164, abstentions 74. A deputy asks for Article 6 to include the phrase "all political parties" and for mention of the Communist Party in the article to be omitted. A member of the clergy calls for the same. There is a vote on this amendment, removing mention of the Communist Party: For 1,067, against 906, abstentions 39. The amendment is not adopted.

At 2058 GMT Kirillov proposes an amendment to Article 6 to create greater clarity and remove ambiguity. Popov proposes three additions to Article 7. He asks for it to be illegal to ask a person for party affiliation. Likwise it should be illegal for there to be party organizations in state establishments. On law enforcement bodies, he also believes that members of the Army, militia and KGB should not belong to any party whatsoever. He accepts that this should not necessarily be discussed now, but certainly in the future.

At 2104 GMT Gorbachev calls for calm in the hall. A deputy says that the Constitution is contradictory, but this should not be further established in legislation. Deputy Surkov asks for militarymen to be allowed to choose themselves whether they belong to a party.

At 2107 GMT Ubaydullayeva suggests an amendment to Article 7. Deputy Lopatin asks the congress to look at foreign experience with regard to the matter of whether servicemen should be allowed to be members of political parties. He says that a group of deputies express doubt as to the procedure for voting with a two-thirds majority. Another deputy raises the same procedural question. A clergyman from Moldavia agrees with the comment that certain deputies are speaking too often and protests about not being allow to finish putting his point earlier.

At 2115 GMT Mikhedov finds the remarks by Popov insulting and contradictory. He calls for Article 7 to be voted on as it is. Nazarenko then makes a proposal. Gorbachev decides to sum up the proposals raised. He sees these proposals as relevant, but says they should be examined later and not in the Constitution. A show of hands confirms that the majority support this suggestion.

Deputies Offer Amendments

LD1303222190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2119 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Gorbachev puts to the vote the amendment suggested by deputy Ubaydullayeva. The amendment is not passed. Gorbachev goes back to an earlier amendment. This amendment is not passed either.

At 2129 GMT an unidentified deputy calls for the omission of part of Article 7 altogether. Boldyrev says he is going to speak on the voting procedure. He recalls an earlier proposal on voting. A deputy from Karelia asks for a revote because his delegation did not understand the procedure. Another deputy proposes that the second paragraph of Article 7 be retained. A Leningrad deputy says the first steps have been made to altering Articles 6 and 7 but says we are left with a nonsense in the constitution. Another deputy asks why those who voted in the past against removing Article 6 are now arguing for its removal. Where is the morality?

At 2135 GMT Gorbachev puts two other amendments to the vote. Both are rejected.

At 2147 GMT Gorbachev announces a 20-minute break.

The recorded relay continues with the registration after the break.

By 2151 GMT registration is complete; 1,941 deputies are present. Gorbachev concludes that the seventh paragraph has been finished. Naumov complains that voting should not be affected by shouting from the hall. Murashev complains that the deputies have not fully understood the electoral procedures. Gorbachev says that Murashev is speaking for himself and should have made sure he understood the procedures. Murashev complains about lack of clarity on the issue of the two-thirds majority and asks for voting to begin again. Gorbachev rejects this proposal.

Gorbunov, from Latvia, puts forward a proposal on the president's power to announce martial law. He points out that the president has the right to announce martial law without the Supreme Soviet's approval. He proposes framing the point so that the announcement of martial law should be ratified by at least two-thirds of the Supreme Soviet. This is a little step towards federation, he says.

At 2200 GMT two unidentified deputies make points about responsibility for the republics' security and the fact that the president is president of the whole country.

At 2203 GMT Moiseyev raises points about martial law which is necessitated by the threat of foreign aggression. In such a case it is impossible to guarantee the security of USSR borders if a two-thirds vote in the Supreme Soviet is needed.

At 2209 GMT Sobchak refers to Moiseyev's comment. He does not see any other way of framing the point on martial law than to define martial law by a special law to be studied by the Supreme Soviet.

Amendment Proposals Continue

LD1303232790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2211 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Deputy Minasbekyan argues that proposals should not be included which would retard the president's reactions, since he is legally a guarantor of the federation. Second, he suggests that a two-thirds majority of republican deputies should be necessary for the presidential election.

At 2214 GMT Akhromeyev notes on Point 15 that there should be a distinction between martial law and a state of emergency. He agrees with Sobchak that there should be a special law on martial law. Izmailov agrees that martial law should be distinguished from a state of emergency. He points out that in the states of emergency civil establishments have not been working, but only military ones. He supports Sobchak, in that all possible situations should be covered by the Supreme Soviet law.

At 2218 GMT Gorbachev summarizes what has been said. He reads out what Sobchak has proposed. In the interests of Soviet security martial law or a state of emergency can be declared in individual regions. Sobchak's version cuts out much of the verbiage of the original. A woman deputy quibbles on the word order. Gorbachev says this is possible. Kirillov returns. If Sobchak's proposal is adopted, then the second part is unsatisfactory.

At 2223 GMT an unidentified deputy says that earlier there was much talk of collective leadership. Now we are saying that the president is guarantor of the Constitution. He argues that definition of martial law and a state of emergency should be entered in the constitution.

At 2227 GMT Gorbachev cuts the debate short and proposes asking the Editorial Commission to summarize the proposals and present them tomorrow. He asks the opinion of the hall. It agrees.

At 2229 GMT Kudryavtsev touches on the preamble to the Constitution where it talks about the leading role of the Communist Party, which contradicts the new Article 6, and therefore this reference should be removed. Later the whole preamble will have to be changed. On multicandidate presidential elections Kudryavtsev reads out a version proposing secret ballot for a five-year term.

At 2232 GMT Gorbachev appeals to the hall for its opinion. The hall votes electronically. This takes some time. The proposal is adopted by 1,884 votes for, 64 against, and 41 abstentions. Kudryavtsev reads out the adopted text. An unidentified deputy gets up to suggest that the president should be allowed to be present at congress sessions. Kudryavtsev says that this is selfevident.

At 2238 GMT an unidentified deputy from the Ukraine suggests that presidential candidates can be bought. Sarayev asks for the president's obligation not to be chairman of a party to be voted on. A Bashkir deputy says that Medvedev has said that Gorbachev should remain leader of the Communist Party. He argues that this is not desirable. He proposes that the president should not be affiliated to a political party.

At 2243 GMT Deputy Petrushenko starts to talk on the next point. Gorbachev says that deputies should not repeat one another. A deputy from Northern Ossetia speaks briefly. Kalyagin proposes that if Gorbachev is elected then he should be given a time limit as chairman of the Communist Party. Krayko says that no one wants a new chairman of the Communist Party, so why make these limitations? Krayko is not a party member, but he thinks Gorbachev is a good general secretary. Travkin emphasizes that command-administrative power must be eliminated by a division of party and state. This demands a nonparty president. However, he cannot envisage anyone other than Gorbachev as general secretary before the party congress.

Gorbachev Summarizes Progress

LD1303233290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2250 GMT on 13 March continues its recording of the Congress of People's Deputies session in Moscow on 13 March.

Gorbachev sums up. Speakers have said that the president should not be a member of a political party. Voting then takes place on the president not being allowed to occupy other political posts. The proposal is rejected by 1,884 votes for, 64 against, and 41 abstentions.

At 2255 GMT an unidentified deputy gets up to say that the president should be allowed to occupy two posts but he should receive just salary for his one main job. In other words, the president can take up more than one posts, but on a voluntary basis. Gorbachev reiterates the above. Another deputy makes the remark that the possibility of combining the posts of president and party general secretary had been made possible by a minority vote.

Gorbachev says the work must be finished even if they work day and night. He puts a proposal to the vote to continue the work until the document is adopted. It is voted on: 767 for; 1,162 against; 31 abstentions. The proposal is rejected.

The recorded relay ends at 2306 GMT.

Vote on Status of President To Be Held 14 March

LD1303205390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies worked for the second day today in Moscow. [passage omitted] Let us remind you that in the morning of 13 March, before the beginning of the discussion, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev informed the congress, on the basis of preliminary data, of the situation in Lithuania. He called the decision adopted by the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] to restore in the republic the bourgeois Constitution of 1938 incompetent [nepravomochnyy]. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed himself in favor of taking active measures in the situation that has evolved. The relevant work has begun, in accordacne with the instructions of the congress, via the government and the Supreme Soviet. Immediately after the completion of the congress, the question is to be presented to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. [passage omitted]

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev summed up the results of the discussion. In particular, he stressed that the debates at the congress are helping to reach a firm conclusion, that the institution of the post of president is an important step in favor of democratization and the defense of democracy, in the interests of the success of the whole of perestroyka. That will help radicalize the reforms carried out within the framework of the policy of perestroyka and to speed up their implementation. We have already informed you of the results of the voting. Then a sharp discussion took place around the article of the draft law devoted to the status and authority of the president. Deputies did not manage to vote on these sections and it is intended for Wednesday [14 March]. Moreover, after the completion of the adoption of the law, the candidacies for the new highest state post must be put forward and discussed and then elections for the post of president of the Soviet Union started.

Further on Debate on Presidency

PM1203203390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition pp 1,3

[Report by IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondents V. Dolganov and A. Stepovoy on day one of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "The Main Issue Is Presidential Power"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A brief report on changes in the body of deputies was delivered by B.V. Gidaspov, chairman of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies Mandate Commission. The Congress recognized the credentials of the following USSR people's deputies:

Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kulik, elected from Priozernyy National-Territorial Okrug No. 553, Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic];

Nikolay Fedorovich Naumov, elected from the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers;

Yuriy Alekseyevich Spiridonov, elected from Ukhtinskiy Territorial Electoral Okrug No. 373, Komi ASSR;

Nikolay Ivanovich Tkalenko, elected from the All-Union War and Labor Veterans Organization;

Nikolay Petrovich Kustarev, elected from the CPSU.

A report on the questions of introducing changes and additions to the USSR Constitution and instituting the post of USSR President was delivered by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The full text is published in this issue of the newspaper.

In order to better organize the questions and answers, the chairman said that it had been decided to convey them to the speaker in written form.

A decision was adopted on the question of relaying the Congress sessions on television. A full video recording will be shown in the evenings, as during the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

M.S. Gorbachev said that 198 deputies had registered for the debate by 1200 hours of the first day. But before the debate had even begun, Deputy N.G. Dmitriyev, backed up by Deputy S.V. Belozertsev, proposed that a vote be taken—without opening the debate—on the question of whether a presidential form of government is to be introduced or not and also to establish when the president will be elected—at this Congress or at some other time. This proposal was not supported by the majority of those present, however.

Substantiating the need to introduce a presidency, Deputy S.S. Alekseyev addressed the Congress as a legal expert and as chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee currently in the process of formation. I must say, he said, that we are now in a situation where power has been paralyzed. Power is not really functioning and is essentially proving ineffectual. Political structures have lost their former strength, and state organs have not gained real strength. This is tragic. That is why there must be no marking of time in such a great cause as this—and I would like to reiterate that we have a great cause: the peaceful, evolutionary transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic, humanist system. However, instead of making progress, uncontrolled phenomena are now on the increase in our country, phenomena which threaten terrible, unpredictable consequences. S.S. Alekseyev told deputies that we are still professing totalitarian notions about the state and regard the state as an instrument of pressure and as an organ of dictatorship. Consequently any actions of authority are interpreted in this context. The deputy proposed a fundamental change in our perception of the state, so that we regard it as the guarantor of legality, freedom, calm, confidence, and protection for people's rights. If this kind of state is not created, then, in his opinion, we could possibly find ourselves facing a catastrophe.

S.S. Alekseyev believes that we have become prisoners to the slogan "All power to the soviets!" This slogan worked well when used against the provisional government. It still works well when we are referring to party structures, but we have interpreted this slogan as meaning all power to collegiate organs. But surely we can see the large minuses existing in these organs? It is not just a difference of opinions. Sometimes the Supreme Soviet begins to interfere in the management sphere and sometimes even in the legal sphere. Sometimes the parliamentary structure leads us into an impasse. It can block any decision on the basis of absent deputies, deputies leaving the hall, a non-vote or refusal to vote, and a number of other tried and tested methods. The whole of world experience shows that a pure parliamentary structure leads state life into an impasse. It is essentially most suited to a dictatorship.

Proceeding from this and a number of other considerations, the deputy proposed that an immediate decision be adopted on the question of instituting presidential power, while stressing that, in our conditions, a presidency is the only real way to transfer real power from party structures to the state. He also proposed that there be no delays in preparing a new constitution, which will establish freedom, human rights, real democracy, and progress toward a market economy in our society.

The speech by Deputy V.F. Utkin was accompanied from start to finish by bewildered murmurs from the hall. He talked about space rocket complexes, the principles of rocket movement, various types of electricity generating plants, and wind-driven electricity installations; referred to the draft Law on Conversion; voiced concern about cutting strategic missiles to the "zero option;" and so forth.... It was only after all this that he apparently recollected the agenda and proposed electing the country's first president directly at the Congress, as it is impossible at present, for various reasons, to hold direct elections.

The debate over the institution of a presidency, Deputy N.A. Nazarbayev pointed out, has very clearly defined the watershed of opinions on this matter. Ultimately it would probably be possible to patch up the holes even without a presidency; but likewise it is not easy to cope with vital tasks even with a presidency. I believe that we should incorporate a new mechanism of power in our work, not just for the sake of removing the present serious problem of personal and national security. We also see presidential power as an important guarantee of our federation's unity. In the conditions of self-management and self-financing, to which many republics aspire, presidential power in the country must assume a somewhat different nature, taking account of the obligatory existence of the same kind of presidential power in every republic. Naturally, it is not a question of blindly copying social structures or a matter of imitation or reluctance to share power with someone else, but a question of the essential nature of state sovereignty and the nature of a USSR Constitution which interprets our Union as an association of sovereign Soviet socialist states.

The deputy went on to voice a whole series of complaints against the proposed structure of the presidential council and the council of the federation. Then he dwelt in detail on the legal acts on ownership and land adopted by the Supreme Soviet, noting that they are flawed in a number of their provisions. In the deputy's opinion, the Law on Ownership is unacceptable to the Kazakh SSR, which he represents at the Congress. It should be returned to the Supreme Soviet for finalization.

Deputy R.F. Safiullin talked longer about the problems of trade and consumer cooperatives than he did about the presidency, but he eventually supported the idea of presidential power in the USSR.

The question of the structure of state power in the Soviet Union and the presidential form of government, Deputy Yu.N. Afanasyev stressed, is a question of our society's political system. It is being decided in a very difficult situation that is burdened, most unfortunately, by many human casualties, and this fact alone compels us all to be very careful and responsible.

Speaking out sharply on behalf of the interregional deputies' group against the introduction of this post at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, he insisted that the law on the presidency can only be enforced when it is written into the integral, unified, organic text of a new, democratic constitution. Outside this constitutional context, presidential power is something dangerous and unknown that will intensify our difficulties, fears, and concerns many times over. Yu.N. Afanasyev also gave a whole series of conditions under which, in his opinion, it would be possible to institute the post of presidency in the USSR, balancing these presidential powers with strong legislative power, a multiparty system, and real parliamentary opposition.

Many people's deputies from the interregional group believe and feel sure that the policy conducted in the country recently under M.S. Gorbachev's leadership is both wrong and dangerous. This, in Yu.N. Afanasyev's opinion, is precisely the cause of the tense situation in the country.

Deputy V.I. Vorotnikov believes that the experience of social reorganization that we have accumulated in recent years—difficult, painful experience—and the complex reversal of circumstances surrounding the democratization process very convincingly affirm that perestroyka's good undertakings in the economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual spheres can have no chance of success if they are not based on firm state structures and effective institutions of power. Life constantly teaches us the simple truth that the more rights and freedoms citizens and social institutions have, the stronger and more reliable the all-state framework must be, the stricter social discipline must be, and the higher the masses' level of political awareness and sophistication must be. We still lack this at present. Worse still, factional processes are intensifying in society; labor and state discipline are on the wane; moral principles are weakening; and crime is growing.

Many new, fundamental laws are not working; the foundations of democracy are being deformed; and the sovereign rights of union republics and autonomous formations are not being properly protected. All this, of course, demands the strengthening of central power and its investment with the kind of prerogatives that would allow it to promptly and precisely direct and control the process of social transformations in the conditions of the growing diversity of forms in political life. The party's changing functions within the state and the increasing number of sociopolitical organizations entail the institution of a presidency, and, in turn, the existence of this institution will help to renew the functions of the Communist Party itself.

In connection with Yu.N. Afanasyev's speech, the speaker said that an opposition in our country really does exist. It is simply a question of ensuring that it takes the appropriate legal forms. Nothing is stopping him and other comrades who share this point of view from leaving the CPSU and setting up their own organization.

People's Deputies N.I. Dementey and A.S. Yeliseyev also took part in the debate before the interval.

The first Congress session also adopted a resolution on forming a Congress editorial commission.

The debate on A.I. Lukyanov's report was continued at 1600 hours.

Voting Figures for Presidency Noted

LD1303143590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1428 GMT 13 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar (TASS)—The extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies today established the post of the country's president.

The vote was 1,817 deputies in favor; 133 against; 61 abstentions.

Implications Viewed for CPSU Multiparty System

PM1303102090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Parliamentary observer Miroslav Buzhkevich article under the rubric "An Item From the Congress Agenda": "Let Us Look to the Future"]

[Text] Yesterday the USSR people's deputies, receiving before the start of the sitting a small pack containing materials relating to the agenda for the extraordinary third congress, found there a draft Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution on Questions of the Political System.

Let me remind you of the crux of the matter. The country's existing Constitution states that the CPSU is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system. This same Article 6 of Chapter 1 of the Fundamental Law enshrines the party's right to determine the general prospects for society's development and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy line.

In the conditions of developing perestroyka in our society, of political and economic reform, when real power is being transferred to the soviets of people's deputies, and of the rapid development of democracy, glasnost, and pluralism of opinion, this monopoly does not accord with the tasks facing the country and the CPSU itself. This question was the source of keen debates both within and outside the party. Their logical culmination was the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that began 11 March on submitting, by way of a legislative initiative, proposals on the aforementioned amendments to the USSR Constitution. The adoption of the new versions of Articles 6 and 7 will be an important event in the country's political life. Because under these articles, the CPSU and other party, trade union, youth, and other social organizations and mass movements participate in the formulation of the Soviet state's policy, the administration of state and social affairs through their elected representatives to the soviets of people's deputies, and other forms. They all operate within the Constitution and Soviet laws.

Thus after ratification by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies of the aforementioned amendments to the

USSR Constitution, the conditions for a multiparty system will basically arise in the country.

What must communists and the party as a whole do in order to be the vanguard of our people and society in practice? I discussed this with many people's deputies in the corridors at the congress yesterday.

Although, as one of my interlocutors observed figuratively, the fruit of political pluralism is only just swelling, it could achieve ripeness very rapidly. We must, therefore, learn to work in the new conditions.

V. Kucher, editor of MAGNITOGORSKIY RABOCHIY, was perhaps expressing the view of many communists most trenchantly when he said that it is necessary to fight a real battle to restore the party's prestige. While renouncing the monopoly of power, it should gain a monopoly of the people's trust. Every communist must be aware of that. However, in his opinion, among the middle level of party workers there is still a strong reluctance to accept criticism. Of oneself, naturally. At party meetings and plenums of certain committees they can criticize central CPSU organs without fear. None of the local leaders objects. But as soon as their own actions are touched on, the red light is illuminated—stop! This undermines the party's prestige.

The party should indeed be the mind, honor, and conscience of the era. Speaking of this, People's Deputy N. Engver observed that in the years of Stalin's terror and Brezhnev's great stagnation, the party chiefly "attracted" the opposite of prestige. It began to acquire prestige when it proclaimed perestroyka. Therefore, there should be a further consistent return to Leninist methods of party work, with special emphasis on the political education of the masses.

The major Soviet scientist V. Platonov, president of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, believes that the strengthening of the party's vanguard role in society requires the renunciation of many stereotypes of the past. First of all, in his view, the very principle of democratic centralism should be changed. Hitherto ordinary communists have not participated genuinely and effectively in the party's activity. Things will change radically when primary organizations are granted truly broad rights to resolve questions that were formerly resolved on their behalf by the party apparatus.

The academician likened our times to a revolution. The one after October 1917. The comparison is highly apposite, because the changes taking place in Soviet society are striking. So why do communists, and first and foremost party leaders, by no means always go to the people's masses in order to assert the ideas of perestroyka in action and advance it with real deeds? Or if they do so, they are often too late.

Nearly everyone with whom I spoke yesterday—workers, kolkhoz members—dwelled on the problems of the work of the party apparatus. Without an administrative mechanism, no political structure can exist. That applies to the CPSU, too. That is obvious. But in our party, over the years the apparatus began to play an entirely different role from that intended by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. It degenerated from the party's helper into its master. This truth is sad, but real.

A good many various proposals were voiced. No one proposed abolishing the apparatus "as a class." It must be cut drastically. In the view of some of my interlocutors, rayon and city party committees could be abandoned. Or at least their full-time apparatus could be reduced.

Of course, not all the remarks cited here are beyond dispute. Much still has to be discussed and reinterpreted. But one thing is beyond dispute: Without waiting for real opponents to emerge who seek to influence state policy and society's life, communists and the entire CPSU must learn and prepare for work in the conditions of a multiparty system.

Speakers Address Third Congress 13 Mar

Ryzhkov Views Presidency, Government

PM1303221190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, on 13 March by correspondent N. Krivomazov under the "Mini-Interview" rubric: "N.I. Ryzhkov: 'Redistribution of Power Under Way'"]

[Text] Yesterday before the opening of the Congress, our correspondent talked to N.I. Ryzhkov, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Krivomazov] Nikolay Ivanovich, what is your attitude to the idea of the presidency?

[Ryzhkov] My attitude to this idea is positive. It goes much deeper than certain comrades would have it when they claim that the situation in our country is grave today and that therefore we need a president, we need a firm hand, and so forth. This is not the point. A redistribution of power is under way. And what is more, during this redistribution much is still escaping us. Party power is waning, while executive power is not yet firmly established, it has not yet gotten used to working in the new system. Consequently, a system is to be set up today—a system for the management of the state. An effective system which will take account of the changes which have occurred in recent years. Therefore, I consider this an entirely natural process. This has nothing to do with personalities. Whether it be Gorbachev or someone else—it is a necessity, a vital necessity. If we do not do it, there will be no balance of power. Yet power must be balanced. Only then will the state function normally. Just take a look, an imbalance has occurred, and we felt it immediately. For instance, the losses incurred through strikes during the last two months are equivalent to those incurred through strikes during the whole of the last year. Therefore, I must repeat, organs to manage the country are being created today. In my opinion, last year when we were establishing the Supreme Soviet we did not think the whole structure through. However, life has shown us what is needed, and, clearly, this is what has to be done. Otherwise we would have to return to the old practices when party power ruled supreme. However, that is no longer possible today.

[Krivomazov] What do you think, will it be easier or more difficult for you to work alongside a president?

[Ryzhkov] I believe that whatever happens, it will be difficult. My opinion is this: All three powers in the country must be strong. If we strengthen only the power of the president, but have weak government power and an even weaker judiciary, nothing good will come of this. Executive power, that is the supreme executive and administrative power of the country, must also be strong. Then it will be able to cope with all the tasks which the Supreme Soviet is raising. However, if we believe that the Supreme Soviet should be a strong organ, while the government is simply some kind of "appendix", we will get nowhere.

[Krivomazov] The Law on Ownership—how will it affect the economic situation in the country?

[Ryzhkov] Many people disagree with me on all laws. However, I say laws are necessary. Without laws there can be no rule-of-law state. However, it cannot be expected that the laws will have an instant effect. They have a very big inbuilt inertia. They need to permeate the whole of society. Society must get used to them.

Ryzhkov Views Lithuanian Move

LD1303202190 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 13 Mar 90

[From the "News and views" program; read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Well, as you heard, the session of the Lithuanian Parliament has sent an appeal to the chairman of the European Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, informing him about the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state and proposing that talks be held to settle the questions arising in this connection. Our reporter at Parliament, Vyacheslav Terekhov, has sent us these details: [passage omitted] Well, this question of course is of interest not only to people's deputies. Journalists are eager to know not only their point of view, but also that of the country's leaders. When Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov appeared, journalists surrounded him at once, and the first question they put to him was his attitude to developments in Lithuania. Nikolay Ryzhkov said:

[Ryzhkov in Russian, fading to English report] My attitude is negative, Nikolay Ryzhkov said. I think people should be aware of what they do when they take important political decisions—otherwise lots of such decisions can be taken overnight. But this is not the way to act. This is a serious political decision that requires a serious consideration—a serious examination within the union of which Lithuania is a part of today. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov, Ligachev Comment on Lithuania

LD1403030490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2115 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] Here are fragments from an interview which was given to TASS correspondents today by Comrades Ryzhkov and Ligachev. During an interval of the congress, Comrade Ryzhkov spoke about his attitude toward the post of president and the events in Lithuania.

[Begin recording] [Ryzhkov in mid sentence] and the presidency...deeper roots, of course, than those which my comrades are stating. The situation today is difficult and that's why we need a president, a firm hand and so on. Yes, Yes, but this is not the point. A redistribution of power is underway. Here, with this redistribution, we are losing out today. Party power is slipping away. It, in point of fact, as they say, had the real power the whole time, but it has not yet strengthened its executive power in any real fashion and has not yet got used to working within the new system. so, a system should be created today, a system for governing the state. [murmured questions heard in the background] Well, on Lithuania, my attitude is negative. I think that people need to be aware that they are making very large political decisions. One cannot simply one night make such decisions. It is true we have not yet seen, but we can imagine, that things are not done as this was done there. These are serious political decisions and they demand serious interpretation and serious study within the union in which Lithuania finds itself today.

[Unidentified correspondent] What is your opinion on the Baltics and how do you view the independence of Lithuania?

[Ligachev] Lithuania, yes?

[Correspondent] Yes.

[Ligachev] I think that, in my point of view, you may not agree, I think that this is a great misfortune for the people. Yesterday I read a document which is being adopted there which states that they, as it were, are inheriting—who are they? well, evidently, the new leaders—a ruined economy, impoverished rural and urban areas and a spiritually crippled people.

[Correspondent] What debt do you think that Lithuania owes to the USSR, how much?

[Ligachev] I think...I think this...as you know we have now commissioned the Congress of People's Deputies, groups of comrades headed by the government, and they will evidently consider all of these issues. They are so complex that to answer unambiguously is very difficult. [end recording]

Arutyunyan Addresses Congress

LD1403031890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1658 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Speech by Deputy S.G. Arutyunyan at the 13 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Moscow Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies. The poignancy of the discussion which has developed at the congress speaks eloquently of the vitally important problems which we are discussing today. The need to introduce the post of USSR president, of an individual head of state, has been brought about by the very course of perestroyka processes. The coming into being of democratic institutions, the separation of party functions from those of the state are proceeding in a way which is much more complex and more painful than planned. We have found ourselves in the situation when the active legislative work is failing to attain its final goal—that is, the implementation of the laws adopted. There is a patent shortage; I would even say, the vacuum of power at hand. Even if this is an exaggeration, it is not very great.

The country is going through enormous difficulties and social tension. The problem of personal, national, and social safety has become more acute. This goes as far as openly ignoring laws and bloody conflicts. Today it is very simple to organize a blockade of a neighboring republic, to perpetrate progroms on interethnic grounds, to evict people from their native land, to incite crowds to destruction of border installations, to the seizure of buildings of the party committee and of bodies of soviet power.

Against the background of falling living standards and of the unfulfilled expectations of the people, all this is promoting the further increase of critical phenomena in society and seriously affecting the progress of perestroyka. In effect we are faced with the choice: either we will come out of the increasing crisis in a civilized democratic way or society will be driven into the abyss of anarchy and chaos. Now as never before what is necessary are laws which protect our society from imbalance and distortions and ensure its democratic development. New state mechanisms to implement these laws are no less important. The ratification of the post of the country's president will be, in my view, a key stage on the path of creating a law-governed state, in which legislative and executive power—power which is flexible, effective, and capable to tackle opportunely urgent problems—will be tied up organically.

The institution of presidential power is being introduced during a complex and difficult moment of perestroyka, and it is quite justified that the president should have special powers when emergency situations arise. But the essence of the presidency is not being reduced just to that. It means not only the urgent filling of the vacuum of power but also a necessary step towards raising the effectivenes of state power on a democratic basis, a logical continuation of the process of forming its integral system. In our enormous multi-ethnic country, the president endowed with broad powers will become an important guarantor of the unity of the federation under renewal, a guarantor of the stability of the state and undoubtedly, a guarantor of the sovereignty of the union republics. He is required to ensure compliance with the constitution and the laws of the USSR, of the rights and freedoms of respective [rus sootvetstvuyushchiy] citizens, nationalities, and peoples residing in this country.

Today many are concerned with the possibility of the transformation of the presidential institution into a regime of authoritarian power. This is understandable. Our hearts remember the pulse of bitter experience of the past decades. Nevertheless, the bill under discussion envisages, in my view, a sufficient range of measures to prevent any intent to establish a regime of personal power. At the same time, as even our present experience of the years of perestroyka shows, the indecisiveness of power is also fraught sometimes with severe consequences.

It would also be desirable to introduce into the bill Article 127 (8)—the provision about the fact that a USSR president can be removed from his post both in cases of breeching the USSR Constitution and USSR laws and in cases of poor performance of his duties. The innovation proposed would bring this article into line with the text of the oath of USSR president. Most dangerous of all at this crucial stage of the revolutionary renewal of society is a crisis brought about by the absence of power.

The experience of our region, and of other regions of the country, bear out that crisis phenonmena are often aggravated because of the lack of state administration mechanisms in extraordinary conditions. Granting the president the right to introduce, if need be, provisional presidential rule in individual localities, and the elaboration of an effective and efficacious system for implementing this right, will become the instrument which will make it possible to prevent developing conflicts, and the possibilities of the state for ensuring security and order in the country will increase.

We would also consider it expedient to invest the president with the necessary powers for taking emergency measures in overcoming the consequences of natural disasters and major industrial and ecological catastrophes. We say this because in Armenia an extremely difficult, critical situation has now arisen in the earthquake zone. The decisions made by the union organs have in effect totally collapsed. The annual program of restoration work has only been fulfilled by 10 percent. Many union republics are renouncing their obligations. All of this requires the taking of immediate measures at union level.

Many speakers have voiced justified concern from this tribune regarding the fact that the introduction of a presidency, a sharp increase in executive power at federation level, could lead to a weakening of the organs of power at republican level, and restrict the sovereignty of the union republics. It seems to me that this side of the matter in the draft law has not been adequately worked through. In order to fill our federation with real content, the elaboration of effective guarantees, securing the optimal correlation between the powers of the president of the USSR and the organs of power of the sovereign union republics is of paramount importance. Proposals have been voiced on this account which merit attention.

For my part, I propose enhancing the legal status of the federation council. Article 127 (4) in the draft law could be supplemented with the following provision: in the event of a disagreement arising between the president of the USSR and the members of the federation council, the president implements decisions adopted by not less than two thirds of the votes from the overall number of members of the council. The president should thereby be granted the right to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a proposal for the annulment of the decision with which he is in disagreement. The introduction of the post of president of the USSR strengthens state power at union level, but the union republics are no less in need of such strengthening. In many of them a multi- party situation has in effect already become established. An open struggle for power is underway, and here there can on occasion be very sharply felt a deficit of executive power, a need for an effective mechanism ensuring democracy in the mutual relations and actions of all social forces. I think this goal would be served by the introduction of a plenipotentiary presidency in the union republics, which would become the logical continuation of the new structure of administration which is being created in the country.

Moreover, we shouldn't be worried by the problem of the compatibility of the competence of the president of the federation and the presidents of the republics; each of them will act within the scope of their powers. I agree, there is much here that has yet to be thought through; primarily, to take account of the interests of the autonomous formations, and perhaps a review of the union treaty, to begin conclusion of appropriate treaties between the union republics and the autonomous formations which belong to them.

Another point: in the submitted draft law, practically all matters relating to the adoption of citizenship, the renunciation and deprivation of citizenship are the exclusive prerogative of the president of the USSR. In our republic this is seen as an infringement of its sovereign rights. This matter obviously needs further study.

I would like to stress once again that I am a supporter of the introduction of the post of president of the USSR. Taking account of the situation in the country, I consider that the election of the first president has to be conducted at the current Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. In pinning great hopes on the leader recognized by the country, we are at the same time forming a precisely operating democratic mechanism of supreme power, incorporating a responsible parliament, a plenipotentiary president and an active government. We are thereby strengthening the political guarantees of the irreversibility of perestroyka. Thank you for your attention.

Moiseyev Speaks on Emergency Situations

LD1303234690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2203 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Speech by M.A. Moiseyev, first deputy minister of defense, at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Chairman, esteemed deputies: I would like to speak about Article 127, paragraph 15. We need to share and make you understand the fact that a military situation and an emergency situation are two different things. And they should not both be in Article 15. We propose and understand that a military situation should be imposed at the start of an aggression by an enemy or if there is an immediate threat of it. This envisages that in areas that have been declared to be military situations, all the functions of the bodies of state power and defense and state security administration are handed over to the military command. Therefore, the president should personally make decisions on this question. Therefore, there is no need to introduce provisional presidential rule in these instances. And then the procedure which the deputies are proposing may be carried out and all the remaining questions can be made known to the corresponding Supreme Soviet.

It is to precisely this that I would like to draw attention. If we consider this military situation together in the same way as an emergency situation, and if a military situation begins and you strive to get this two-thirds of the votes, you will realize that it will then be impossible to guarantee the security of the country and the security of the motherland and its borders.

Everyone today is perturbed by this question of emergency situations, and I understand the complex nature of the situation that has been developing in a number of regions in our country. In an emergency situation declared in peace time in the interests of the defense of the USSR and ensuring the security of its citizens, power remains in the hands of local bodies of power and administration. In this instance, can presidential rule be introduced as well? And as far as what deputies have added to this is concerned, I think you might agree with this.

Lukyanov on Lithuania, Republics

LD1303210290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Program presenter Igor Fesunenko] Well, in short, the congress is continuing its work. Each of its regular sittings comes to an end, but the work of the deputies does not cease. They work during the intervals and hold news conferences, interviews, and meetings with Soviet and foreign correspondents. Of course, there are a great many questions connected with presidential rule, and, naturally, there is discussion about the events in Lithuania:

[Anatoliy Lukyanov, talking to a group of people in the Kremlin foyer] We will examine this question thoroughly. This is not a discussion between the USSR and a republic, with one or two participating; this is a discussion between all the republics which comprise the union with these republics. The union is not the center, or Moscow, or Gorbachev, or anyone else. The union is the unification of the republics, a federation of republics, that's all.

[Correspondent] But many republics are saying that we must have a discussion about a new union treaty.

[Lukyanov] I am in favor of a new union treaty, but it must be renewed and a solid law must be made in which a union treaty will be renewed. There's nothing terrible in that, time is passing, treaties are becoming outdated, and they need to be renewed.

[Correspondent] What do you think? How soon can we expect a new treaty, during this year?

[Lukyanov] Political decisions need time. [video shows Lukyanov talking to a group and a view of the crowded foyer from the balcony]

Kudryavtsev Report Described

LD1303154890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Report by Marina Novitskaya]

[Excerpts] As you know, the congress has devoted the whole of today to discussion of the main issue—that of making changes and additions to the USSR Constitution. [passage omitted]

At the end of the afternoon session, deputies' questions were answered by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

After that, on instructions from the drafting commission, an address was made by Vladimir Nikolayevich Kudryavtsev [commission chairman]. He explained that all amendments, of which there had been over 370 submitted in the course of the debate or directly to the secretariat by individual deputies, had been examined by the commission, and some of them had been accepted. Thus, new wording is proposed for Articles 6 and 7, which encompass the notion of political parties. The commission proposes, for instance, that Article 6 will now read as follows: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other political parties, as well as trade union, youth, and other public organizations and mass movements play a part through their representatives elected to soviets of people's deputies and in other ways in shaping the policies of the Soviet State and in the management of state and public affairs.

Some amendments have likewise been introduced into the proposed chapter dealing with the president of the USSR. In the main these concern those points relating to the president's right to declare martial law or a state of emergency in individual localities. Here the amendment guarantees the rights of union republics and account is taken of the wishes of autonomous republics and other autonomous formations.

Certain other clauses have also been added. For instance, this one: The USSR president cannot be a people's deputy. In addition, he may receive pay only for the post of president.

There were certain other observations too, all of which Kudryavtsev explained in detail, just as, incidentally, he also gave a detailed explanation of why the commission had not taken account of certain remarks or other submitted by deputies.

After the break deputies were invited to put questions to Vladimir Nikolayevich Kurdyavtsev, and a line immediately formed at the microphone. So, what kind of questions were asked?

For instance, is there a need for two councils attached to the president—a presidential council and a council of the federation? Should the Constitution not say that the president cannot be at the same time a party leader? Kudryavtsev replied to these questions in the negative, and in my view he was quite right to do so.

On the other hand, he agreed with a suggestion from Deputy Tsyplayev. This amounted to the fact that the new wording of Article 6 means Article 51 is no longer consonant with it, inasmuch as under the latter citizens are permitted to combine only into public organizations, whereas, as I have already said, Article 6 talks of political parties.

At the moment questions and answers are still continuing. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Deputy Speaks

LD1303235790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1651 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Deputy Antanaytis, with interjections by President M.S. Gorbachev, at the 3d Congress of People's Deputies in the Kremlin on 13 March—recorded]

[Text] Respected chairman, respected deputies:

Taking into consideration the fact that each republic should state its position with regard to the elections of the president... excuse me, just a minute [Sound of water being poured; Gorbachev says: "There can't be any speech without water"; laughter is heard.]

Thank you. I have been charged on behalf of the people's deputies of Lithuania and on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic to say the following. The Lithuanian delegation has repeatedly proposed in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that talks should be started between the Soviet Union and Lithuania on the restoration of Lithuania's statehood. It is being proposed to us that we should discuss a mechanism for secession of the republic from the union. The adoption of such a mechanism is unacceptable to us because Lithuania was included in the Soviet Union by force by Stalin's arbitrary rule. It is not to our liking that in the name of correcting Stalin's arbitrary rule we must soil the mood of Mikhail Sergeyevich, who is deeply respected by us and other pleasant people present here, but you must understand that we have no choice.

In Vilnius, for the third day running, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania is taking place. Allow me to acquaint you just with excerpts from some of the documents adopted. First, the act of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic on the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state.

Excerpt: Expressing the will of the people, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic decrees and solemnly proclaims that in restoring and implementing the sovereign rights of the Lithuanian state taken by an alien force in 1940, from today Lithuania becomes an independent state again.

An excerpt from the law on the designation of the state and the coat of arms: the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania decrees that in the Constitution and other law-based documents the only official designation for the state is the Lithuanian Republic, and in abbreviated and composite designations Lithuania.

Excerpt from the law on the Constitution: It is decreed that on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic the Constitution, the Basic Law of 1977, as well as the legislation of the USSR and the union republic and other laws of the Soviet Union should cease to be in effect.

The statement of the people's deputies of the USSR from Lithuania: Proceeding from the well-known fact of the annexation of the independent Lithuanian Republic by the Soviet Union in 1940, which is also reflected in the official documents of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of 1989 and 1990, we, the deputies of Lithuania, do not recognize that we have the right to take part in the adoption of the law on the status of the president of the USSR and in the elections of the USSR president. At the same time, we express the hope that the deputies from all the republics of the USSR will find the necessary solution to combine such tasks as preserving law and order for the sake of perestroyka and developing democratic institutions providing for the rights of citizens and all the peoples. Taking into account what has been said, it follows that we are present at the congress in the capacity of observers. [shouts are heard] Thus, we request that the congress render influence in getting bilateral talks started on the restoration of Lithuania's statehood. We desire good-neighborly relations with the peoples of the Soviet Union, an economic union—I stress, an economic union—cultural, scientific, ecological, and other ties. With all our hearts, we wish the Congress of USSR People's Deputies success in its work.

There is another thing I must say. Will time permit? [Gorbachev says: "You still have some time. You have another six minutes."] Oh, another six minutes. [laughs] That's all right then. [Gorbachev then remarks: "Especially because we can let observers have some extra time"; laughter and clapping is heard.]

I should thank you for your kind sentiments, and I think that we will always find mutual understanding. Now, I have in my hands the address of the Congress of Estonia to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I don't know whether I should read out excerpts, or evidently it is expedient to.... [Gorbachev interrupts: "You hand it in and we will make copies of it."]

All right. Now I must say that yesterday the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich which was brought by Bichkauskas, the representative of our soviet, and because I have saved five minutes, I earnestly ask Mikhail Sergeyevich to give him the opportunity to hand over this letter and read out some of the documents brought—in particular, the address to the congress. Thank you for your attention.

[Gorbachev then speaks to congress: "I think, comrades, that we will decide to make copies of the address, the second one that has been brought, for the delegates as well. That's what we'll do, all right?" A chorus of voices says: "Yes."]

Latvian Deputies on Lithuania's Move

LD1303160190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1512 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondent from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar—The recent decision by the parliament of Lithuania on the formation of an independent Lithuanian state and the cessation of the effects of legislative acts by the USSR on the territory of this Baltic republic does not reflect the interests of the whole population of the republic. This was stated today at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists by Viktor Alksnis, USSR people's deputy from Latvia. He reported that according to the official figures from the Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania, the deputies who voted for these decisions represent only about 39 percent of all voters of the republic.

Another deputy from Latvia, Yuriy Boyaris, holds a different view, and said at the new conference that "from a legal point of view, the decisions of the Lithuanian parliamentarians do not contradict the Constitution and other laws of the USSR." At the same time, Yuriy Boyaris noted the haste with which this decision was taken in the Lithuanian parliament, which, in his opinion, has placed the legislators of the other two Baltic republics—Latvia and Estonia—"in a somewhat awkward situation."

As has already been reported, at today's morning sitting of the Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a preliminary briefing on the decisions adopted by Lithuania's parliament. These decisions declare invalid the republic's accession to the USSR and contain a call for talks "between Lithuania and the USSR." A similar standpoint is adopted by certain political groups in Latvia and Estonia. In commenting on these decisions, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that "there can be no question" of any talks with Lithuania, nor with Estonia and Latvia. "Talks are what we have with foreign states," the Soviet leader emphasized.

PRAVDA Criticizes Some Congress Speakers

PM1303231090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Reportage from V. Izgarshev, O. Losoto, Ye. Sorokin, A. Stroyev, V. Khatuntsev, and V. Shirokov on 13 March proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, under the rubric "PRAVDA Special Correspondents Report From the Kremlin": "Post of USSR President Instituted"]

[Excerpts] They have seen a great deal during their long life, these world-famous Kremlin walls with their towers topped with red stars, these palaces, cathedrals and squares. They know a great deal, and they remember a great deal. The Kremlin is not simply the center of the capital of a great state. The history of the Fatherland is linked with it.

Yesterday was an ordinary day in Moscow, with the occasional snow or rain shower and rare glimpses of a blue sky. However, this year's 13 March is destined to go down in the history of the state. In the Kremlin, the extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies instituted the post of USSR president. Its endorsement will open a new chapter in history.... What will it be like? Time will tell. However, people in all corners of the vast state are hoping that presidential rule will finally help pull the country out of the crisis, impart momentum to it, serve the welfare of the people, and help instill peace in their souls and confidence in the future. [passage omitted]

It really is true that there are as many opinions as there are people. Involuntarily, you focus on the fact that the more difficult the situation is in a specific republic, the closer it attaches itself to the federation. The popular saying that our strength is in unity is acquiring a special meaning and a new ring today.

Of course, these themes by no means resounded in all the speeches. Thus, for instance N. Dabizha (Chobanu) from Moldavia, chief editor of the weekly LITERATURE SHI ARTA [name as transliterated], called on deputies to help protect Gorbachev from...Gorbachev. "The concentration of enormous power in the hand of one man," he said, "presents a threat to the democratization of our society which is linked with Gorbachev's name. We have confidence in Comrade Gorbachev. However, who among us can be confident that in four or nine years' time someone who has created czarist-style socialism in the USSR will not come to power? This is what we should be afraid of."

Well, such fears are understandable if not justified in a country which started breathing freely only some five years ago. However, it is hardly possible to share the chief editor's fears that "perestroyka will choke as a result of the presidency." [passage omitted]

Our organs of people's power are currently reminiscent of those social structures that are currently without a manager and whose property has been lost and now belongs to no one, I. Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar CPSU Kray Committee, said in his speech. We see this as the main cause of the stagnation and many of the social and moral distortions. And the same thing is now happening to state and local power. The CPSU Central Committee, Secretariat, and Politburo have dissociated themselves from it, as has been mentioned earlier. Our government has no rights and its members are constantly meeting, but they are unable to adopt effective measures. This situation is largely due to the fact that we do not have a head of state either who would provide the link between the authority of the republics and the center, between legislators and the executive, a kind of conductor of society, if you like. This is why presidential rule must be instituted now, otherwise we will again fall behind.

At the same time, both this speech and many others were weighed down with superfluous arguments. I. Polozkov painted such a horrible picture of the plunder of the state by cooperatives that it sent chills down your spine, as the saying goes. This is why, he argued, strong presidential power is needed. It seems that many speakers are using the congress rostrum to air problems that have only an indirect bearing on the agenda.

The speaker even discovered the existence of some kind of "parliamentary-journalistic cooperative lobby," which "now has a law that suits it, plus mass media, money, and hence also real power." All this smacks of the painfully familiar efforts "to seek out the enemy." [passage omitted]

Constitutional Amendment Ends Leading Role of Party

LD1303173590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1626 GMT 13 Mar 90

[TASS parliamentary correspondent report from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 12 March—The extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR today altered the articles of the Constitution that enshrine the monopoly role of the Communist Party in the country's political life. The congress decision essentially lays the foundations for an official multiparty system in the USSR.

As a result of a vote by name, 1,771 deputies voted in favor of changing the formulations of the articles; 164 voted against it, and 74 abstained.

The Constitution now stipulates that the "CPSU, other parties, as well as trade union, youth, and other public organizations and mass movements participate in developing the policy of the Soviet state and in managing state and public affairs via their representatives elected to soviets of people's deputies, and also in other forms."

It is also envisaged that all political parties, public organizations, and mass movements, fulfilling functions designated by their programs and charters, "operate within the framework of the Constitution and Soviet laws."

The Constitution prohibits the creation and the activity of parties, organizations, and movements whose objective is to forcibly change the Soviet constitutional system and the integrity of the socialist state; to undermine its security; or to kindle social, national, and religious dissent.

The party Central Committee agreed at its plenum in early February to review the articles on the role of the CPSU. In speaking at that time, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted that broad democratization in Soviet society is being accompanied by a growth in political pluralism. He stressed that in the new conditions, the CPSU "intends to fight for the position of the ruling party, but to do it strictly within the framework of the democratic process, renouncing all legal and political advantages, presenting its program and upholding it in discussions, and working together with other sociopolitical forces."

During the debate on these articles at the Congress, the most substantial proposal was one to prohibit the activity of all parties at production enterprises, as well as in the Army and in the law- enforcement bodies. The participants in the congress decided not to examine these proposals at the moment, but to do so in parliament, when adopting the law on parties and public organizations, which is currently being developed.

Further on Congress News Conferences

LD1303230290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 13 March carries a report by Igor Zorin on the news conferences which took place today within the framework of the third extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies. At the first news conference, there is a question on how the union president can be elected, when nearly four republics are not participating in the elections. Deputy Kerimov, a lawyer, says that he is not aware of the existence of such republics except, probably, Lithuania which declared this. He thinks that even in such a case, the president will remain a USSR president.

Deputy Lubenchenko replies that "we presented the conclusions of the committee, for instance, presented a formula for the presidential elections. It can be realistically carried out. The formula can enable the election of the USSR president according to the votes by the republics, so that the president will be the USSR president and not just the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president, for instance, which might happen at this congress."

Deputy Alksnis from Latvia is asked how would he prevent in Latvia a situation similar to that which has developed in Lithuania? Alksnis replies: "Well, I think first of all the president should speed up the adoption of the law on secession from the USSR. According to the data in my possession, two governments have already recognized the independence of Lithuania. If the law is adopted now, it can in some way halt this process. Because it is clear that if there is no law on the secession procedure from the USSR, the acceptance of such decisions will be unlawful."

Zorin comments on the working style of the Supreme Soviet as being of an administrative character, entrenched in the old traditions of the party administrative style. The full potential of the lawyers, he says, is not utilized.

The second news conference concentrates on the constitutional changes and the introduction of the presidency and their international impact. Deputy Dzasokhov, chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, Deputies Kim and Falin, members of this committee, answer questions.

Asked what influence on the currently complicated relations with the socialist countries the institution of the presidency will have and if any changes to the Constitution will be needed in Article 30, which says that the Soviet Union is an integral part of the world socialist system, Valentin Falin replies: "The congress has already decided that the whole Constitution should be subjected to reexamination and a practically new constitution should be drawn. Article 30 will be one of the first to be reexamined. Today our relations with the East European, central European, and many other countries, which are either building socialism or have socialist orientations, will continue not on the ideological basis, but on the similarity of national, state, economic, and other interests."

TASS Comments on 13 Mar Congress Session

LD1303115490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0955 GMT 13 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar (TASS)—At the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the discussion is coming to an end on the main point on the agenda—the changes to the USSR Constitution and institution of a post of president of the country.

It was chiefly representatives of the union republics who spoke at today's morning session.

Vaydotas Antanaytis, a deputy from Lithuania, noted that a session of the supreme legislative organ of the republic is into its third day in Vilnius, and he briefed participants at the congress on a number of documents adopted at the session. In particular, he read excerpts from the act on restoring an independent Lithuanian state. The document asserts that in 1940 Lithuania was incorporated into the USSR by force. The Lithuanian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) is being renamed the Lithuanian Republic. The deputy went on to announce the invalidation of USSR legislative acts on the territory of Lithuania.

As has already been reported, speaking at this morning's congress session, Mikhail Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, described the decision on the independence of Lithuania "illegal and invalid." He likewise pointed out that "there can be no question" of any talks with Lithuania. "We hold talks with foreign states," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed.

The Lithuanian representative also stated that the deputies from this republic do not regard themselves empowered to participate in adopting the law on establishing the post of the USSR president and in the election of the country's president, inasmuch as, in his words, they are present at the congress only in the capacity of observers.

A deputy from Latvia, Andris Plotnieks, criticized the draft law on the presidency. He feels that the draft "deliberately complicates the organization of power." The establishment of the institution of the presidency, the deputy asserted, has an effect on the character of relations between the union and the union republics and aggravates the imbalance between structures of the organization of power.

Speaking in favor of election of a president of the USSR at the current congress, Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party stressed that the institution of a presidency would be a guarantee of unity of a renewed federation, of the stability of the state, and of the sovereignty of the union republics. This position was supported by Kakhar Makhkamov, leader of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Ovlyakuli Khadzhakov, representative of Turkmenia and first secretary of the Tashauz CPSU oblast committee, and by Askar Akayev, president of the Khirghizia Academy of Sciences.

Voices were also to be heard in opposition. Thus, Nikolay Dabizha, a representative of Moldavia, said that necessary conditions for introducing the post of president of the USSR are first to revise the treaty of the union, ensure clear delineation of the functions of the union and of the republics, and guarantee their sovereignty.

Deputy Salambek Khadzhiyev, manager of an enterprise in Checheno- Ingushetia, northern Caucasus, spoke on behalf of the country's autonomous formations. He qualified his support for instituting a presidency with the condition that autonomous areas be given the same rights as union republics have in the near future.

Marshal Ivan Kozhedub, famous World War II ace, poetess Yuliya Drunina, and others spoke in favor of instituting a presidency. Yuriy Blokhin, a scientist from Moldavia, who spoke on behalf of the "Soyuz" group of deputies (it comprises about 300 USSR people's deputies, who have as their goal the preservation of the country's territorial integrity), spoke in favor of electing a president at the current congress. On behalf of the "Soyuz" group he proposed as candidates for the post of USSR president Vadim Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, and Nikolay Ryzhkov, head of the country's current government, alongside Mikhail Gorbachev.

Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Committee of the CPSU (southern Russia) spoke in favor of establishing without delay the post of the head of state and his election at the current congress. He stressed that this post is a counterbalance to decentralization.

After the conclusion of the debate, the congress moved on to an article-by-article consideration of the draft law on changes to the USSR Constitution.

Further Reportage on 12 Mar Congress Proceedings

PM1303170190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Single Edition pp 1, 3

[TASS report: "In the Mainstream of Renewal Processes. Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies Has Opened in Moscow"]

[Excerpts] The extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies began work 12 March in the Kremlin.

The congress was opened by M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

The deputies moved on to examining the first item on the agenda. In his report Credentials Commission

Chairman B.V. Gidaspov announced certain changes to the composition of the corps of deputies in the period since the second congress and the results of elections in some electoral districts and social organizations.

At the proposal of the Credentials Commission the congress ratified by a majority of votes the powers of the following newly elected USSR people's deputies: N.F. Naumov, from the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers; N.I. Tkalenko, from the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans; N.P. Kustarev, from the CPSU; and Yu.A. Spiridonov and Ya.V. Kulik, from electoral districts.

After this the congress moved on to examine the question of making amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution and instituting the post of president of the USSR. The report was delivered by A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Before the start of the debate on the report Deputy N.G. Dmitriyev submitted proposals that the fundamental issue be put to the vote without discussion: Is there a need to institute a presidency at all and, if so, exactly when and how should the president of the USSR be elected? The congress eventually rejected this approach.

A deputy who did not introduce himself but said he was a Muscovite made a complaint about the congress secretariat, saying that despite his requests he never received the floor. We have not been elected in order to sit here and listen to the same old speakers, who often say the same old thing, he said.

The chairman reminded deputies of the procedure for the receipt and registration by the congress secretariat of their notes asking to be allowed to speak and told them to stick to the standing orders.

We are now in a situation in which there is paralysis of power in the country. That was the statement with which Deputy S.S. Alekseyev, who opened the debate, began his speech. Power is not truly functioning, it is essentially incapable of action. Political structures have lost their old strength while state organs have not gained real state strength. And this is tragic because there is a certain impasse in the peaceful evolutionary transition that is being made from a totalitarian system to a democratic and humanist system (something without precedent in history), the speaker remarked. Marking time is resulting in the increase of unruly elements that threaten unpredictable consequences.

Going on to touch on the essence of the question of a presidency, the chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee highlighted three points in this topic. Until now we have professed a totalitarian notion of the state, he pointed out. We have regarded the state as a machine for oppression, for organizing a dictatorship, and so forth. Therefore any actions regarding the state have been seen in this context. But, the speaker believes, we must change the very vision of the state and conceive of it in a secular sense. The state means guarantees of legality, calm, freedom, confidence, and the protection of people's rights.

The second thesis of the speech concerned the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" This slogan worked well and continues to work well when it operated against the provisional government or when it comes to party structures. We expounded it when creating a collegial organ like the Supreme Soviet. But are not great minuses emerging today in parliament's work? Answering this question, the speaker declared that a purely parliamentary structure can sometimes result in an impasse, can block any decision, and, paradoxical though it may seem, is most adapted to a dictatorship.

The speaker called for the abandonment of what he believes is the current primitive idea viewing the separation of powers as merely the separation of functions. However, he pointed out, this is precisely the great idea that will be able to organize state power. On the basis of scientific data, the jurist asserted that only organized, structured state power begins to acquire its own strength. It alone can prevent overcentralization, when its main components—the judicial, executive, and legislative branches—are mutually balanced. As world experience of statehood testifies, the presidential form is the embodiment of their unity.

The speaker advocated immediately resolving the question of a presidency, stressing that it is associated with major, long overdue changes in our political system. He also urged that there be no delay in preparing a new USSR Constitution. [passage omitted]

The debate on instituting the post of president of the USSR, in the view of Deputy N.A. Nazarbayev, has defined with the utmost clarity the watershed in opinions on this score. Ultimately, he said, it would be possible to patch up today's problems even without a presidency, just as it is hard to cope with solving the vital tasks even with one.

We must activate the new machinery of power not merely for the sake of eliminating the present acute problem of personal and nationwide security and eliminating the social tensions that have arisen, though this is exceptionally important in itself, the speaker believes. It is a hundred times more important to see beyond the presidential form of rule the image of the country's future, the outlines of a sensible correlation between legislative and executive power, and the contours of a just, humane, and democratic structure of society.

The chairman of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet expressed the conviction that presidential power can be a kind of guarantee since it contains in its foundation regulating principles capable of imparting a harmonious integrity to all forms of state power. As for the specific candidate for this post, he declared, we are in favor of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whose prestige and political leadership are not in question.

The speaker went on to dwell on what he described as certain controversial points of the Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR as submitted for examination. Thus, he believes, it is not entirely clear why, if the president is incapable of performing his duties, his powers pass to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It would be far more logical to institute the post of vice president of the country.

Continuing to express his views, the deputy stated that representatives of the union republics view questions of a presidency from the angle of local problems and measure its principles against the state of the sociopolitical situation in the regions. We see this form of power as a guarantee of our federation's unity, he asserted, but the crisis phenomena cannot continue forever. Sooner or later the country will pass the difficult stage, and then other problems will emerge in their full magnitude, above all republics' sovereignty. The speaker proposed introducing similar presidential power in each union republic also. In his opinion, the law should more precisely clarify the functions of the Presidential Council and Council of the Federation.

Kazakhstan's representative devoted part of his speech to analysis of the work of previous Congresses of People's Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of the acts of legislation adopted at them, in particular the Law on Ownership, proposing that it be referred back to the Supreme Soviet for further work. He also touched on the government's foreign economic activity.

The work of the extraordinary congress, Deputy R.F. Safiullin stressed, is taking place at a complex time. There is much that perturbs people: The state of trade, the development of national cultures, and the struggle against crime. They link the solution of these and other questions with strong Soviet power and the prestige of state organs capable not only of adopting laws but also of ensuring strict compliance with them. Otherwise there can be no question of any rule-of-law state. Perestroyka has shown in a critical light the actual state apparatus and the incompetence and even lack of will of certain of its elements and officials. The huge army of managers and mass of various, sometimes mutually contradictory, departmental instructions and ordinances are no guarantee that quantity will be transformed into quality. The science of management has still not been grasped. But it is never too late to learn it. And it is a good thing that we have embarked on this path.

In the deputy's opinion, the questions being examined by the congress are tricky. Their significance is not confined only to expanding the politicolegal lexicon of perestroyka by introducing terms new to our language—president, Council of the Federation, Presidential Council, and so forth. It is also a question of the integration of power and the dominance of the law and democracy not just in words but in reality. The introduction of the post of president is simply essential now. After all, there is a shortage of stability and order everywhere, and legal nihilism and fear on the part of certain soviet and party personnel, economic leaders, and labor collectives of taking the initiative into their own hands and of increasing respect for the state are on the increase. This act will provide a real opportunity to change the situation in the country for the better. Moreover, the development of perestroyka is constantly putting forward new, equally complex problems that can be solved only given strong state power.

However high the post of president may be, it needs deputies' support and conscious responsibility on the part of all social forces regarding the fate of the country, its present, and its future. In this connection the speaker recalled the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—every person has a duty to society, only within which is free and full development of his personality possible. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of Deputy N.I. Dementey, the draft law on establishing the post of president of the USSR that is under discussion can be regarded as a guarantee of the elimination of the kind of power vacuum that has formed in the country and is now being filled by supporters of anarchy, lawlessness, and total license. This fact in turn entails increased instability in the economy and sociopolitical life and is leading to interethnic conflicts, rising crime, and a lack of confidence in the future among people. In these conditions, the speaker believes, there is a need for strong state power really capable of acting swiftly, competently, and resolutely.

In the light of this he supported the idea of introducing the institution of president in the country while at the same time criticizing certain articles of the draft. In particular, it is necessary to more clearly formulate the president's duties and powers associated with protecting the sovereignty of the USSR and the union republics and with implementing the principles of the USSR's national-state structure. There should also be specific answers to the following questions: How will the new form of rule influence the activity of our socialist federation and will the proposed Council of the Federation actually effectively implement nationalities policy?

The speech stressed that when a complex situation or even an emergency arises in a particular region, there is a need for urgent and resolute measures that as yet are not taken either by the legislature or by the executive. As a example the chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium cited the situation in which the republic found itself as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. A state program to eliminate its grave consequences there has not been ratified even now. The hope was expressed that this emergency and others will be resolved more promptly upon the introduction of the institution of presidential power in the country.

At the same time this certainly does not mean that hopes should be pinned on one-man power. The form that is under discussion must certainly accord strictly with constitutional principles and ensure efficient, high-quality work by all organs of management.

The deputy proposed that the Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR be adopted and that relevant amendments and additions be made to the USSR Constitution.

Deputy A.S. Yeliseyev advocated establishing presidential power as swiftly as possible. There are two arguments in favor of this decision, he said: The need to strengthen executive power and the heightening of the personal responsibility of the country's leader to the people. The speaker proposed that the problem of Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution be solved before the adoption of a resolution on the question of presidential rule; their retention in their present form, he believes, is fraught with a constant threat of a return to authoritarian methods of leadership.

There must be no delay, the speaker stressed, we must swiftly fill the vacuum that is forming before our very eyes as party organs withdraw from the resolution of state tasks. Today we must preclude the possibility of a restoration of the old regime through the very structure of state management.

While proposing that the first president of the USSR be elected at the congress, the speaker mentioned as necessary conditions preceding this act assurances by the candidates for the lofty post that they will be guided in their activity by the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and the congress, not by the opinion of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo or the leading organs of any new-found parties.

The speaker voiced a number of criticisms about the draft amendments to the USSR Constitution in connection with the institution of the post of president. The amendments he introduced include incorporating candidates for foreign and defense minister and KGB chairman in the list of officials submitted by the president to the Supreme Soviet and the congress, and deleting the candidate for chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee from that same list. The deputy also proposed reformulating the provision of the draft concerning the Council of the Federation, which, he believes, should unite the leaders of the executive branch in the republics and should not be an organ even partially duplicating the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

The decision on introducing the post of president of the USSR is dictated by the logic of the democratic transformations in our country, Deputy V.I. Mironenko noted. We have already made mistakes in delaying the elaboration and adoption of a new Constitution. We are also delaying the conclusion of a new union treaty. We cannot stop at the crucial moment now.

In order to improve the situation in the state there is a need for a minimum of civil consensus and political stability, the first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] continued. But these are unattainable when there is a deteriorating economic situation and people are in a disastrous position and are extremely irritated by the shortage of the most basic necessities. The speaker admitted that he does not like the path of removing certain articles from the Constitution. But the institution of a presidency, he explained, will make it possible to coordinate the activity of the new organs of power while accelerating the adoption of a new Constitution.

To the arguments already voiced at the congress the speaker added a number of points in favor of the presidential form of rule. In particular, he said that, in defending the idea of a presidency, the emphasis should not be placed on strengthening executive power. In his opinion, the expediency of introducing a presidency is justified both by general, long-term considerations and by the deepening and acceleration of democratic transformations.

While describing himself as a convinced supporter of election of the president by the whole people, the deputy suggested considering whether the exception now proposed—electing the president at the congress just for the first time—is not a serious and important check and balance. In this case, he said, the Congress of People's Deputies, possessing the right both to make such a decision and also to rescind it in instances envisaged by law, will be able to be a guarantee against an excessive increase in the role of presidential power to the detriment of other institutions.

Citing the remark of the scientist Nobel, whose name is carried by the most humane of prizes, that "any democracy ends up as a dictatorship of riffraff," Deputy I.V. Dorokhov expressed the hope that it will not prove prophetic for our country.

The question on which our future depends is the following: Will we be able to channel the energy of discontent in a constructive, creative direction, or will it be channeled into destruction and anarchy, up to and including the disintegration of the first-ever socialist state? Today, the speaker noted, not only dogmatic but also extremist forces are opposing the processes of perestroyka. Exploiting social discontent, they are seeking to seize informal and then formal leadership. Extremism is operating in populist garb, seeking to lead the crowd in its footsteps at one moment with left-wing talk, at the next with right-wing talk. The extremists are attempting to split our society. These sentiments were displayed during the first and second election campaigns.

The speaker expressed the opinion that we must be aware of the main conclusion from a number of recent conflicts and sit down at a round table for talks not after passions have run high, but before. We must learn to forecast the course of events. Crime, embezzlement, the shadow economy, and other ills mean that Soviet people are beginning to have a terrible life. They are asking why riffraff feel they can do what they like in society.

Who can impose order? Answering that question, the speaker dwelt in detail on the need to introduce presidential power. The people are fed up with promises and splendid slogans and are demanding resolute action today. With the introduction of presidential rule a rule-of-law state will be created. The deputy expressed the opinion that, in instituting the post of president, we are being not hasty, but backward. He proposed that additional work be done on the main provisions of the draft and urged: Enough of sessions let's do some work.

Deputy N.P. Shmelev resolutely supported the establishment of presidential power in the country. In a complex multinational country, he said, there is a need for a supreme arbiter elected by the whole people. The vacuum in the political sphere cannot be effectively filled without ensuring that the country's leader ceases to look over his shoulder at political structures which were not elected by the whole people and are still not answerable to them. It is also necessary to fill the vacuum in interethnic relations, where we cannot ensure the implementation of our own laws, foresee events, and handle them.

We are increasingly aware, the speaker continued, of a vacuum of determination, political will, and power in the most sensitive sphere—the economy, where a process of disintegration is under way under the influence of errors made in the new era. Let us speak the bitter truth: We built a madhouse in the economy and we are continuing to live according to its laws. Until we return to common sense and normal economic laws, we will not emerge from the crisis.

The way out of the crisis cannot be painless. There is a need here for maximum authority of political power, which will have to make unpopular decisions and overcome hoary ideological dogmas and the leveling mentality.

The scientist criticized the government program adopted at the last congress, describing it as irresolute and halfhearted. We must give scope to new forms of economic life that are finding it difficult to make headway. The Law on Taxation that is being elaborated is based on the old approaches: Not ensuring the maximum growth of income, but stifling initiative. The president's courage and authority are needed in order to switch from food requisitioning to a tax in kind, to put an end to the artificial support for "prostrate" farms, and to free the countryside from all vestiges of serfdom.

The deputy expressed disagreement with what he regards as the government's two-faced position on the cooperative movement, stressing that all the movement's inherent shortcomings are even more characteristic of the state sector. The clause about preventing exploitation foisted on the government in the Law on Ownership is another instance of self-deception. The harshest exploiter is the state, and no economy can live without exploitation.

We cannot manage without unpopular but necessary measures and a reform of prices and finances, the speaker said in conclusion. I hope that the new presidency will display a bold approach. We need a president not in order to suppress hunger riots but in order to make life better.

Deputy M.I. Ibragimov supported the advocates at the congress of instituting the post of president of the USSR and those who approved the basic provisions of the draft law on this question. The country has reached an important point in its movement along the path of perestroyka, he said. The transfer of power by the party to the soviets is becoming a reality and the politicization of the broad masses is growing. Of late both at the center and at local level there has been a decline in the efficiency of the management of political and economic processes, and disorganization of the economy, disregard of the demands of the law, and a decline in its prestige have become reality. Attempts by destructive forces to disrupt the normal rhythm of the country's life and to make people feel uncertain and afraid have become more frequent.

We cannot, we have no right to be apathetic onlookers of attempts to push our country into the abyss of confrontation and strife. In these conditions the full restoration of the prestige of power, the organization of effective management in the state, and the ensuring of unswerving implementation of the law are of paramount importance.

The institution of the post of president of the country, the speaker stressed, is an important step along the road of enhancing the prestige of power, including executive power. It will certainly accelerate perestroyka processes and advance the development of the economy and the democratization and humanization of society. The separation of the legislature, executive, and judiciary will also receive additional impetus.

In the deputy's opinion, certain provisions of the draft law as submitted require clarification. In particular, the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council will have an exceptionally important place in the system of state organs. The definition of their competence and procedure and forms of activity must be approached with the utmost care.

Deputy S.Ya. Batyshev believes that the presidency will certainly enhance the prestige of state rule in the country. After all, for all its prestige, the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet is rather vague in our legislation. Although he is proclaimed the top state official, he has no powers either to control the government's work or to suspend erroneous decisions. In this connection the speaker said that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet in practice has no real power today.

Speaking of the existing power structure, the speaker pointed to its functional invalidity and contradictoriness. For instance, both the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies engage in legislative activity. At the same time he believes that the presidential rule that is now proposed will not greatly simplify the existing structures. On the contrary, it is planned to additionally establish the post of president, a Council of the Federation, and a Presidential Council. Aren't we overly committed to creating such structures, which we subsequently flippantly abandon?—the speaker asked rhetorically.

The scientist stated that the proposed structures, he thinks, will complicate the adoption of swift and urgent decisions by the president. At the same time the mechanism of presidential power must be clarified so that there are reliable guarantees against relapses into totalitarianism.

Our people are worried by the future of the country, which is experiencing the gravest crisis in its history. State and executive power are demonstrating astonishing sluggishness and irresolution with incomprehensible obstinacy. In this connection the speaker is confident that we must display state wisdom by establishing the presidential form of rule and elect a president. Tomorrow may be too late. [passage omitted]

Deputy V.I. Goldanskiy straightaway set the tone of his speech by declaring that he would speak about instituting the post of USSR president, meaning specifically M.S. Gorbachev, whom he perceives as the sole realistic candidate at present. The scientist noted the variety of positions taken on this issue by the group of academician deputies he represents. There is no unanimity in the analysis of this problem, but unanimity would be strange—to say the least—today. Therefore the speaker opted not for appealing to what he described as the many-faced average voters, but for expressing his personal opinion, which coincides with the position taken by many of his colleagues from the Academy of Sciences.

There can be no doubt, the speaker went on, about the topicality of the law on the presidency, which is not only exceptionally pressing but is even overdue. It would of course be better to elect the president on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, as it is proposed to do in the future. But there is simply no time for this now. This is a matter, in the figurative expression used by the deputy, of emergency resuscitation rather than sanatorium recuperation.

He described as absurd the claims that the creation of the post of president is allegedly due to Gorbachev's desire for absolute personal power. According to the old criteria, he acquired such power exactly five years ago when he became general secretary of the party Central Committee. It is absurd to suspect that, having dedicated himself all this time to the demolition of the administrative-bureaucratic system whereby the party ruling clique was sovereign master of the country, M.S. Gorbachev has now supposedly decided to take power in a different form into his own hands.

Having unambiguously declared himself in favor of instituting the post of USSR president and electing M.S. Gorbachev to this post, the speaker proposed a series of amendments to the draft law under discussion. Specifically, concerning the article on the composition of the Presidential Council, he deemed it expedient to agree on a broader circle of persons who would join this organ "ex officio" (like leaders of certain ministries and departments, for example) and would thus be automatically subject to confirmation by the Supreme Soviet. In the academician's opinion, the first president's term of office ought to be set at three years so as to ensure a smooth mechanism for the transfer of power when the current USSR Supreme Soviet's work ends.

We must not forget, Deputy E.Yu. Salayev reminded the audience, that we live in a union state composed of sovereign republics. The observance of their rights in the sphere of executive power must be backed by proper guarantees. It was from this standpoint that the president of the Azerbaijan SSR proposed a series of remarks and amendments to the draft law.

The national-state structure, he said, is too delicate a tissue of our multinational country's life to be implemented on the principles of presidential one-man command. In this context, the speaker emphasized the special importance of broad people's referenda and decisions by soviets at different levels.

In his opinion, the draft law gives the president exceptional powers in the sphere of lawmaking activity. The proposed mechanism, he believes, unjustifiably diminishes the Soviet parliament's role.

It is necessary, the deputy said, to more precisely formulate the article which covers the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency. People here, he went on, have already mentioned that the question of introducing a state of emergency in Baku was not considered by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Nonetheless, the relevant decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was adopted, with all the well known consequences. Bearing in mind the existing lamentable experience, the speaker insisted on the following being clearly enshrined in the draft law: The USSR president can declare a state of emergency subject to consent by the Supreme Soviet of the union republic concerned.

The scientist dwelt with equally keen interest on many other articles and paragraphs of the draft law under discussion. We have no right, he said in conclusion, to make a decision on such important questions in haste. There is a need for a renewed union treaty, we need new and clear-cut regulations governing the functions of the USSR and the union republics. Once we resolve these fundamental questions, and only then, will we be in a position to talk seriously about the functions we would entrust with the USSR president and the limitations we would impose on his activity and one-man command.

Having recalled that numerous arguments in favor of the need to institute the post of USSR president had been adduced at the congress, Deputy A.I. Kazannik proposed that this problem be examined from the viewpoint of the scientific organization of management labor. In his opinion, a collegial organ cannot make effective decisions in complex and fast-changing situations. Furthermore, he believes, such an organ bears only political responsibility. This is confirmed by the practice of state building, the speaker said. He cited a series of examples which, in his opinion, show that at times nobody knows who made a certain decision which subsequently had a grave effect on the future of the country and the people.

Therefore, the scientist emphasized, I advocate that the post of USSR president be instituted. Nonetheless, he deemed it necessary to declare that the proposed draft law needs a substantial amount of additional work. First and foremost, it is necessary to draw a clear line of separation of powers, there is a need to build in a system of what he called checks and balances so that no single organ of state can rise above another.

The senior lecturer in an Omsk State University faculty went on to analyze a series of articles in the law under discussion concerning the rights and duties of the USSR president. A series of his proposals concerned the interpretation of the president's responsibility to the people. He called for broader reliance on other countries' experience in the interpretation of this section of the law. In his view, the first president ought to be directly elected by the voters.

In conclusion, the speaker declared that the last sentence in Yu.N. Afanasyev's speech does not express the opinion of the Interregional Group's members. I have no recollection, he explained, of any of its sittings ever discussing Lenin's legacy or trying to interpret it in any way.

The day was drawing to a close, and the following question was raised: How should the congress continue its work? There were different proposals, almost mutually exclusive: To continue the debate into the small hours and conclude it, to give representatives of all union republics an opportunity to speak and then call a halt, to continue the exchange of opinions the next day until noon.... The results of votes on these proposals actually proved to be... also mutually exclusive: Not a single one of them got through.

At that point, the chairman made a Solomon-like decision: To give the floor to the speaker who had already been announced, and to decide on the procedure for further work in the morning. This was accepted.

Deputy Ye.I. Podolyanina, who then took the floor, called on those elected by the people to make a sensible decision based on the voters' opinion, a decision by which the people would judge their ability to lead the country out of the crisis situation and restore socialism's Leninist look. The prevailing situation demands immediate and radical solutions to impose order and improve the state of the economy. It is in this situation that presidential power is needed.

The deputies who work in agriculture, the speaker went on, realize that, along with adopting the laws on ownership and on land, they are responsible to the people also for the fulfillment of the Food Program. Much is being said now about different forms of economic management. The solution should not be at the agricultural workers' expense.

Relying on her years of experience, the kolkhoz (collective farm) chairman stressed that her farm enjoys democracy but it also has discipline, responsibility, and order.

In her capacity as deputy, as leader of a collective, and as a mother who is not indifferent to the grief caused by interethnic strife, the speaker called on people to heed the voice of conscience and impose order in the state, in the multinational family. If there is no accord in a family, everyone suffers. Misfortune will not bypass even those who are in favor of strife.

The president should be elected for the first five-year term by the present congress, and election to this post by the whole people should be enshrined for the future. Everything should be done according to the dictates of conscience.

This was the note on which the first day of the congress' work ended.

Congress Reaction to Lithuania Cited

LD1303002190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] At the beginning of the Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev, introducing the leading bodies of the Congress, stated in a voice tinged with alarm that there was no representative of Lithuania (?in the Presidium). He went on to explain that a session of the Supreme Soviet was being held in Vilnius and its decisions affected the vital interests of the Soviet Union and each of the union republics.

According to the correspondent of the Lithuanian news agency ELTA in Moscow, [name indistinct], after these words a silence fell upon the hall and Mikhail Gorbachev's warning of the situation being very serious was heard in every (?corner of it). For the majority of USSR people's deputies, this was unexpected news which they had heard for the first time from the lips of Mikhail Gorbachev. Even the formidable Yegor Ligachev this time could propose no recipe for rescuing Lithuania. [passage omitted]

A number of people in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses are alarmed. But there is also a [word indistinct] number of observers who shook the hands of the Lithuanian deputies there. A lot of warm words and congratulations were said by the Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, as well as Muscovites, Ukrainians, and Armenians. All are awaiting further news from Vilnius. The ELTA correspondent reports that the leaders of the Soviet state and Communist Party are also waiting patiently for news from Lithuania.

Correspondent Reviews Congress Proceedings

LD1203181590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1330 GMT on 12 March carries an 8-minute report on the Congress of People's Deputies proceedings by correspondent A. Ruvinskiy.

Ruvinskiy quotes the following from the address by Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Presidium, noting that Gumbaridze was the first to speak after a long break:

"He noted that in our country the introduction of the post of president will take shape on special political ground. Many factors have not been taken into account in the draft law submitted to the deputies, in his view. There should be a mechanism of collective supervision [kontrol nad] over the president. The draft law arouses serious doubts. Power is being transferred to the center. In these conditions the republics, too, should have their own presidents. The country's president should guarantee that the rights of union republics are not infringed on. The establishment of the post of USSR president should be accompanied by new treaty relations with the republics."

"Deputy Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, when delivering his address, noted that the decision to introduce the post of president is dictated by the logic of democratic reforms in the country. One should not take the path of plucking individual articles from the Constitution and changing them. But the presidency should, on the whole, speed up the adoption of a new constitution. He stresses that the main emphasis should not be laid on strengthening executive power in the country. And moreover, the nationwide election of a president is of course advisable, even though he also admits that the first time the president may also be elected at the Congress."

"The floor is now being given to Deputy Shmelev, head of a department of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Let's listen to part of his address:"

[Begin Shmelev recording] "Comrades, I want to unequivocally support the establishment of presidential rule in our country. We need this in a long-term historical context. In such a multi-ethnic complex country there should always be a supreme arbiter elected by the entire people. We need this especially (?in order to get out) of this, I hope, short-term crisis, in which we now find ourselves. Evidently, it is impossible to effectively fill the vacuum which has formed in the political sphere unless the country's leader ceases to look back to the political structures which were not elected by the entire people and which up till now do not answer before the entire people. We need to fill this vacuum of power in interethnic relations where much blood has already been spilled. We are even unable to ensure the implementation of the laws themselves, I mean laws concerned with the criminal nature of any nationalistic and chauvinistic propaganda. We are neither able to foresee events nor handle them without bloodshed.

"We are feeling more and more a vacuum of resolution, a vacuum of political will, and a vacuum of power in the most unhealthy sphere, in the economy, where, for the time being, we are unable either to bring to a halt or even, in my view, slow down markedly the collapse of the economy, a collapse under the effect of mistakes committed already during the new period.

"It is on the economic problems which, it seems to me, presidential rule will inevitably have to tackle, that I would like to dwell. I am profoundly convinced that problem number one for us today is our deteriorating economic situation. We should speak the entire truth, however bitter it is. In the economy we built a madhouse, and we are continuing to live by the laws of the madhouse. And until we return to normal, human common sense, to normal human laws of economic life, we will not get out of this crisis we are in."

"What is, evidently, holding things up? What requires authority? Failure to get out of the crisis economic situation cannot be painless. For great mistakes a high price will have to be paid. And here a maximum authority of political power is needed because it will have to make unpopular decisions, the kind of decisions which will give rise to grumbling and mass meetings. But without these decisions I personally do not see a way out of the situation, and I am afraid that without state action, without massive action in political life, we will also be unable to surmount these ideological dogmas, equalizing moods, this psychology of the equality of all in destitution, which has taken hold.

"What, does it seem to me, is most indispensable now? It is necessary, at last, to take up a position. It is necessary, at last, to stop sitting on the fence. It is necessary to stop looking back at every step to the moss-covered ideological dogmas, which are holding us back, and to return to the line that everything that is economically effective and everything that is useful is what must be. Now we are not in the mood for luxuries, we are not in the mood for ideological, so to speak, disputes, provided that we are able to climb out of this hole which we have found ourselves in." [end recording]

Ruvinskiy then comments: "I should say also that prior to Deputy Shmelev an address was made by Deputy Dorokhov, first secretary of the Bobrov Rayon party committee in Voronezh Oblast. He spoke of extremists who are straining to get into power in our country, of slander factories. Well, from his address it was nevertheless difficult to understand what specifically he was talking about. At the end of his address Deputy Dorokhov called into doubt the simultaneous existence of the Congress and of the Supreme Soviet and voiced profound dissatisfaction with the Supreme Soviet's work, having noted that it is operating according to the law of the jungle."

"Well, on the whole, the general debate, the keen debate at the Congress is now continuing and we wil inform our listeners further on how it is proceeding."

Political & Social

Yeltsin Queried on Party Reform, Baltics

90UN1104A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with B. Yeltsin, USSR people's deputy, by ETA correspondent R. Amos in Moscow]

[Text] **As I walked along Kalininskiy Prospect in Moscow to the meeting scheduled for that morning, I remembered for some reason an episode from the 19th All-Union Party Conference. I remembered how Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev pointed a threatening finger and shouted, "As for you, Boris...", and how Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin asked the conference for his political rehabilitation. They denied his request back then. But time and the people have rehabilitated him.**

[Amos] Boris Nikolayevich, at the last CPSU Central Committee plenum you declared that the party's long monopoly of power has turned it into a bureaucratic structure which has brought the country to a state of crisis and the people, tens of millions of them, to poverty. And it must answer for that. The party's Central Committee has to answer, of course, and so do the members of the Politburo, and not just the man in charge as usually happens.

Can you pick out someone specific from the Central Committee or the Politburo who is especially guilty before the people?

[Yeltsin] Each must answer for his part. Ligachev must answer for the Food Program and for the anti-alcohol decree which caused so much damage. He must also answer for the policy on cadres. He recruited the first secretaries who are the most conservative today and who are a virtual brake on perestroyka. It was he who staffed the apparat of the CPSU Central Committee. And I could reproach him for much more.

[Amos] And beside Yegor Kuzmich?

[Yeltsin] Well, perhaps Gorbachev. The events in Tbilisi....

[Amos] But was he involved?

[Yeltsin] Ligachev gave him away together with the Politburo. It means that the Politburo met on it after all, and the people need to be told about it. And then there are mistakes and inconsistencies in the implementation of perestroyka.

And more. Why did Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy, Romanov, and Grishin, who led the country to a state of paralysis, leave so peacefully? They left with honor, with dachas, and with large pensions. With everything, everything, everything that a working member of the Politburo is due.

Yazov. He must answer for Tbilisi, for Baku, and for the general absence of any sort of renewal or reforms in the Army, where nothing changed for five years.

Razumovskiy. Why has reform of the party dragged on for five years? It calls itself a vanguard party, but it trails along behind society, which continually outstrips the CPSU. The Baltic republics have outstripped society, and the party is at the very rear. What a paradox! And in general it has not implemented perestroyka inside itself. There has been no renewal. The party has only now presented a program, but unfortunately it is not very radical at all. And I voted against it.

[Amos] Were you the only one?

[Yeltsin] Yes I was. But that does not mean that the others supported it fully. They are simply afraid to vote against it openly. Unfortunately, there is still that element of fear.

[Amos] At the CPSU Central Committee Plenum you proposed renouncing the principle of democratic centralism and exchanging it for the principles of general democracy, which would provide genuine pluralism in the party, guarantees of the rights of minorities, freedom of opinion, a defense for the beliefs of a member of the party or a citizen of the country, political rights, and personal freedom. How must thinking in the party change so that these principles can be implemented?

[Yeltsin] First, the opportunity to create various factions and programs must be provided. This is the essence of pluralism.

[Amos] But has the average member of the party gone this far?

[Yeltsin] I believe that we have to just start these processes in order to arrive at the final goal as quickly as possible. I meet people at the local organizations, and I have met many people, and they say that the party should not be so rigid.

Before the Congress of People's Deputies there is a plenum where they all stake out their positions. I say at the plenum that we cannot adopt such a resolution, and that in fact we cannot even discuss it never mind adopt it. It is an issue for the congress, and only the congress is authorized to decide it. But then they adopt the resolution anyway, and I end up looking like a fool. In accordance with the principle of democratic centralism I must submit to the majority, but that contradicts my principles. How should I function at the congress—as a member of the CPSU or as a people's deputy? Democratic centralism has been handed down to us from Lenin's times when Lenin created a party that was underground, militant, and readying itself to take power, but not democratic.

That is the first thing. Secondly, Lenin always intended for these principles to function inside the party and not to be extended to the soviets and other civilian institutions.

[Amos] Is it your thought, Boris Nikolayevich, to renounce the apparat as an instrument of power and to make the transition to democratic principles of self-management in the party using the forces of the electoral organs and of councils of the secretaries of the local party organizations?

[Yeltsin] Yes. I want to move to a party structure without the apparat.

[Amos] And what will happen to the workers of the present apparat? Where can these people be used?

[Yeltsin] Wherever they are able to work. One is a journalist, another works at a lathe, another builds....

[Amos] Are you sure that they will be able to do anything else? After 10 years of service in the apparat?

[Yeltsin] I am sure that the majority are unable to do anything else. But in the first place, some people there are past retirement age and should be put on a pension. And those who have other professions can go over to the service sphere or some other branch. And in the end we still do not have any unemployment. On the contrary, we still have too great a need for workers.

[Amos] A question about a multiparty system. Specifically when and how? Which of the parties would you yourself enter?

[Yeltsin] I believe that if there is a renewal of the party and that, as a result of the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress, it turns out to be more radical than envisioned in the program of the last plenum, then the first stage is to create in the party various factions and programs that would have their own staffs, their own organizational structures, and their own representation in all the organs of power. Otherwise there will be a split in the party and the creation of a new party.

[Amos] On what sort of program?

[Yeltsin] We have a democratic platform. But the important part is not the name, it is the principles and the program. We have prepared declarations and rules for a democratic platform in the CPSU. And if not in the CPSU, then in a new party.

[Amos] That means you would join a Democratic Party?

[Yeltsin] The name is not important....

[Amos] ...but the democratic platform is?

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Amos] Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. If it is changed soon, what will happen? Up until 1977 there was no constitutional article about the monopoly of the party.

[Yeltsin] That is true. But nor did the party ever renounce its monopoly of power. This is the essence of the matter. That is, equality of all the political parties and social organizations in the life of society. Each should prove, not with declarations but on its merits and deeds, which of them will be the vanguard party that society will really choose.

[Amos] Let us return to the CPSU. You propose a gradual transition to a horizontal structure in the party in conjunction with the creation of organs of local self-management. That is, an association of communists along goal-oriented, functional, and territorial principles. How do you think communists will take this innovation?

[Yeltsin] I believe that not all of them will accept it. In this case we have to proceed in several stages. It seems to me that this principle includes getting nearer to the people. But this process must move slowly and calmly. We must prepare the psychology of the communists for it. At the second stage we must dispose of the political organs and party organizations in state institutions.

[Amos] Speaking of that, how can the Army, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the KGB be depoliticized?

[Yeltsin] By eliminating the political organs in them.

[Amos] Compulsory nonaffiliation with the party for the officers and enlisted men of the Army, MVD, and KGB—is that possible, or is it a fantasy?

[Yeltsin] I do not believe that it is a fantasy. We must get to the point where a president, whether it is of the country or of a republic, will also suspend his membership in any party or social organization while in power. He must be independent in his decisions.

[Amos] At the CPSU Central Committee plenum you raised the question of subordinating party mass media only to the congress or to the party conference. Why?

[Yeltsin] It is as an interim stage, in order to make them independent later.

[Amos] Do any of the members of the Politburo currently make their influence felt on the mass media?

[Yeltsin] Yes, directly. How can the Central Committee not influence, let us say, PRAVDA if the chief editor of PRAVDA is the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Amos] In many of your speeches you have insisted and still do insist that elitism and nomenklatura be renounced and that there be no interference in questions of the appointment or election of leaders to those ranks with prerogatives at the local soviets or the Congress of People's Deputies. You insist that all privileges in the party be renounced. But what kinds of privileges do members of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo have today?

[Yeltsin] A distinction has to be made between members of the Central Committee and the Politburo. These are different notions. Members of the Politburo have immense privileges. It is easier to describe what they do not have. Their lives consist of privileges.

There exists such a monster as the 9th directorate of the USSR KGB, which serves the leadership. And no one knows how many people make it up, but there must be thousands. There are guards at all the dachas and private residences (and there are hundreds of them) that are left empty for years. The state dachas where the members of the Politburo live are free of charge. And each has a cook, waiters, and guards.

[Amos] And what do they pay for, Boris Nikolayevich? Let us say a uniform is sewn for them or they eat a tasty meal—who pays for it?

[Yeltsin] At the moment I find myself in an uncomfortable position. Just the day before yesterday they suddenly renounced it all! But when I was on the staff of the Politburo, all this was done through the 9th directorate. They even have special kindergartens and children's sanatoriums.

[Amos] To end our conversation about interparty matters, I would like to ask your opinion of the decrease in the amount of membership dues.

[Yeltsin] First, I believe that students and retirees should not have to pay dues at all. And for other communists, a reduction in the amount of dues by a factor of 1.5-2 is realistic.

[Amos] You expressed the thought that we need to move from a unitary principle of the construction of the state, and accordingly of the CPSU, to a voluntary union of the people and a voluntary union of the communist parties of the republic. How can that be achieved at the present stage of the development of our society?

[Yeltsin] Just as you people have done it.

[Amos] Through parliamentary and democratic methods?

[Yeltsin] Yes. But, of course, only if there is no foolishness and they do not forcibly restrain some republic that wants to secede from the USSR.

[Amos] In your election platform you, in particular, propose that a program be developed to organize the voluntary return to Russia of the Russian population currently living in the other national rayons of the USSR. How do you intend to implement such a program in terms of ethics and resources?

[Yeltsin] I believe that we must give independence to all the autonomies within the borders of the Russian Federation. And then create, for example, six independent Russian territories where the majority of the population is Russian. So that the Russian knows that he still has a homeland. Just like the Estonian, the Latvian, and the Lithuanian. Or any other. Therefore we need a law that if a person or a family wants to return voluntarily or just to travel to this independent Russian territory, he will be welcomed there with pleasure. In the first place we need a law concerning compensation for the property that is left behind in the republic, and in the second place we need to create jobs and social conditions for residence in Russia. First and foremost we are looking for people in the rural localities, where we have a colossal vacuum. Hundreds of towns are in ruin. We must restore these lands—in former times Russia not only fed itself but even exported food. But now...

[Amos] You expressed support for some progressive ideas from the platform of "Pamyat." What sort of ideas are those?

[Yeltsin] No, I never said that. I said that "Pamyat" is breaking up into factions. The extremist part I categorically renounce. But as for what this movement began with: A struggle to preserve monuments, to restore them, and to study Russian culture, history, and architecture—I fully support these things.

[Amos] What sort of future do you see for the Baltic republics? What degree of independence? Their existence in the USSR or outside the state?

[Yeltsin] I am for maximum independence of the republics. The central authority should only preserve some small sector of strategic planning with a minimal apparat. That is all the center should present of itself. The republics should decide everything else.

It seems to me that, having received almost maximum independence, the percentage of those who want to secede from the USSR will decrease somewhat and there will be less tension. Why not try such independence, but within the USSR? Several years will pass, let us say three years, and then both the republic and its people will decide. If everything that has been promised only remains on paper, if the laws do not work and the center does not wish to give power to the republics, then it is fully permissible for the republics to leave the USSR.

[Amos] In your interview for the newspaper SUNDAY TIMES, you said that there are prerequisites if the "Rumanian variant" is to take place in the Soviet Union.

[Yeltsin] Let us assume that we in the center are not going to undertake the radical measures that will promote democratization and the renewal of society. But people are already tired, there have been no changes, and the only way out of this situation is for the people themselves to take their fate in their hands. But are we confident that this process will take place within civilized bounds as it did in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, and not as in Rumania? But those organs—the KGB and the Army—are too powerful here. We see living examples of how they can be brought into action. And then civil war can break out. Although, of course, we must not allow that in any case because of the loss of life.

[Amos] You expressed the opinion that M.S. Gorbachev has fallen behind in his activities by two or three years. What can he do?

[Yeltsin] He needs to change his thinking.

[Amos] In what manner?

[Yeltsin] Perhaps he will still understand that he needs to renounce his support from the right, conservative wing. And finally, he must choose between the people and the apparat. The time is past for half-measures and compromises that just lead to dead ends and give no results. The time has come for radical measures.

[Amos] There has been a lot of talk in the press that the final goal of your electoral campaign is to become president of Russia.

[Yeltsin] No, I have not set myself that task. It is just that when they nominated me the voters demanded that I not act the way I did at the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies, when I refused to accept. And so I agreed. But that does not at all mean that I will fight with all my might for the presidency of Russia.

[Amos] But if they elect you anyway, what will your first steps be?

[Yeltsin] I will do what the center did not do in the country in general. And that is the radicalization of all reforms. And the most important issue is the question of nationalities. We must anticipate complications in this sphere. The national formations must immediately be given political and economic independence, the right to self-determination, and even the right to secede. And in this fashion we will reduce the tension that exists.

Girenko Discusses Interethnic Relations

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[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "The Policy Is Formulated, the Task Is To Realize It"]

[Text] [SOYUZ] Andrey Nikolayevich, it is obvious today to everyone how imperfect our nationality policy has been, made worse, what is more, by a variety of political, ideological and economic deformations. What is being done to remove these deformations?

[Girenko] I would not assert this so categorically. There have in our country's history been very different periods, which have been reflected in nationality policy also. But let us take an impartial look at its results. After all, it is a fact that dozens of nations and nationalities have acquired statehood for the first time. In speaking about this we more often than not cite the example of small peoples. And forget that prior to the revolution even the Ukraine, Belorussia and Georgia were in the position of provinces of the Russian Empire.

And let us take the development of the economy of the country's outlying areas, their successes in the training of national personnel, the acquisition of a written language by nations and nationalities which did not previously have such and the flowering of literature and art. Could anyone deny this?

And none of this was manifested of its own accord. It is well known that the Bolsheviks approached the October Revolution with a program which clearly expounded their attitude toward the nationality issue and which was fully supported among the working peoples of Russia.

The adoption among the first decrees of Soviet power of the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the peoples and their right to free self-determination, the abolition of any national and national-religious privileges and restrictions whatever and the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups, appeared as evidence of the consistency of fulfillment of this program. The Soviet Government appeal "To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East," which guaranteed the freedom and inviolability of Muslims' religious beliefs, customs and national and cultural institutions, was published on 22 November 1917. And these were not simply slogans. As a result of the pursuit of a consistent nationality policy 16 autonomous state formations were quickly created within the Russian Federation. In the republic the interests of small peoples were represented by 30 provincial nationality affairs departments and 12 peoples of the Russian Federation departments—under the auspices of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities.

This body was unparalleled. And its experience, in my opinion, is in need of closer study. It was entrusted with the tasks of ensuring national-state building and the cooperation of all nationalities and tribes of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and also of the fraternal republics and promotion of their material and spiritual development with regard for the particular features of everyday life, culture and economic status.

So I have spoken of the results.

[SOYUZ] But, Andrey Nikolayevich, you would not deny that they could have been far more substantial?

[Girenko] This is an entirely different matter. There are many reasons of both an objective and subjective nature, which led to the deformations about which I am speaking, why we have not achieved what we could have achieved and to which we aspired. With time the activity of the central and then local organs of administration also ceased to take account of national specifics, and they were leveled, as it were. The successes, which there undoubtedly were in the solution of the nationality question, came to be absolutized, and the viewpoint concerning the problem-free nature of national relations became pervasive. And ultimately all this led, as the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference observed, to the "dynamism characteristic of the initial stage of the formation of a multinational state of soviets being appreciably lost and undermined by the departure from Leninist principles of nationality policy, violations of legality in the cult of personality period and the ideology and mentality of stagnation."

[SOYUZ] So what needs to be done to remove these deformations as quickly as possible?

[Girenko] This question today confronts all of us, the whole party. But it is not enough now to remove the deformations. It is essential to lend impetus to a further improvement of national relations. The paths of this process were determined in the CPSU Platform "The Party's Nationality Policy Under Current Conditions." As you recall, representatives of literally all peoples of the country, scientists and soviet deputies participated in its preparation and the discussion of the draft. The draft was published in the press, which enabled thousands of readers to have their say on this issue. It has to be said that it has been accorded a positive reception by the people, on the whole.

Work has begun on implementation of its ideas and propositions. Many of them have already been embodied in a number of statewide and republic legislative instruments. The USSR Supreme Soviet Second Session adopted the Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Leasing, the "Economic Independence of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], Latvian SSR and Estonian SSR" law and the declaration "Recognition as Illegal and Criminal of the Acts of Repression Against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and the Assurance of Their Rights." The drafts of such laws as "Languages of the Peoples of the USSR," "Free National Development of USSR Citizens Residing Outside of Their National-State Formations or Without Such on the Territory of the USSR," "USSR Citizenship," and "General Principles of Leadership of the Economy and Social Sphere in the Union and Autonomous Republics" have passed their first reading.

And take Russia. A CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau has been created, a bicameral Russian Federation Supreme Soviet will be elected for the first time, a number of ministries and departments has been formed and a republic Academy of Sciences is being created.

As a result the rights of the union republics are being expanded and their sovereignty is strengthening. Now each of them has to independently, primarily from its own potential, develop the economy. But this does not at all mean that the interrepublic relations of the single national economic complex have to weaken or disintegrate. It is essential to build relations between republics on the principles of equivalence, equality and mutual benefit.

[SOYUZ] Nonetheless, the seriousness and tenseness of the situation on national grounds in certain regions not only have not diminished but have intensified. Localist tendencies and a separatist mood are being manifested increasingly, a growth of national egotism and manifestations of nationalism even are being observed everywhere in the most varied walks of life, and there have been instances of open interethnic discord. This, in turn, is stimulating social and political forces adhering to positions of defense under the flag of unity of the union of the principle of unitarism. What, in your view, are the reasons, let us speak plainly, for what are for us surprising phenomena?

[Girenko] I would like to cite information obtained in response to such a question by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, it having included it on its poll sheet. It was distributed in Armenia, the Baltic, the RSFSR and the Ukraine. The majority of those polled see as the cause of the threat to good relations between peoples of our country ill-considered intervention from the center, national extremism and the particular interests of certain groups. There is all this, as they say.

However, I would be more specific: not only the ill-considered, as frequently emphasized, intervention of the center but also the incompetent leadership of these processes locally and the haste and irresponsibility of political decisions, whose consequences are the most severe since enormous masses of people are, as a rule, a part of processes on a national basis. Analyzing the reasons for the exacerbation of interethnic relations at the sensitive and flash points, it is not difficult to see that the basis thereof are distortions of, deviations from and, in places, manifest resistance to the policy line on the nationality issue which the party formulated at the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum.

[SOYUZ] You evidently drew such a conclusion following your trip to Baku, to the epicenter of the January events in the Transcaucasus? How did the situation come about there?

[Girenko] The interethnic conflict, which arose two years ago, could and should have been resolved in an atmosphere of calm and businesslike negotiations and mutual concessions in the interests of the Azerbaijani and Armenian population living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. But on account of the political ambitions of a number of public and political figures, this conflict grew into Armenia's territorial claims on Azerbaijan and brought the two peoples to the brink of civil war. The unprecedented decisions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on the reunification of

Nagornyy-Karabakh with Armenia lent impetus to the recent escalation of the conflict. The decision cannot be seen other than as a political challenge to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which by its decree of 28 November 1989 had determined measures pertaining to a normalization of the situation in the region.

Taking advantage of this, extremist forces of the Azerbaijan People's Front called the people to arms, formed a national defense council, instigated the tearing down of the state border and pogroms against Armenians in Baku and began the ouster of the authorities which were attempting to direct events along a different channel. Ultimately the party, soviet and law enforcement authorities were paralyzed. Real combat operations with the use of weapons captured from the police and the Army, including automatic and heavy weapons (armored personnel carriers, field guns and mortars), were conducted in Nagornyy-Karabakh and in the border areas. A real threat to the lives of hundreds of thousands of people was created.

Under these conditions the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to impose a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and a number of areas of Azerbaijan and Armenia and subsequently in Baku also corresponded to the actual situation and was, in my view, the sole correct decision. Following its imposition, the escalation of armed clashes has been halted, the situation is normalizing, albeit with difficulty, and squads and individuals both in Azerbaijan and Armenia are being disarmed.

[SOYUZ] What lessons should we learn from these events?

[Girenko] Primarily the serious danger of nationalism in all its manifestations—policy, ideology, economic practice and the sphere of culture and language. We see in the example of Azerbaijan and Armenia how in a short space of time nationalist tendencies have in the literal sense deformed the consciousness of millions of people. And we should with every means lay completely bare the inhumane essence of nationalism and the entire brutality and tragedy it can bring people.

There arises also the question of the need for a prompter analysis and reaction to the realities which take shape in life. Both locally and in the center. I emphasize once again the need for joint, coordinated work. After all, the events on the border and in Baku have an entirely particular social foundation. This is corruption and bribery, which honest people cannot tolerate, the aspiration to broaden ties to relatives in an adjacent country and hundreds of thousands of refugees, which have inundated Armenia and Baku and now other republics also. I cannot predict how the country's government will solve these problems but they must be solved and, obviously, from the budget resources of the republics which are unable to ensure people's normal life.

And, finally, about increased responsibility. The political responsibility of politicians who permitted deviations from the fundamental line for the consequences of their decisions.

These deviations have led to tragic consequences with human casualties. It is essential, I believe, to make personal political evaluations with respect to the leaders who transgressed the principles of internationalism and contributed to the fanning of national enmity between the two peoples.

[SOYUZ] As you know, the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front and the Armenian Pan-National Movement met for negotiations in Riga. How should we evaluate such negotiations—as a manifestation of people's diplomacy or as a consequence of the fact that other possibilities, at the state level primarily, are exhausted?

[Girenko] Some of the organizers of these negotiations might, possibly, had they proved a success, have attempted to portray it as proof of the growth of the influence of the people's fronts and their possibilities compared with government institutions and to have made political capital thereby. Unfortunately, the negotiations did not produce positive results. I say unfortunately because it is not that important whose share in the settlement of the conflict in the Transcaucasus is the greater. When blood is being spilled, it should not be a question of personal ambitions. The price is too high. Playing on this is not only amoral but criminal.

We support the use of all measures, the efforts of the informal organizations included, for the establishment of peace in this region. As far as the possibilities of a settlement of the conflict at the state level are concerned, we believe that they are far from exhausted, and I am sure that they will be found. But the main thing is that it is necessary to act, easing the tension step by step. The question of Nagornyy Karabakh can and must be solved on the basis of unfailing compliance with constitutional principles, including the integrity of Azerbaijan. It is these principles which were the basis of the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 28 November 1989.

[SOYUZ] Events in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic show that together with those who are sincerely concerned for the future prosperity of their peoples, forces using slogans of perestroyka for the achievement of their ambitious ends are participating in the national movements also. Does it not seem to you that under these conditions some party committees have become confused, have adopted a wait-and-see position and have gone onto the defensive?

[Girenko] We have entered a period of extraordinarily acute political struggle. It has already in a number of instances reached its highest intensity. And the main task for us in this struggle is protecting the democratic gains of perestroyka.

The dynamism of the restructuring processes demands of us not only the anticipatory formulation of political decisions, in which it needs to be said self-criticially that we are not succeeding as yet, but also the prompt, ideally anticipatory, adoption of specific measures by both the party and state authorities.

As far as the opinion to the effect that some party committees have become confused in the face of the extremist part of society, I would say that there are such people, but that your question is one further example of how tenacious the old stereotypes are with us. After all, nationalist and extremist forces are endeavoring to satisfy their ambitions not only by attacks on the party but also on the soviets and the public organizations which do not share their ideas. It would be more correct, therefore, in my view, to speak of the position of all truly restructuring forces in the face of the pressure of the pseudo-restructuring forces, which frequently degenerate into avowedly anti-restructuring forces. It is most likely not only a question of confusion here but also of the party committees and the soviet authorities and other representatives of society being unable to permit themselves to act by the methods of their opponents, which are frequently amoral and sometimes unlawful.

However, they should not, I believe, be jumping onto such a thought. Perestroyka should be implemented on the basis of legality and law and order. Seeking to ensure the compliance therewith of everyone is our common task and duty. The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum was quite unequivocal on this score.

[SOYUZ] Andrey Nikolayevich, we all followed this plenum with great interest and attention. I would like to hear from you, as one who took part therein, a description, brief, of course, of the atmosphere which determined the course thereof and the significance of its decisions for the fate of the party and society.

And, further. Much attention was paid once again at the plenum to questions of interethnic relations, although a previous plenum had been specially devoted to these problems....

[Girenko] Answering the first part of your question briefly, which is very difficult, it may be said that the participants in the plenum displayed their profound concern for the fate of perestroyka. The results of the plenum indicate unequivocally that the party and its leadership intend to press ahead, develop perestroyka and boldly renew the party by way of democratization and glasnost. The general opinion was that we need to move along this path more decisively than hitherto, relying on the politicization of the masses and their civic assertiveness. As far as the second part of the question is concerned, the party defined its position on the nationality issue at the September (1989) Plenum, having adopted the CPSU platform. The February Plenum confirmed its basic propositions and at the same time developed and went more deeply into a number of questions. Nations right to self-determination up to and including secession was reaffirmed. At the same time, however, attention was called to the possible consequences of such a step, which requires as quickly as possible the elaboration and enactment of a law on the mechanism of realization of this right.

I believe that the draft is a timely reminder to the communists that they are obliged to struggle against separatist slogans and tendencies leading to the breakup of the great multinational state. Whoever is calling for secession from the USSR either does not understand what he is doing or is deliberately disregarding the fundamental interests primarily of his people and other peoples of the country. The republics relations with the center and with one another may be built with regard for the specifics of each of them—geographical location, historical paths of the formation of statehood and culture, their role in the location of the productive forces which has taken shape in the country, the nature of their own economic development and the psychological makeup and customs of the peoples inhabiting them. This would, I believe, be in the spirit of our restructuring ideas.

Obviously, in a multinational country the CPSU also must in its building take account of national relations. The aspiration to the greater political and organizational independence of the union republic communist parties is dictated by perestroyka itself and the implementation of the political and economic reforms.

There is a relationship between the strengthening of the sovereignty of the union republic and the enhanced status of its Communist Party. According the republic greater independence objectively confronts the republic party organization with the task of formulating its action strategy and tactics under the new conditions, particularly under conditions of open ideological and political struggle against other social and political movements and organizations. It would therefore evidently be correct to recognize the right of each union republic Communist Party, while taking the all-party program and rules as a basis, to itself decide questions of personnel policy, the structure of the executive bodies, finances and publishing activity and others.

[SOYUZ] The question of the revival of a number of autonomous entities eliminated in the 1940's has been posed quite often in recent years. The declaration adopted on this issue at the USSR Supreme Soviet Second Session is grounds for supposing that there will shortly be legislative enactments resolving this problem positively. At the same time it is known that not all the present population of, say, the Volga area or the Crimean peninsula has a positive attitude toward the recreation on these territories of the autonomous regions which once existed there. What is being done to achieve mutual agreement taking account of the rights and interests of both parties?

[Girenko] Truly, the declaration "Recognition as Illegal and Criminal of the Acts of Repression Against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and an Assurance of

Their Rights" provides for the adoption of a number of legislative enactments fully rehabilitating these peoples.

The USSR Council of Ministers has formed state commissions on the problems of Soviet Germans and the Crimean Tatars, which are functioning and which, I hope, will find solutions suited to all.

[SOYUZ] Various structures pertaining to study of national processes are being actively created today. They have appeared under the auspices of party authorities, in the Academy of Sciences system.... What do you see as the main goals of their activity? On whom should they base themselves, and what tasks should they be tackling primarily?

[Girenko] Yes, the urgency of problems of national relations has posed the question of the creation of the corresponding structures in state, public and research organizations. Such subdivisions have been formed in the USSR Supreme Soviet and are being formed also under the auspices of the country's Council of Ministers and, as you have said, in the Academy of Sciences system, in the CPSU Central Committee and in a number of party committees where this is deemed expedient and also in the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

To formulate the purpose of the activity of these organizations in brief, it amounts, in my view, to a search for ways to restructure nationality relations promoting the free development of all peoples of the country and a strengthening of their friendship and cooperation within the framework of our union.

The sphere of interethnic relations is so diverse that each has an opportunity to use its own forms and methods of solving its problems. It is very important that we prevent a repetition of past mistakes, when the party apparatus substituted for the soviet authorities and the representatives of the authorities predetermined scholars' conclusions.

Successful work here will largely depend on the coordination of their actions. Ideally this should, in my opinion, appear as follows: the research establishments carry out in-depth theoretical studies and provide recommendations, on the basis of which the political principles to be realized in legislative enactments are elaborated. And constant political, ideological, organizing and personnel work and legal education should be performed simultaneously together with this. And all this in the very thick of the masses and with reliance on the masses, on the local party and soviet authorities and on their deputies.

There have recently been certain changes in the orientation of the masses in connection with the granting of the soviet authorities extensive rights. People are increasingly demanding the solution of national problems of the legislative and executive authorities and connecting the harmonization of national relations with actual steps on the part of the supreme soviets and councils of ministers, both union and republic.

This has engendered in some people the opinion that the party has already accomplished its mission and may step aside. This is, I believe, a great error. The CPSU is today confronted with the task of realization of the platform on the nationality issue. And for this each party committee, primarily the republic central committees and the party committees of the autonomous republics and oblasts, should have their own programs for the implementation of its ideas, proceeding from specific local conditions.

[SOYUZ] The cover of our weekly contains only the number "7". SOYUZ is young. It is only just beginning. How would you like to see it develop?

[Girenko] Without an allowance for its youthfulness?

[SOYUZ] Per the most stringent requirements.

[Girenko] Well, in this case, highly professional: competent on the issues on which it intends speaking with the reader and responsible for each word published. You have surely sensed how painfully each carelessly uttered phrase at the time of the settlement of a conflict on national grounds is perceived. And the printed word! This becomes a document.

Great, even decisive significance, perhaps, psychologically, in the solution of conflicts is attached to public opinion. For this reason it is important to shape it in the right direction for a positive outcome, associate the country's public with the solution of the problem and make skillful use of union state and party authorities and public organizations.

Considerable importance in such situations is attached to a reevaluation of controversial moments in history; the study of little-known events and facts; the introduction in scientific and propaganda circulation of hitherto banned or unknown archive material; the publication of new history textbooks, monographs and advocacy literature and fiction and poetry on historical subjects.

It is altogether necessary in places of potential or actual national tension to put special emphasis on glasnost and openness in all things which in some way affect the interests of this national group or the other. A big positive role may be performed by truthful and candid socioeconomic and demographic statistics and prompt information in the press about events in various spheres of social life. No attempt to conceal something or other leads to calm and a stabilization of the situation but, on the contrary, to the incitement of passions and the spread of rumors and inventions.

I would like the title of the weekly, SOYUZ [Union], to become a program principle for its staff and authors. Let the voice of representatives of all peoples of the country on what brought us all together in the past and unites us today and on how we should all live to ensure that our common home—the Soviet Union—be always the dear and desired home for each nation and each nationality residing therein be heard from its pages.

Sobchak Interviewed, Denies Lobbying Charges

PM0603102090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Anatoliy Sobchak, by P. Gutiontov; date, place of interview not stated; first four paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction: "Anatoliy Sobchak: All These Accusations Are No Coincidence"]

[Excerpts] Last Sunday, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a lengthy article exposing the "cooperatives' lobby" in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the press. The people who are "pushing the 'new' economy by way of the present cooperatives" are, the newspaper wrote frankly, doing so not without self-interest. Deputy A. Sobchak was named among those who are "not without self-interest."

Two days later, Yu. Nikolayev, deputy chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, appeared on Leningrad Television. Now People's Deputy A. Sobchak was the leading figure, while the nature of the accusations had taken on a still more definite color: "Sobchak claims in the journal KOMMUNIST that he has never received a kopek from the cooperatives. That is not true," and Yu. Nikolayev showed viewers account sheets where figures on the order of 40-70 rubles were shown....

Facts are facts: Something has been said, and USSR Supreme Soviet member Sobchak is a sufficiently well-known figure in our political life for what has been said not to go unnoticed. After all, it is not, in the end, a matter of indifference to us who sits on the Supreme Soviet.

IZVESTIYA asked A. Sobchak to clarify the situation.

[Gutiontov] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, first of all: What can you tell us about the facts cited on television? What money did you receive from cooperative members, and for what services?

[Sobchak] The facts are these. In 1988 I organized a scientific training cooperative at the university, where six doctors and seven candidates of legal sciences worked. The accounts of this cooperative were what was shown on television. But the way they presented it was: Sobchak received money from cooperative members. They omitted to say the most important thing: that Sobchak **earned** this money by his own efforts, that he himself was a member and, indeed, the leader of this cooperative. [passage omitted]

[Gutiontov] But why do you think it was necessary to revert to this topic at this particular time?

[Sobchak] I will tell you frankly: I associate the newspaper article primarily with my position on the "Tbilisi affair" in general and after Comrade Ligachev's speech at the February plenum in particular. The point is that, in giving evidence to the Congress commission, all the members of the Politburo, Ligachev included, said that the only session on the situation in Tbilisi was on 7 April, that is, when Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze were still abroad. But at the plenum Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev] said exactly the opposite.

One of two things: If he was telling the truth at the plenum, that means that we are looking at collective disinformation before a commission set up by the country's highest organ of state power. And such people have no right to remain at the helm. But I think the truth lies elsewhere: Comrade Ligachev has once again deviated from the truth.

Since the time of the publication of Nina Andreyeva's letter SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has consistently reflected the views of politicians of a certain hue, and is, naturally, prepared to defend them. So I am sure that all these accusations against me are no coincidence. The attempt to discredit me is being made by the methods of a provincial attorney: When you have no real objection to make, sling mud at your rival, and then, perhaps, you will have some hope of winning the case. [passage omitted]

[Gutiontov] Now for the accusations of "lobbyism."

[Sobchak] More unscrupulousness! The question is: Why was it Tikhonov and Sobchak who torpedoed the adoption of amendments to the Law on the Cooperative System? But that is a lie—in fact, a double lie. Because it was Tikhonov and Sobchak who insisted that amendments be adopted as long ago as the second session of the Supreme Soviet. But our voice was not heeded....

[Gutiontov] Let us try now to summarize all that has been said.

[Sobchak] [passage omitted] Any freedom (and I am resolutely in favor of freedom of the press and the lifting of all censorship) also implies responsibility for what you say and do.

In conclusion, I wish to stress yet again: Everything relating to the cooperative in which I worked is strictly documented and can easily be checked. Let me add that we offered our services only at state rates or even lower. And when I am accused of some kind of self-interest, it makes me laugh. I live in an ordinary apartment block, in a cooperative apartment, I have no car, no dacha. It is the normal, ordinary life of a member of the Soviet intelligentsia. We have a great many people who are dissatisfied with their material position; I am satisfied with mine. I am only dissatisfied that there are some things that you cannot buy in the stores, and that is more my wife's problem.... For my part, most of my time is taken up by work.

I think that social tension often arises because instead of minding their own business, people spend their time calculating who is earning how much and where. It is only if someone works half-heartedly or only pretends to work, yet receives wages for it, that he has time to think about how much his neighbor earns.

Administrator Kruchina Discusses CPSU Budget

PM1303145790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with N.Ye. Kruchina, CPSU Central Committee administrator of affairs, by A. Petrushov: "CPSU Budget: Fact and Fabrication"—date and place unspecified, first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS, the newspaper PRAVDA, and the other mass media have already discussed the CPSU budget. However, judging by the phone calls and letters to the editorial office—not least from Communists—readers are not fully satisfied with the information provided on the party's financial and economic activity.

Glasnost is a natural sphere of public opinion. In a situation whereby on the eve of the 28th party congress and the election of its delegates certain forces have resumed their attempts to manipulate mass awareness, it is particularly necessary to specify our answers to many questions of concern to people on party perestroyka and to bluntly and honestly reveal to readers the full sweep of this hard process with its difficulties and initial improvements.

Above all, this applies to the new approaches to the sources and principles behind the distribution of the party's financial resources.

[Petrushov] Nikolay Yefimovich, could we start by defining just what the party budget is?

[Kruchina] We have started publishing information on the party budget in the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS on a regular basis. Readers have familiarized themselves with reports for 1987 and 1988. Some people were not satisfied by our information, but we ourselves do not consider it final. Yu. Gankovskiy, party committee secretary at the "Nizhnevartovskneftegaz" Association, got it right when he said at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum: "The budget was published in our city party organization, and the questions stopped straightaway."

Above all, we should mention the groundlessness of the claims that the party budget is unlimited and that the party is living beyond its means. This is a deliberate falsehood prompted either by ignorance of the state of affairs or by deliberate distortion of the truth.

The party receives no state subsidy and covers all its spending out of its own resources. Today we do not yet have any figures on the implementation of the party budget for 1989. This work will be completed by March-April. The party budget for 1990 is also at the formulation stage. That is why we will be talking about the planned indicators for 1989. CPSU budget income amounts to 2,568.9 million rubles [R], including R1,672.8 million in income from union republic communist parties and kray and oblast party organizations.

[Petrushov] You have given the main figure for income. What does it comprise?

[Kruchina] The party covers its requirements out of traditional sources. And the main source is membership dues. Their contribution to the budget is planned to amount to R1,489.4 million.

In order to carry out its statutory tasks the CPSU owns property. One type of property is party publishing houses. Almost R900 million has been put into their development over the past decade. A considerable amount of this money has been channeled not only into expanding the production and social base of party publishing houses, but also into raising the artistic, journalistic, and scientific standard of publishing output—specifically, the preparation of newspapers, journals, and books which would fully meet readers' growing demands. Naturally, we receive corresponding income from this investment. The 1989 plan envisages that R1,069.5 million will be paid into the CPSU budget from party publishing house profits.

For the purposes of greater accuracy I would note that approximately R10 million is made up of revenue from our economic subunits' activities and from sales of obsolete property, motor transport, and other fixed capital.

[Petrushov] So far we've been talking about sources of financial resources. But what is the expenditure? What are the main headings in that area?

[Kruchina] The party's economy is large and structurally complex. Out of its budget the CPSU finances the activity of more than 4,000 party committees and around 1,000 party institutions—political enlightenment centers, universities of Marxism-Leninism, cadre and aktiv training subunits, higher educational establishments, and so forth.

Total party budget spending on all items has been set at R2,386.8 million. The bulk of this money—R1,300.3 million—has been channeled into financing the activities of local party organs and implementing their organizational, ideological, and political work. And one in every five rubles is spent on primary party organizations' needs, including the upkeep of released workers in them.

If we take account of capital investment on developing the material and technical base of local party organs' party publishing houses, the construction of facilities by party committees and institutions themselves, and expenditure on equipping them with computer technology, around 70 percent of all budget spending will go on financing their activity.

[Petrushov] Readers are particularly interested in the spending on the upkeep of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

[Kruchina] There is no secret about that. The CPSU Central Committee funding estimate for 1989 has been set at R35.9 million, out of which the wages fund for apparatus workers accounts for R12.2 million. The remaining spending is on secondments, the holding of plenums and conferences, the acquisition of fixed capital, and economic backup for apparatus activity.

In order to provide a fuller picture of CPSU budget spending we should give the other expenditure headings: upkeep of central party institutions (the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute of Social Sciences, the All-Union Political Enlightenment Center, the Central V.I. Lenin Museum, and the "Lenin Hills" historical state park)—R29.8 million; upkeep of departmental facilities [khozyaystva], including sanatoriums—R21.6 million; acquisition of computers for party committees and party institutions—R25.3 million; and financing of the CPSU's international ties, our share of participation in the publication of the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, and other targeted expenditure—R13.2 million. The budget also makes provision for a reserve of R20 million for unforeseen spending during the year.

We devote major attention to strengthening our material base, rightly considering it the foundation without which the organization of party activity would be impossible. R436.3 million was envisaged last year for the construction and repair of buildings belonging to party organs at all levels, including spending on shared participation in housing construction. As I have already noted, priority in this area is given to the construction and modernization of the material and technical base of party publishing houses. I would quote as examples of installations under construction the printing and offset ink plant in Omsk costed at R70 million and the printing complex in Kostroma costed at R27.4 million. We are also constructing buildings for party committees and institutions. I know that in a number of places this prompts criticism from people. We cannot keep quiet about the fact that certain party committees permitted digressions from ratified plans and funding estimates as well as major waste during the construction of administrative buildings.

[Petrushov] We have also been receiving the following kinds of letters in the editorial mailbag. "It is time to realize," S. Gilinskiy of Yaroslavl writes, "that it is not a luxurious office that embellishes a leader, and it is not fancy committee buildings that create the party's prestige."

[Kruchina] I fully agree with the writer. That's our position, too. Undoubtedly, we must create the conditions for the party apparatus' work. But these should be modest and normal working conditions, not fancy conditions. And we are resolutely putting a stop to such excesses.

We have also fundamentally reviewed policy in the sphere of the construction of administrative buildings. As a result, the plans for 1989-1990 exclude the construction of 234 installations costed at R163 million. The construction and installation work quotas thereby released have been transferred to local soviets for the construction of mainly social installations.

If we talk about party budget policy over the past few years as a whole, it is typified by stricter thrift. The reorganization of party organs that has taken place in this area has been of considerable importance, as has the abolition of a number of oblast, city, and rayon party committees, as a result of which 8,500 staffers have been released. Some 840 official cars have been cut, 200 militia posts for guarding party committee installations have been abolished, and economic and other spending on the upkeep of party organs has been reduced.

The effectiveness of the measures being taken to introduce the thrift policy and elements of economic accountability into the activity of economic subunits is bearing fruit. I would back this up with just one example. We have already completed a report on the fulfillment of the funding estimate for the upkeep of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. The saving in funds was around R3 million, and R3.7 million was saved on the upkeep of departmental installations and sanatoriums.

The implementation of these and other measures under the thrift policy and the limitation of the scale of capital construction has made it possible for the party Central Committee to earmark R500 million from the 1989 budget for the purpose of increasing pensions for the poorer sections of the population. In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee decision we have been continuing to give material help in eliminating the consequences of the Armenian earthquake. Through the efforts of the Administration of Affairs' economic subunits a 140-place kindergarten has been built in Kirovakan and the spending on housing homeless Armenians in a number of sanatoriums and the "Polyana" Guest House—totaling R4.4 million—has been recouped.

That is a consolidated view of party budget spending. On the whole, income exceeded expenditure by R182.1 million. However, this does not make us complacent. The entire party budget is not isolated from the state's economy, and the changes taking place in it directly or indirectly affect its condition. According to our preliminary calculations, merely reviewing wholesale prices and tariffs will call for around R400 million in extra expenditure. And this means that as of 1991 all union republic communist parties and oblast party organizations—apart from Moscow City and Leningrad and Moscow Oblast organizations—will need financial support. The budget deficit, like any deficit, is an abnormal phenomenon. The situation requires that all of us—from the CPSU Central Committee to party raykoms [rayon party committees], fundamentally analyze ways of cutting spending, intensifying the thrift policy, and searching for—as we now put it—nontraditional sources of funding. Incidentally, this is a special point.

[Petrushov] Nikolay Yefimovich, let's turn to party apparatus staffers. This area also gives rise to different interpretations.

[Kruchina] There are currently many contradictory arguments about the party apparatus—arguments which sometimes even contradict each other. Everyone's attitude to the apparatus differs. But it is clear that no one party and no one social movement can get by without highly qualified professional cadres.

Party organs at all levels currently employ 102,450 senior officials and 33,420 technical staff. For many readers this figure may seem impressive. But what stands behind it? On average there are 79 senior officials for every obkom [oblast party committee], kraykom [kray party committee], and union republic communist party central committee, and 20 for every gorkom [city party committee] and raykom.

Constant attention is devoted to strengthening the party's grass roots. While cutting the party committee apparatus, the number [shtatnaya chislennost] of full-time primary party organization workers has increased by 1,625 over the past two years and now stands at 77,000. That is the size of the party committee apparatus.

[Petrushov] Many readers have been asking us to give party workers' salaries. There has been particular interest in this following the salary increases. What prompted the increase? Incidentally, where did the figure of R20 billion—allegedly spent on increasing party workers' pay—come from?

[Kruchina] It's hard for me to answer the second question—it's a pure fabrication. Under the 1989 budget the annual wages fund in the party amounts to R807.4 million. To be more specific, R265.7 million was channeled into increasing pay over the year. The total increase in wage funds, as I have already stated, will amount to R350 million.

There are many reasons—above all, objective reasons—for increasing wages. Demands had increased, the scale of activity had expanded, but engineers, foremen, teachers, designers, and even academics invited to join party raykoms and gorkoms could expect an instructor's salary of R190-220, while a first secretary would receive R300-390. Salary rates for many categories of workers had not been reviewed for more than 10 years. During this period the pay of managerial personnel in all production sectors of the national economy has been increased on many occasions. And that is correct.

But, on the other hand, a sharp disparity has emerged between the pay of party workers and that of national economic specialists who are the reserve for nomination to party committees. The fact that the average monthly pay of party committee and party institution workers in 1988, including all types of labor remuneration, ranked 45th among national economic sectors is proof of that.

All this taken together has led to the apparatus at many party organs being 20-30 percent understaffed for a long time now.

[Petrushov] What are the figures for the increase?

[Kruchina] It applied to party workers from raykoms to the CPSU Central Committee, as well as to released workers at primary party organizations. Rural raykom instructors' pay has been set at R280-330—the average wage level for farm leaders and administrators at kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm] departments throughout the country in 1988. Department chiefs' pay has been brought closer into line with the earnings of farm [khozyaystvo] senior specialists—R360-400. First secretaries' pay has been increased from R340 to R500-550—the pay level of leaders of profitable farms. The pay of kraykom and obkom first secretaries is now R700-850. This is equivalent to the average monthly earnings of leaders of industrial enterprises. I think there is no need to give the pay rates of all categories of workers, that would take up too much space.

Let me say the main thing—wage funds for the party as a whole have increased by 34.6 percent as a result of the salary increases—that is, to the same extent as wage funds increased when pay was raised in production sectors of the national economy. One further point: I am convinced that we should accelerate the resolution of the question of increased wages for press workers.

[Petrushov] I agree. But please explain which funds were used to bring about the increase. In this area, too, there has been a lot of conjecture. Particularly with regard to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

[Kruchina] Budget appropriations to increase wages have mainly been channeled into party committees' rayon and city components, where personnel is not being cut. At party obkoms and kraykoms and union republic communist party central committees this has mainly been done through cutting the apparatus. As for the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, 94 percent of wage increases have been brought about through cutting apparatus numbers.

[Petrushov] Nikolay Yefimovich, we cannot fail to devote attention today to a problem which has emerged recently. I am talking about the large amount of dues which would be left at the disposal of primary party organizations. This question was raised at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum as well.

[Kruchina] We have been receiving similar proposals. They mainly boil down to leaving primary party organizations up to 50 percent of membership dues. These come above all from party organizations in major industrial centers. We understand them. I think that in the very near future this question will have to be examined at the party Central Committee together with the draft new CPSU Statutes.

[Petrushov] Our readers are interested in the party's opportunities for organizing leisure and treatment at sanatorium resorts.

[Kruchina] It should be said that our sanatorium resort facilities are used not only to organize vacations for party workers. The CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs runs 23 sanatoriums and leisure centers in various parts of the country. Last year party workers and their families accounted for 42 percent of visitors to these sanatoriums. Some trips are carried out under agreements with trade unions and collectives at large enterprises. These include the Medical and Cultural Workers Trade Union Central Committee, the "Roskolkhozzdravnitsa" All-Russian Association, Moscow's Likhachev Car Plant, the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant, the "KamAZ" Production Association, the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, the "Tyumenneftegaz" Main Administration, and other organizations.

The sanatoriums themselves have direct agreements for the sale of tourist passes with collectives at approximately 50 enterprises and organizations. I can name some of them: the "Bryanskiy Mashinostroitelnyy Zavod" Production Association, the Orsko-Khalilovskiy Metallurgical Combine, the "Zaporozhzhilgrazhdanstroy" and "Dneprostroymekhanizatsiya" Trusts, the "Valgunde" Interkolkhoz Association in Yelgava in Latvia, and the Crimean Oblast's "Shirokoye" Sovkhoz. These labor collectives are widespread—from the Baltic to the Far East. More than 14,000 tourist passes are sold in this way each year. Former internationalist servicemen also take health cures at the "Rus" Sanatorium in the Moscow area. PRAVDA has already covered this.

That is why we believe that we should not relax our work to properly maintain our sanatorium resort facilities. Such facilities are controlled by trade unions, many social organizations, ministries, and departments. And they are rapidly developing. The leisure base of enterprise, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes is growing. And that is correct. We, too, should act sensibly. We intend to further expand the contingent of people vacationing in our sanatoriums.

[Petrushov] The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform talks about the need to expand party organizations' autonomy when it comes to using party funds. What is your opinion on that?

[Kruchina] It is indisputable that excessive centralization in budgetary policy has had its day. We need to find a new solution to the problem, which would make it possible both to take account of local party organizations' interests and rights, and to prevent any damage being done to overall party interests. In our opinion, it would be correct to more clearly demarcate the powers of the CPSU Central Committee and local party organs, to expand their autonomy on budgetary, personnel structure, and financial questions, and to allow them to resolve at their own discretion all questions linked with spending on primary party organizations' needs.

[Petrushov] One last question. Or rather, a request. After reading this discussion PRAVDA readers will be interested in the changes in the CPSU budget, the practice of its formulation, and the use of party funds. I think that proposals will be submitted on these questions and specific decisions adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress. The editorial board is hoping for another interview with you. By then life will have raised new questions, which we will ask you to answer. Do you have any objections?

[Kruchina] Of course not. On the contrary, it is necessary.

Department Chief Discusses New KGB Units

90UN1113A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with K. Ejhmanisu, chief of the KGB department for the protection of the Soviet constitutional system of the Latvian SSR, by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent V. Smetannikov; date, place not given: "Openness and Lying Are Incompatible Concepts—On a New Subdivision in the KGB System and Some Disinformation"]

[Text] **"I learned recently that a directorate for the protection of the Soviet constitutional system was created in the USSR Committee for State Security last year. Apparently, the same thing now exists in the KGB of our republic. What is it supposed to be engaged in, and what do its duties include?**

"I would like to get an answer, as the saying goes, firsthand, because information on KGB activity these days, which appears in the mass media of Latvia (indeed, in the central press also), sometimes has a tendentious tinge.
[Signed] V. Chapluzhkin, worker of the Order of Labor Red Banner Ship Repair Plant.

The desire of our reader to get information, as he asked, firsthand, led us to K. Ejmanisu, chief of the department for the protection of the Soviet constitutional system of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB. Our correspondent conveyed the questions of the worker of the Riga ship repair plant to Krisianisu and, availing himself of the opportunity, added several of his own questions during the course of the interview.

[Smetannikov] Glasnost has also invaded the sphere of state security. It was not long ago that the KGB was behind a solid screen of secrecy. Of course, the specifics of the organization, and where you work, compels adherence to certain prudent restrictions on information concerning its activity. But, nevertheless, recently a lot of material was publicized in the press and over the radio and on television about the Committee for State Security.

[Ejmanisu] This, undoubtedly, responds to the spirit of our times and the processes of openness and democratization. I will mention some of this kind of material. For example, V. Kryuchkov, the chairman of the KGB, appeared on Central Television. An interview with V. Kryuchkov under the heading "Perestroyka in the KGB" was published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA on 27 October 1989. He informed the viewers and the readers about changes in the organization which he heads.

S. Zukul, the chairman of the KGB of the republic for the past year, talked about the activity of the Committee for State Security of the Latvian SSR in the current period of the renewal of society in the August issue of the journal AVOTS. Ya. Trubins, his deputy gave an interview on the program "Labvakar." The inhabitants of Latvia learned about the specifics of the rayon subunits of the committee from statements made by A. Robeznieks, chief of the department of the Tsesisskiy Rayon; P. Grushkevich, chief of the department of the Saldusskiy Rayon, and I. Sormulis, chief of the Venstpils municipal department, which were published in the republic press. As you see, the list is rather extensive. By the way, if you wish, it can be expanded.

In addition, efforts were made to throw light on our sphere of activity by the prominent programs "Labvakar," and also by the radio feature of Ingrid Abol and by correspondent Arnis Sablovskis of the newspaper LATVIAS JAUNATNE, and others. All, of course, from their own position and to the extent of their personal understanding of the place and the role of the KGB, both under today's processes and also in the history of the state.

As for the Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System in the USSR KGB, this new subdivision took the place of the abolished fifth directorate for the struggle against ideological sabotage, which existed since 1967. These kinds of changes in the structure of the KGB were fundamental in nature. They became important steps of a radical perestroyka in the system of the Committee for State Security, and they ensued logically from the important changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state.

[Smetannikov] What, nonetheless, brought about the creation of the new directorate, when it comes to specific reasons?

[Ejmanisu] There are facts that state irrefutably: The special services of some states, and the foreign anti-Soviet organizations associated with them, are adapting to the new conditions that are setting in both in the USSR and in the relations between the East and the West. Not relaxing their subversive activity, they are directing it now, first and foremost, against the constitutional system of the USSR. One cannot close one's eyes to the fact that there are also elements inside the country that are hostile to the Soviet system.

[Smetannikov] I admit frankly: The words "hostile elements" evoke a certain visceral resistance because formerly this was the name given to all of those who were suspected of anti-Soviet activity because of certain conversations, "imprudent" statements, and even for jokes. But what do you, a chekist [security officer], think of this expression.

[Ejmanisu] To avoid false rumors, I will say outright that by hostile elements we by no means mean those people who in the recent past were dubbed dissidents. It is not a question of the convictions or opinions of one or another person. It is a completely personal matter, a matter of conscience. Please, prove your point of view, as the saying goes, state your reasons. Today's democratic standards in Soviet society give a full right to this. With only one condition: by peaceful means—on a platform of debates and discussions.... The hostile elements are those that for lack of arguments, and seeing the spiritual impotence of their position, resort to weapons—firearms or cold steel. But a weapon is always a weapon: It sooner or later can lead to victims.

Of course, protection of the constitutional system, in the final analysis, is a state task. Soviet and public organizations have to be involved in it, and their leaders, but in a broad sense of the word, all are true patriots of our country. But the subdivision established in the KGB structure will execute only specific functions within the scope of official competence.

[Smetannikov] What are these functions? Talk about them, Krisjanis Krisjanovic, please, in more detail. Of course, provided the data is not secret.

[Ejmanisu] There is no secret in this. Moreover, IZVESTIYA of 2 November of last year gave a rather detailed description of the expanded meeting of the collegium of the USSR Committee for State Security with the participation of the managerial staff of a number of subdivisions of the central apparatus and field organs of the KGB. Questions were reviewed there concerning the protection of the Soviet constitutional system.

In discussing the tasks which the new directorate has to resolve, the collegium emphasized: It is called on aggressively to counteract encroachments of the special services of foreign states and foreign anti-Soviet centers against the constitutional principles of the Union of the SSR; to foil their plans to create and utilize organized anticonstitutional groupings aimed at destabilizing the domestic political situation in our country; to anticipate and prevent criminal activity of persons who try by violent means to overthrow or change the Soviet state and social system.

The duties of the employees of the directorate (correspondingly of our department also) include participation in the prevention of disorder and resolute suppression of terrorist intentions and other anticonstitutional displays of a violent nature. And this also includes those directed at inciting interethnic dissension. In addition, the fight against organized crime, in cooperation with other subdivisions of the KGB and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

It was recommended that the organs of the KGB strengthen cooperation with other law enforcement organs, rely more widely on workers, and develop contacts with work collectives and public organizations. Emphasis was given to the need for more effective use in the work of public forms and to more boldly and as completely as possible inform the population concerning the prevention of subversive activity of foreign special services, foreign anti-Soviet centers, and hostile elements inside the country. Close ties with the workers, public speeches, including in the mass media—the decision of the collegium indicates—should become an inseparable element of chekist work. This approach is stipulated by the very social nature of Soviet organs of state security and by the principles of the USSR Constitution.

[Smetannikov] It seems to me that our reader, not without some purpose in mind, turned attention to the tendentious nuances of some materials that appeared in the mass media. What can you say about this?

[Ejmanisu] Criticism that is directed at the KGB, as against any other establishment, is a normal phenomenon. Objective and true remarks about us do not bring anything but benefit. Naturally, this also concerns errors committed by employees of the committee in the recent past. But, I emphasize, criticism that is objective and based on real facts.

In this connection, I will say that the so-called five subdivisions established in 1967, which conducted counterintelligence work in the struggle against ideological subversion, were guided by the laws of that time. But the legislative acts then were not very specific. This allowed their broad interpretation to the detriment of justice. In particular, I have in mind the 65th article of the Criminal Code of the Latvian SSR—concerning punishment for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

The admission of errors, committed by us because of imperfect legislation, is known to everyone. And to go into details means to repeat what has already been said or published more than once. But, at the same time, we believe that no one has the right to accuse today's generation of chekists of committing any kind of crimes that are declared in an abstract form.

Unfortunately, a journalist who is inspired by a pressing subject, at times voluntarily or involuntarily becomes the distributor of nonobjective (this is just half the trouble), but sometimes even incorrect information. First, this in no way plays a good role in the formation of public opinion. But, secondly, it passes the "trump card" into the hands of those conservative forces who blame glasnost as the source of all kinds of complications. The more so, because, sooner or later, the disinformation is exposed and the lie that is clothed in emotions comes to the surface.

Openness and lying are incompatible concepts. This is an old truth. And the present generation of chekists will remember it forever.

[Smetannikov] How do you justify your reproach against my colleagues?

[Ejmanisu] For example, the radio journalist Ingrid Abol in October of last year in several broadcasts quoted from the "memoirs" of Harij Antons, a former official of the Ministry of State Security in the postwar period, concerning his work in the Talsinskiy Rayon. I put the word "memoirs" in quotations unhesitatingly. Because this person, pardon the harsh words, is an impostor. He never worked in the MGB [Ministry of State Security], and in 1946 he was discharged from the ranks of the army. Moreover, because of the worsening state of his health, he was completely excused from military service.

How do you characterize the use of similar "recollections" and actions of a journalist who presents such "historical" facts that were taken at face value? There has to be an elementary sense of order and professional culture. But, unfortunately, it is often being replaced of late by an attempt by some members of the mass media to publish sensational material, without minimal verification, to the detriment of the truth. If, of course, the authors of similar publications and transmissions do not have other motives and objectives.

Worker V. Chapluzhkin, I must say, is not alone in his opinion concerning the bias of the statements of journalists. We receive thousands of letters daily and comments by citizens on a wide variety of questions. Among them also are comments on individual telecasts and radio broadcasts and articles.

For example, one of the residents of Latvia writes regarding the transmission "Labvakar," which went on the air on 15 October 1989: "Everyone knows the interest of the public in the press and in TV programs. The interview on the 'Labvakar' television program of former KGB employee Trojcis was rather shocking (in a certain part of it).... (For those who did not see the telecast, I will explain that the matter concerned the former employee of a KGB division of the republic in the city of Yelgava. He quit the organs, according to his explanation, because he believes that the KGB comes out against the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] and against the awakening of the Latvian people. He has now joined the DNNL [Movement for the National Independence of Latvia]. His speech was from the arsenal of the so-called "dirty" methods. The service, which, in his very own statement, he betrayed, is needed by any state and will still be needed for a long time.... The behavior of Trojcis can only be classified as negative and even, it can be said, as action not worthy of an honorable person. In this connection, the TV journalists themselves should have had more internal efficiency.... It is futile to try to find moral principles in the behavior of Trojcis.... This is an interview which is overall quite similar to that which is called "the yellow press" abroad.

Comments like this, I assure you, are not unique. Their authors do not want to write to those correspondents who see pluralism only in the form that they like—in the form of "a one-sided game." And, to put it mildly, tactless are the unreasoned and unsubstantiated statements of some sectors of the mass media that the "KGB always fought against the people," and that, they say, it is now against all enlightened forces that are defending the sovereignty of the people of Latvia. This simply does not correspond to reality: The Committee for State Security does not come out against the Latvian people (nor against any other people), and it does not now conduct any kind of actions that oppose those social organizations that direct their affairs within the framework of the law and do not engage in unconstitutional activity.

[Smetannikov] At the beginning of our conversation, you mentioned interviews and reports that were given by KGB officials of various ranks to the mass media. Is what they say always adequately presented on the pages of the periodical press?

[Ejmanisu] Unfortunately, not always. It is especially unpleasant when it is a question of the fate of specific persons. Here is an example.

Your newspaper published debates at the last plenum of the Latvian CPSU Central Committee. They were prepared for the press by LATINFORM. S. Zukul, the chairman of the Committee for State Security of the republic spoke at the plenum, in particular, about the alarming number of cases of illegal possession of weapons. Information about these cases, by the way, was previously reported in the press. But in the materials of the plenum, which were published in the Russian language, there was one important place where the sense of words of S. Zukul was distorted. Actually, the correct text looked like this: "After a careful study of the materials, we would be able to submit a proposal to the procurator of the Latvian SSR regarding a possible change to the preventive punishment for citizen Leo Hirssonsu."

The distortion apparently occurred in LATINFORM in the translation from Latvian. And accuracy in our work, and in information about it (no matter what form it appeared in), is an immutable law.

There are cases where editors for some reason "forget" to publish KGB answers in their publications regarding doubtful or distorted information directed against them, or they supplement material prepared by the committee with commentaries which often distort their meaning. And when doing this they make claims to the highest order of truth. For example, the newspaper PADOMU JAUNATNE did not find room for our refuation with respect to false information contained in the article "Justice and Equality Behind Closed Doors?". In the 3 June 1989 issue, this newspaper asserted that KGB employees supposedly enjoy the use of recreation facilities in the Tsesisskiy Rayon that were "built by inmates" (that is, prisoners).

In concluding our conversation, I would like to note once more that the series of functions of the department that I head are outlined by those tasks that were discussed by the aforementioned meeting of the collegium of the USSR KGB. It is they and only they that lie at the basis of activity of the subdivision of the KGB of the Latvian SSR for the protection of the Soviet constitutional system.

We will try to keep the public of the republic as fully informed as possible with respect to specific cases we encounter and the prevention of crimes by the chekists, so that the employees of the KGB and their work are presented objectively. Especially among people who are not well informed about the true specific nature and specific tasks of our organization.

[Smetannikov] Thank you for the thorough and detailed interview.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Speaks at 14 March Council Session

Sees Possibility of 'Disturbances'

LD1403105790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0803 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Speech on possibility of disturbances by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, from live relay of Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Although things look quiet, in fact disturbances could be created. We have received news that forces which are against the path chosen by Lithuania want to strike a blow at a rather vulnerable spot—bread supplies. If someone succeeds in organizing a strike at bakeries and bread combines in Vilnius, at least for a short time, for several days, then in Vilnius, where the population is rather mixed both in terms of politics and nationalities, where people succumb to various instigations and deceptions, this would be enough to start disturbances, albeit on a small scale.

As I mentioned yesterday, events of this nature could be desirable to political powers which would like to question the decisions we have made, even if these were the expression of the general will of Lithuanians and of people living in Lithuania.

It doesn't really matter that several Soviet Army officers are sending telegrams arguing that not every member of the population of Lithuania was consulted about these decisions. This, of course, could not be regarded as an impediment to us; it was expected, we expect such statements from various groups in future. The question is only how much this process will be stimulated and what profit one might like to make of it. I have already seen posters and invitations to a protest rally being distributed. The rally is being organised by organizations or groups known to you which now are openly getting united, such as the old-type communists united by the CPSU platform, people from the "Yedinstvo" organization and the so-called "Defenders of Socialism", which until today have failed to explain their status. There are also others calling themselves political units. There is such a little list obviously to show that their numbers appear greater than they are in real terms. [as heard]

On the other hand, it seems that in the town of Snieckus there are no disturbances or changes. However, they expressed their wish that we make a statement from the Supreme Council concerning the future of the town of Snieckus, and concerning the treatment of the population of Snieckus, and I think perhaps this would be a very good idea and a useful thing to do.

Of course, the situation in the republic to a great extent also depends on us, on our concord, harmony and constructive work. Although I have already said repeatedly that we want to work constructively, that we want to find forums in which opposing opinions would remain opinions and not an expression of absolute confrontation. The situation could arise in which a fierce confrontation is sparked off by a trivial problem and then it becomes clear that the main point is not this trivial problem, the main point is somewhere else, but this problem is being artificially blown up. [passage omitted]

However, it could happen that opposing political forces will take advantage even on trivial pretexts to impede the decision-making of an opposition party. This would not be right. We lost time and we give—or we could give them, if the situation exacerbates—a pretext to assume and interpret the situation in Lithuania as being unstable, that one should wait and see what will emerge, perhaps elections were still going on, the political campaign is still continuing and therefore, it is not yet clear what the position adopted by Lithuania is. This would impede both our recognition on a world scale and our contacts with the outside world, and the contacts which should protect our people from the possible consequences of an independent ailing economy. Therefore I would like very much to call upon everybody in this house, as well as upon the people of Lithuania, not to look for cause for confrontation, to view things from a wider perspective.

Discusses Military Commissariat

LD1403110890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0852 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Speech on work of Military Commissariat by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, from live relay of Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Text] Esteemed deputies, we should perhaps discuss not only the taking over of [Military Commissariat] buildings. Somebody has to take over, as its seems to me, a part of the functions, which at the same time would solve some of the problems of the staff, then information would be collected about our young people as to where they serve, and some files and so on. All this, as I understand it, cannot be abolished. This is very important.

The question is made somewhat more specific by my conversation this morning before the beginning of the session with the commander of the Kaliningrad military district. General Kolesnikov, who asked that I or we appeal in some way to our citizens serving in the Soviet Army to be patient—and I roughly quote him—until their problem is solved at a state level. Since they are impatient, and the atmosphere around them is not very good, I asked to take special measures. I cannot talk here about it and waste your time, but a problem is arising which I would call the problem of the mechanism of returning these soldiers. If there is spontaneous desertion, hunting, and so on, I do not know whether this would be good, because it is connected with a certain risk, or, maybe, we could propose and should propose to consider this mechanism as soon as possible. And this mechanism should be served by former military commissariats. Thus, whether their work is being discontinued or abolished should not be the goal. This resolution or another resolution drawn up now should contain a positive element which would solve both the problem of personnel and the problem of all the amassed information. This is essential for the solution of the basic problem. Thank you.

Appeal Asks for End to Signature Campaigns

LD1403111190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0908 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Appeal to Lithuanian people read by session chairman Bronius Kuzmickas from live relay of Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Text] Dear people of Lithuania, after waiting for several centuries, after suffering and hardship, the independent Lithuanian state has been restored. This remarkable historical step has been made at the right time and with the approval of the majority of you. People of good will all over the world are congratulating us.

We, the deputies elected by you, unanimously voted for a free and independent Lithuania, democratically and according to the constitution we elected the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania.

Now we all together will have to overcome many diverse difficulties. Therefore there is worry about a barren split among the people of Lithuania, about a collection of signatures in assessing legal decisions by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania.

Dear countrymen, let us understand—the elections are over. We ask you not to collect any signatures. Let us be united and not create a danger to the regenerating Lithuania which would be useful only to the enemies of our independence. We invite you, both Lithuanians and people of other national communities, to engage in sincere fraternal work, to calm and concentration. We invite you to unite for the benefit of the new and independent Lithuania.

Vilnius Radio Carries 13 Mar Supreme Council

Third Day Opens

LD1303121390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 13 March begins live coverage of the third day of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session. The session begins with a discussion of the agenda. Aleksandras Abisalas is chairing the session. Present are 122 deputies.

At 0806 GMT Deputy Sadreika says that "after adoption of the act of independence there was a mass desertion by the Republic's citizens from the Soviet Army. Officers of the Soviet Army persecute them, catch them, and lock them up. I would like to ask you to set up a group of deputies that would finally draw up all documents and ask the session to take immediate steps."

At 0808 GMT proposals to the agenda continue. A vote is taken on the draft of the agenda with four proposed items to be included. The agenda is approved with 119 deputies voting in favor, none against.

At 0811 GMT work according to the agenda begins. Vytautas Landsbergis reports on the political situation. He says Deputy Egidijus Bickauskas has left for Moscow with an appeal and a set of basic documents to hand to Mikhail Gorbachev. He then speaks about world reaction to recent decisions by the Republic of Lithuania.

At 0819 GMT Landsbergis speaks about a demonstration in Snieckus by the Russian-speaking population there and says the local CPSU has taken power into its own hands. They have demanded that Snieckus declare itself independent of Lithuania. Landsbergis says the political situation can be destabilized by many factors which would play into the hands of Moscow.

At 0830 GMT Mecys Laurinkus reads the text of an appeal to the president of the USSR concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuanian territory. Discussion of the text of the appeal continues. The text of the appeal is approved with 122 deputies voting for it.

At 0843 GMT telegrams of greeting are read.

At 0844 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis says that "Gorbachev has allegedly asked Bickauskas if he would agree to take the post of the plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania in Moscow.."

At 0845 GMT Kazimiera Prunskiene reports on the status of enterprises of all-union subordination.

At 0851 GMT debates on the issue are begun by Sakalas.

At 0908 GMT debates continue. It is proposed that installations of the Soviet Armed Forces should not be nationalized, however, the oil and gas lines should be under the control of the government of this republic.

At 0926 GMT a vote is taken to conclude the debate. The text of the draft decision is read.

At 0932 GMT the session is adjourned until 1000 GMT.

Greetings Read

LD1303140190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1004 GMT on 13 March resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Deputy Kazimiera Prunskiene reads a reedited version of the draft resolution of the status of enterprises, offices, and organizations under union-republican administration. The new draft is adopted unanimously, with 126 votes.

At 1007 GMT Viktor Kogan, representative of the Memorial Organization expresses congratulations on the occasion of the declaration of independence.

At 1010 GMT a short discussion about the order of the items on the agenda ensues.

AT 1013 GMT Deputy C. Jursenas speaks about the draft resolution on the republican television and radio relays of the republican Supreme Council sessions. The text of the draft is not read.

At 1017 GMT debate of the draft begins, and at 1025 GMT, the draft resolution is read, as follows: "To instruct the Republican Radio and Television Committee to resolve the problems concerning television and radio broadcasts from Supreme Council sessions within the scope of its authority, taking into consideration the wishes of the republic's residents, except when the Supreme Council decides separately: a. to broadcast a specific session of the Supreme Council; b. to hold a closed session."

The resolution is adopted with 117 votes in favor and four abstentions.

At 1031 GMT a representative of the West Berlin Senate reads his greetings to the Supreme Council, in German with Lithuanian translation. He says that Lithuania's decision on independence will serve peace in Europe and presents a piece of the Berlin Wall to the Council.

At 1036 GMT a resolution on participation of USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania in the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies in Moscow is read. A debate on this issue ensues.

At 1115 GMT Deputy Saudargas introduces a group of deputies working on general principles for the restoration of statehood, and informs the Council about the work that has already been carried out by this group.

At 1119 GMT Deputy Vagneris introduces another working group of deputies working on the principles of the structure and functioning of the government of the republic and other organs of control in the republic.

At 1123 GMT Deputy Zigmas Vaisvila presents another working group which is working on the principles of the legal system and the security of the country. Vaisvila says that the working group is engaged in work on reforming the legal system. The reform will take a long time before it is implemented. When these reforms have been introduced, the work of legal institutions will become easier. The security system has been started from scratch and some work has already been done. Vaisvila adds that law and order should be under the jurisdiction of the police.

The draft resolution on implementation of these plans is not read because of the approaching lunch recess.

At 1130 GMT Deputy L. Andrikiene proposes making an appeal to the people of Lithuania to keep calm because, she says, the situation in Lithuania is not quiet and a state of panic is being created deliberately by some people.

At 1132 GMT a recess is announced until 1300 GMT.

Working Groups Established

LD1303153590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 13 March resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Aleksandras Abisalas announces that debate on the establishment of the working groups is to continue.

At 1303 GMT Deputy Nedardas Ciobotas takes the floor. He says that Moscow's reaction to developments was expected. However, judging by the current situation, it can be assumed that Moscow understands that there was no other way.

Speaking about the means to pacify the nation he says that parliament has to reassure everyone. He personally is prepared to meet his voters tomorrow and to explain the situation, proposing that this could be done tomorrow by everybody—to cancel the work of the session and go to see and speak to people.

Deputy Ciobotas suggests that Brazauskas and Landsbergis go on television and reassure the nation, telling the people that they have worked together and that there are no differences between them.

At 1314 GMT debates on the work groups of deputies continue.

At 1321 GMT M. Laurinkus proposes that the working group on the security of the country be divided into two groups.

At 1322 GMT the names of deputies in the group working on the principles of functioning of the supreme council are read out.

At 1324 GMT debate on the working groups continue.

At 1330 GMT a vote is taken on the proposal that the above-mentioned groups should be set up. By a majority of votes it is decided to set up the above-mentioned groups.

At 1333 GMT a "Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania" is read, as follows:

"In view of the fact that by an act of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state, Lithuania is no longer linked by any obligations with the validity of the USSR Constitution, USSR People's Deputies elected by the Lithuanian people are losing their status.

"Assessing the fact that the USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania have accomplished important work striving for the restoration of the independence and statehood of the Republic of Lithuania, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania resolves to:

"1. Authorize the USSR People's Deputies to take part in the third extraordinary congress of People's Deputies on the basis of the status of the representatives of the state and acquaint the USSR Government and society with the resolutions of the first session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on the restoration and recognition of the Republic of Lithuania.

"2. Grant to former People's Deputies elected by the Lithuanian people the right to take part in the work of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania with powers of a deliberative vote.

"3. Express gratitude to those USSR People's Deputies from Lithuania who, being delegated by public organizations, have been appropriately representing Lithuania's interests in the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies.

"4. Establish that the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania have no right, without a special decision by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, to take part in the work of the supreme organs of other states, including of the USSR."

The resolution is adopted by 113 votes in favor and six abstentions.

At 1343 GMT Deputy Kazimieras Antanavicius presents a draft law on the government of the Republic of Lithuania.

At 1417 GMT questions are put to Antanavicius concerning this issue.

At 1432 GMT it is announced that the commission preparing the draft law on the government is to meet in another hall in 10 minutes.

At 1434 GMT the session is adjourned until 1500 GMT.

Economic Issues Discussed

LD1303183190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1500 GMT on 13 March resumes its live coverage of the third day of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. Aleksandras Abisalas, who is chairing the session, outlines the objectives of the session.

At 1501 GMT Deputy Antanaitis and K. Prunskiene answer questions about the provisional basic law of the republic. At 1507 GMT it is proposed to discuss the issue in detail in the deputies' commissions. After a vote is taken, the proposal is adopted.

At 1508 GMT session chairman Abisalas addresses the session: "Esteemed Deputies, I have here a recorded telephone call. Allow me to read it to you. The information was conveyed by telephone by Kestutis [name indistinct] and received by Deputy Laucius: The Bank of France has announced that it has 2.2 tonnes of Lithuanian gold worth roughly $30 million. It will be handed over to Lithuania after the French Government recognizes the independent Lithuanian state."

At 1509 GMT K. Prunskiene takes the floor to speak about short- term objectives, primarily the issue of currency. She proposes that the Supreme Council appoints Bronius Povilaitis executive manager of the Bank of Lithuania.

At 1512 GMT Bronius Povilaitis takes the floor. He expresses his gratitude for the nomination and says that he is fully aware of of the importance of the post and the difficulties that lie ahead. He says that Lithuania should claim back the gold reserves which have been used up by Moscow. B. Povilaitis is then questioned about the future independence of the Bank of Lithuania and the initial deposit of currency to start the bank of Lithuania.

At 1525 GMT debates begin on the problems related to banking and inflation problems. There is a debate on the appointment of Povilaitis to the post of executive manager of the Bank of Lithuania.

At 1536 GMT participants vote on the issue, and Bronius Povilaitis is appointed executive manager of the Bank of Lithuania by a majority of votes.

At 1539 GMT 20 deputies request the release of Domijonas Sniukas from the post of chairman of Television and Radio Committee of the republic. Lively debates on the issue take place. D. Sniukas is not present at the session—he is outside the republic—therefore, many deputies say that they are against this proposal. The group of 20 deputies refer to the "Panorama" television program. Then Rupeika speaks in Domijonas Sniukes' defense.

At 1601 GMT it is proposed to extend the work of the session until all the issues on the agenda for today are resolved. Debates continue on deciding Sniukas' position.

At 1628 GMT names of the chairman of the council groups are announced.

At 1629 GMT Deputy Andrikiene then reads the text of an appeal to the Lithuanian peoiple to be united. An alternative version is read. Debates on both versions begin.

At 1649 GMT the chairman proposes that a vote on adopting a version of the appeal.

At 1705 GMT Landsbergis describes reactions in various countries to the steps toward independence taken by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania. A message of greetings from Vatican radio and the Lithuanian community there; greetings from Maya Plisetskaya, the

Lithuanian Consumer Cooperative; and others are read. Greetings from the Vilnius Teachers' Training Institute are also read.

Deputy Saulius Razma then appeals for unity among the deputies.

At 1721 GMT a resolution is adopted on temporary use of an official seal on documents.

At 1724 GMT the session is adjourned until 0800 GMT 14 March.

Landsbergis Describes Political Situation

LD1303121590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0811 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, Supreme Council chairman of the Republic of Lithuania, at Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] This morning a deputy of our Supreme Council and a USSR People's Deputy, Egidijus Bickauskas, left for Moscow. I hope he will—perhaps he has already done so—present an appeal, a letter, to Mikhail Gorbachev. This is a letter we adopted yesterday; he will also present a set of our basic documents. [passage omitted]

Verbal reports I have received from the town of Snieckus bear witness to the fact that the attempts in Lithuania to destabilize the political situation are not diminishing. According to this information the local CPSU organization is acting as a local government. A meeting was organized; it was attended by a couple of thousand people. During the meeting the head of the nuclear power station and local political leaders were spreading various contradictory rumors that a referendum would be held to separate the town of Snieckus from the Republic of Lithuania. At the same time it was stated that the union authorities would create conditions for people to leave Snieckus and to settle down somewhere else in the Soviet Union and close down the power station. [passage omitted] I wish to draw this to the attention of our government, which should take the necessary steps to expose people who violate laws concerning public order and who incite people.

The political situation in Lithuania can also be destabilized in other ways. It is especially dangerous, as this can serve the interests of our great political opponent. [passage omitted] Our greatest moral and political support in the eyes of the whole world is the ideas expressed by the will of the people. If someone is able to succeed in creating the impression that people have changed their minds, this would hamper our recognition, the recognition of the political acts we have undertaken. [passage omitted]

If the attitude of a large part of the people is represented as a great regard for the esteemed Algirdas Brazauskas, especially on a world scale, or as good will toward the political line represented by the leader of that political group, this would pose an even greater question mark to the events in Lithuania and to the genuine wish of the Lithuanian people. Perhaps they wish to be governed by the Communist Party in the future? Perhaps we should once again check the results of the elections? Although there are no grounds for this, as I have already said, this may hamper the recognition of political (?acts) we unanimously adopted.

I know the collection of signatures has begun in support of the election of Vytautas Landsbergis to the post of the chairman of the Supreme Council. Today I have received many papers and messages, etc. I ask you very strongly, esteemed and beloved Lithuanian people, to not do this. It would be very uncomfortable to feel that there are differences among us about who likes who, that people would quarrel in the places of work, political groups, and even in the families. Who would gain from this? I think you understand this very well. For us, for Lithuania, this would not be useful and could be even disastrous. Therefore, I repeat, I ask you very much not to do anything like this concerning me. I hope the esteemed Algirdas Brazauskas will accept the invitation to appear with me on television when he returns from Moscow [words indistinct].

Lithuanian Resolution on Status of Enterprises

LD1303121490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0926 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Draft Resolution of the Lithuanian Supreme Council read by unidentified deputy at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] A resolution of the Republican Supreme Council on changing the status of enterprises, offices, and organizations under the union and union-republican administration on Lithuania's territory.

The Supreme Council of Republic resolves:

1. To state that all state enterprises, offices, and organizations under the union and union-republican administration existing on the day of adopting this resolution on Lithuania's territory come under the republic's jurisdiction.

2. The government control of the enterprises, offices, and organizations that come under the republic's jurisdiction, in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, is entrusted with the government of the Republic of Lithuania.

3. The agreements of the enterprises of the Republic of Lithuania with their partners in the Soviet Union remain valid.

4. When disputes arise regarding the objects mentioned in the first item of this resolution, problems of their property and legal status are to be solved via negotiations with the USSR.

Lithuania Seeks To Maintain Economic Relations

LD1303135290 Hamburg DPA in German 1311 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Leipzig (DPA/VWD)—Representatives of the Republic of Lithuania, recently declared independent, expect that their industrial enterprises which are now free will increasingly conclude deals with enterprises in Western Europe. However, Algimantas Apings, chief of the Planning Committee of the Republic of Lithuania, told DPA at the Leipzig Spring Fair on Tuesday, that the economic relations between his country and the Soviet Union are to be maintained. "We hope that there is still enough common sense in the USSR and Lithuania not to break off these relations," Apings said. After all, the big neighbor is, with 90 percent, Lithuania's main trading partner.

The Baltic Republic, according to the planning chief, will soon have to adopt free market yardsticks even in these dealings. This means automatic price increases in many areas. However, the intention is not to implement these from one day to the next. Only in the course of this year will Lithuania begin with that, Apings said during a reception by the consul general of the USSR in Leipzig. Traditionally the 29 representatives from Lithuanian industry set up their stands at the fair in the Soviet pavilion. Apings said that this will no doubt change next year.

Landsbergis on Status of People's Deputies

LD1303213190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Video report from Vilnius by correspondent A. Paulyus; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] Meanwhile, it is the fourth day of work for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius.

[Paulyus] At the morning session the debate continued on the question of changing the status of enterprises, establishments, and organizations of union and union-republican subordination which operate on the territory of the republic. According to a resolution which was adopted, all these enterprises, establishments, and organizations will, as of today, pass under the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Republic.

Then the question of the status of USSR People's Deputies elected in Lithuania and their participation in the work of the extraordinary third Congress of USSR People's Deputies was discussed at the session. It was decided to send a group of people's deputies from Lithuania to the Congress in order to inform the Congress about the situation in Lithuania and the decisions adopted at the session of the republican Supreme Soviet.

At the session, discussion is under way on the question of personnel changes in the Lithuanian government. It has been decided to form a number of working groups of Supreme Soviet deputies, among which are groups to work on the general principles of the emergence of the state, on the principles of the structure and activity of the Supreme Soviet, on the principles of the legal system and the defense of the region, and others.

[V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, identified by screen caption] We are seeking independence by peaceful, parliamentary means and through international talks. We are certain that we are not infringing upon the interests of any nation. Each nationality in Lithuania is guaranteed equal rights and each organization is guaranteed its own national culture.

The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council appeals to the peoples of the USSR with a request that they understand our objectives and they support our aspirations. [video shows session in progress and Landsbergis reading from prepared text, speaking to camera]

Council Issues Appeal for Withdrawal of Troops

LD1303124890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0830 GMT 13 Mar 90

["Text" of an appeal to the president of the USSR concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuanian territory, read by Mecys Laurinkus at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Appeal to the president of the USSR. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, basing themselves upon the act adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania about the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, declares:

1. The presence of units of the Soviet Armed Forces stationed on the territory of Lithuania has been illegal since 15 June 1940. Adhering to the provision of the 12 July 1920 peace treaty with Russia, Articles 1 and 2, which are still valid, the government of Lithuania invites the Government of the USSR to support the proposal to begin negotiations at the earliest and most convenient time for both sides concerning the status of the above-mentioned military units, their deployment, and their complete withdrawal from the territory of the republic. Until this has been solved, the USSR Armed Forces, internal troops, KGB troops, and border troops should not engage in any maneuvers, redeploy troops, or increase the current contingent of the Armed Forces on the territory of the republic. At the same time, the republic's government will concern itself in seeing that the safety of Soviet soldiers, officers, and their families residing in Lithuania is maintained.

2. The people of Lithuania and the Supreme Council of Lithuania express a wish that citizens of the republic, servicemen, officers, and their families who are outside the territory of Lithuania will be protected and returned to Lithuania without delay.

3. We ask you, esteemed chairman of the USSR, to give relevant instructions to the USSR Government.

Moscow Radio Reports on Lithuanian Session

LD1303231790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Today, the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic continues work in Vilnius. Over to our correspondent Elena Kurkletite:

[Kurkletite] At the session today, the question of changing the status of enterprises, institutions, and organizations of union and union-republican subordination operating on the territory of Lithuania was discussed. The adoption of the relevant document will go over to the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Republic. Also on the session agenda is the question of the status of People's Deputies of the USSR elected in Lithuania. Three drafts were even proposed on this question.

Yesterday, in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium, there was a news conference for Lithuanian and foreign journalists accredited to the Supreme Soviet session. As VSYE [the Sajudis information agency] reports in reply to the question to Vytautas Landsbergis as to what fate is awaiting the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet answered, and I quote: In no way can Lithuania lay claim to being in the ranks of independent states if any of its departments are managed from Moscow. Now, both the KGB and the MVD should be subordinated to the Lithuanian Republic alone. How we can implement that depends not only on us. That is the end of the quote.

Today, in the republic's newspapers, an interview is published with Kazimra Prunskiene, temporarily acting prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, on the theme of what will the economy of an independent Lithuania be like? Kazimra Prunskiene answers that it is very important how the talks of the Lithuanian government with the Soviet Union will pass, how both sides will resolve the question of cooperation. Of course, it will be necessary to alter the profile of certain enterprises, to retrain workers. For six months and perhaps a year, things will be rather difficult. Only in resolving these questions together will we be able to reduce unemployment to a minimum. This is the opinion of Kazimra Prunskiene.
The session is continuing its work.

Landsbergis on Election Tasks and Goals

LD1303151090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 8, 23 Feb-1 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Vytautas Landsbergis, entitled "On Election's Doorstep."]

[Text] We are approaching a most important and perhaps, decisive period in Lithuania's new history. February, March and April are dawning and its seems to many of us, we may soon win back our state's independence, and break the "order" of former cliques. This will mean foreign and tyrranical laws will no longer be in effect and free Lithuanian intellect and hands will begin to create the welfare of each of this land's workers and everyone in general.

Really, it will not be that easy and simple, however, these will be great steps—the elections. Two of them even—one on the heels of another.

The new Lithuanian Supreme Council will have to continue preparing laws and announcing decisions that will change even faster our fatherland's existence; and will open for it genuine economic, economic restructuring and independent useful action. We will require good partnership and cooperative relations with the West and the East and we shall base them on the necessary declaration of independence and other independent actions. We will become Lithuania once again and others will converse with us not from the top and not via Moscow.

Local councils or local administrations, will obtain markedly more rights and power to manage local matters. This is why the type of people working there, their motivations and their interpersonal relations are of vital importance.

Esteemed voters, whatever deputies you shall elect to the Supreme as well as other councils, will be there for your enjoyment. Local councils can be regulated somewhat by the Supreme Council; the Supreme Council elections come first, and are already upon us—that is why, esteemed ones, reflect and consult among yourselves and advise your relatives in other electoral districts as to who can be trusted.

Since spring, this year is very swift: February—March—April, and it seems it is right here, just a batting of an eye away from the time when, having decided who is to represent us, we shall make the announcement and will experience the sensation of becoming citizens of our own state.

Moreover, we will have to prove that we possess the knowhow and are worthy of this position.

TASS on Developments in Lithuania

LD1003230190 Moscow TASS in English 2029 GMT 10 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscilla]

[Text] Vilnius March 10 TASS—The first session of the newly- elected republican Supreme Soviet opened here late tonight.

The new Lithuanian parliament begins its work with some seats still being contested in the hurriedly arranged general elections.

Deputy chairman of the Republican Electoral Commission Vaclovas Litvinas told TASS that only 131 deputies were elected and registered by the commission before the session opened. Ten seats were undecided yet. Run-off elections were held in two constituencies on the day the session opened. New elections will be held in eight constituencies on April 7.

The agenda of the first session is also unclear at this point. The leaders of the Sajudis public movement, representatives of which have won two-thirds of seats in the new parliament, said in their televised addresses that they would press for the consideration and approval on Sunday of a number of documents aimed at radically changing the republic's political status.

For its part, the outgoing Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet proposed for the consideration of the first session organisational questions, including the recognition of the deputies' authority, the election of parliamentary leaders and the appointment of a new chairman of the Council of Ministers.

"We should not take rash, unconsidered steps," which can "cause great economic hardships", acting president and leader of the Lithuanian independent Communist Party Algirdas Brazauskas said in an interview with local television.

Estonian Official Reports on Talk With Gorbachev

LD1303114790 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Interview with Arnold Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, by correspondent Juhan Virkus, on 12 March at the Moscow Palace of Congresses—live or recorded]

[Text] [Virkus] This afternoon, here in the Moscow Palace of Congresses, politics on a big scale was being pursued. And in the name of Estonia this was done by Arnold Ryuytel. First of all, before the evening session started, you went up to Mikhail Gorbachev, talked to him, and handed over some documents. What kind of documents?

[Ryuytel] Inasmuch as the whole country—the Soviet Union—at the moment is facing a very serious political move—a changeover to the institution of a presidency—this, in essence, will indeed mean essentially handing over a section of the power from the union republics to the central power—to the president. And inasmuch as we have declared our independence, complete political independence in the form of a state, then, in essence, this is unacceptable to us. However, the presidency within the union as such is completely acceptable and very commendable. Inasmuch as this is happening so quickly, without the possibility of discussing it with the junior partners, and without the republics being able to discuss this in their supreme soviets—because I cannot visualize handing over power in any other way—and altogether, indeed, union deputies elected from a republic cannot decided upon such a matter. [sentence as heard]

Well, I presented these to him and said that in the given situation we have no authority, (?that is) the union deputies do not have authority to adopt such a resolution. And well, our conversation then branched off to our resolution which was adopted on 23 February in which we announce the start of talks between Estonia and the Soviet Union. And finally, we got down to the point where I hope that another additional point will be included in the constitutional amendments. This obviously will be of interest to all union republics. It will then mean that the status of union republics will not change after the presidency is introduced.

And the other principle amounts to this—that in the very near future we will begin talks with the central power. In essence, we agreed that this long conversation which today took place between us would be the first stage of the talks, in which we, more or less, agreed in principle on the basket of questions to start from. A start has to be made in the nearest future. We have set up a commission and we can include in it also very competent persons in order to hold talks with the union on all issues. But on the part of the union—the Supreme Soviet and the Government, and, in the given case, we hope, the future president which will come into existence any day now—specific persons or commissions will already have been appointed to hold talks with us.

[Virkus] By the way, by the way, somehow I have never noticed before at the congress, and in the presidium, that Mikhail Gorbachev would beckon somebody and go with this person to confer over there, behind the presidium barrier. That is how it hapened today. But who was this third man?

[Ryuytel] Indeed, our communication with Mikahil Gorbachev was very active and very intense inasmuch as the questions were indeed very serious questions both for the Union and for our republic. And I simply did not give away over many questions. For this reason our conversation was interrupted. We continued it again after an hour, and that at his initiative [words indistinct]. For this reason at the same time as he was chairing the congress, we also, from time to time, went over to the back, to exchange thoughts.

[Virkus] But who was this third man?

[Ryuytel] He was his aide who was preparing the materials about what we agreed upon. The aide prepared and set down these materials immediately.

[Virkus] And yet, as long as those agreements are verbal, they do not amount to anything.

[Ryuytel] Yes, that is so, of course. That is, I hope that he will set out these principles to the congress. That was the agreement, that before voting he will set out these principles which we agreed upon. And we also talked about Lithuania. These talks will indeed take place with Lithuania and ourselves. There will be, that is, one resolution in respect of both Lithuania and us.

Discuss Separatist Issues

OW1303043990 Tokyo KYODO in English 0406 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 12 KYODO—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who Monday called Lithuania's declaration of independence "alarming," met Estonian Presidium President Arnoid F. Ryuytel later the same day to discuss separatist sentiments in Estonia.

Lithuania on Sunday proclaimed itself an independent republic, defying Gorbachev's efforts to prevent a withdrawal from the Soviet Union, and fueling the desire of the other Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia to reclaim their independence lost in 1940.

Although Gorbachev appears to have executed a turnaround in agreeing to negotiate with the Baltics states, Ryuytel told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that the Soviet leader is forced into a situation where he must compromise with the republics.

Gorbachev met Ryuytel during a break between sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies, which he opened Monday by saying, "the information coming in (from Lithuania) is rather alarming."

Ryuytel, who heads a newly created negotiation team for Estonia, emphasized that the Baltic representatives were seeking Moscow's recognition that the republics association with the Soviet Union is invalid.

"Legally, Estonia is not affiliated with the Soviet Union but it is just that we are a participating republic," said Ryuytel.

The Baltic states were absorbed by the Soviet Union after a 1939 agreement with Nazi Germany that granted Moscow influence over the republics.

One Estonian representative said it was unclear if negotiations for independence would be held concurrently with Lithuania but thought there was a possibility the talks would begin in the near future.

In addition to a settlement of the issue of the republic's status, the Estonian negotiators will also seek to resolve matters concerning the Soviet military presence in the Baltic states, economic relations and cooperation with Moscow, environmental questions, and humanitarian exchanges, the representative said.

The Soviet parliament is considering expanding the powers of the Soviet president and is expected to grant Gorbachev the new powers on Tuesday.

Estonian Congress Urges 'Secession'

LD1203204390 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT 12 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn March 12 TASS—The Estonian Congress which worked for two days ended here on Monday. The 499 delegates elected on the initiative of three political parties which formed in this Soviet Baltic republic in the democratisation period, as well as 35 representatives of Estonians living abroad elected Estonia's committee. It is called upon to resolve internal questions on behalf of all Estonian citizens and to conduct foreign policy.

The Estonian Congress proclaimed its goal of Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union. Most delegates declared for cooperation with the new Estonian Supreme Soviet, to be elected on March 18, if it set itself the same goal.

The participants in the Estonian Congress sent greetings to the new leadership of another Baltic republic, Lithuania, which decided to restore independent Lithuanian state.

Latvian Deputy on Lithuanian Indpendence Vote

LD1303172690 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 13 Mar 90

["By TASS parliamentary correspondent."]

[Text] Moscow, March 13 TASS—The recent decision of the Lithuanian parliament to form an independent Lithuanian state and to terminate the operation of legislative acts of the USSR on the territory of that Baltic republic does not reflect the interests of the republic's entire population, USSR People's Deputy from Latvia, Viktor Alksnis, told a news conference here today.

He said that in accordance with information from Lithuania's Central Electoral Commission, the deputies who voted for these decisions represent some 39 percent of voters in the republic.

Another deputy from Latvia, Yuriy Bojars, told the news conference that from the legal viewpoint the Lithuanian parliamentarians' decisions do not contradict the Constitution and other Soviet laws.

At the same time Bojars noted the haste with which the decision was passed by the Lithuanian parliament. He said this put legislators in the two other Baltic republics, Latvia and Estonia, in a rather awkard situation.

As it was already reported, at today's morning meeting Mikhail Gorbachev informed the Congress of the decisions taken by the Lithuanian parliament. The Lithuanian parliament abrogated Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union and called for independence talks between the republic and the Soviet Union.

A similar stand is held by some political groups in Latvia and Estonia. Commenting on these decisions, Gorbachev ruled out any independence talks with Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia. "We conduct talks with foreign states," Gorbachev said.

Official Discusses Status of Latvia at Plenum

LD1203191190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1538 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Speech by Janis Peters, member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga on 6 March—live]

[Excerpts] Very respected comrades: I am not able to conclude the debate, as Comrade Vagris said, because I think that our party's first secretary, the Central Committee's first secretary, will himself conclude this plenum. I have not also, in my turn, prepared this speech beforehand at home, but these reflections occurred to me here while listening to communists and members of the Central Committee.

I want to begin with what is most important—namely, with the attitude of the Communist Party of Latvia toward the statehood of Latvia, toward the state status of Latvia.

On 26 February, quite recently, I was invited to meet Vaclav Havel at the Embassy of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, where there was quite a restricted circle of the Soviet Union's political workers, and I had a brief conversation with this man, who has gone from playwright and also detainee to state president.

In the brief conversation, I asked him whether he would come to Latvia, to the kind of Latvia it is at the present time, on an official or unofficial visit, because the leaders of the so-called classical Western countries do not do this, do they? No president of a so- called classical Western country has visited us. He said: I am able to visit everywhere I am invited to go; I shall go to Latvia, although I know that the Baltic region has a double status. What status these Baltic republics—states—have, as he literally said, I do not want to say; it has been imposed by the Soviet Union.

We have spoken a great deal about this today. We may like or dislike this thought which I am just now expressing, but I think that if the Communist Party of Latvia succeeds in somehow evading this question, then by no means will anybody evade this question at the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. That is because, so far as I understand, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the chairman, the deputy chairman, and the chairmen of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet have firmly decided to transform the Soviet Union into a law-governed state, and international law cannot be excluded from a law-governed state by any means.

I think that what the Second Congress of People's Deputies proclaimed concerning the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 is a step; we have to go still further.

I have been a great federalist. You all know that. You all know that; I have written [words indistinct] in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on a federative state, I have hoped for our state's reformation, for liberalization, for democratization. Those articles of mine have also been quoted, with the aid of the Inter-Front, during this time, and have also managed to get into the Western press, where, as it were, I am being reminded of how I had understood those issues. I also do not want to regret anything here, because I have really believed in federalism, and not only I. I think that the principles of federativism were alive in the Latvian people, and among all the other inhabitants of Latvia very, very recently.

As federalists we gathered on 2 June 1988, at the plenum of creative unions, which made, I think, significant contributions to the republic's political development.

As federalists we traveled to the 19th CPSU Conference. Alfreds Cepanis also spoke about this here, and we greatly believed in the development of a federation, because the 19th conference outlined an alternative path to elections in this future law-governed state.

I shall remind you that the First Congress of the People's Front, whose head to a certain extent I was, also took place as a congress of federalists, as a congress of supporters of a federation, which is also proven by the program of this First Congress of the People's Front.

Even at the elections of 26 March [1989], a year has not yet passed, I spoke in a big constituency, in the Valka and Valmiera constituency, in which a great many thousands, nearly 100,000, electors live—I am probably making some small mistake here—I spoke about a renewed federalism and I obtained almost 80 percent of the votes in a very serious competition with very serious people of the Valka and Valmiera Rayons. So the trends of federalism were very much alive and people believed; if not all, then a very large part of them, in the Latvian Republic.

I think that the center lost exactly half a year (?with) the creation of a renewed federation, with the creation of a federation or a confederation, and by giving freedom or independence to the communist parties. But in politics, in my opinion, half a year is worth light-years, light-years. This is the reality. We may like what is taking place at present, we may dislike it. We may love, not love, dislike one another, but we must become realists. From utopians, communists must become realists. Today I look upon my republic as a realist, as a realist, and I see that today in the elections I would not obtain that number of votes if I were actively to agitate for a federation which has, in fact, disappointed the rights of peoples, the hopes of peoples. There have been bloody events. Immediately after the elections, remember, there were the events of Tbilisi, yes? Well, yes, also other bloody events, and this federation has not guaranteed and does not guarantee—let us not politicize the question, let us speak humanly, as human beings—does not guarantee the security and well-being of people.

I think that the center lagged considerably behind the political tempo and the political realities of the Baltic region. We should not be too proud, but, nevertheless, we must also be self-confident. In the Baltic region, while the southern republics, the southern regions, were fighting, were shedding blood, in the Baltic region the people's fronts were searching for a conciliatory policy among the people. I think that the people's fronts have gained many allies among inhabitants of other nationalities. The people's fronts, and not only the people's fronts, it also must be said, well, the press of the other movements, perhaps partially even including the Communist Party's press, published articles by international law experts, explained what international law was, and nobody was able to ignore the events of 1940 in the Baltic region.

I am turning today to all jurists who are present here, and also to those who are Central Committee members or members of other organs in the party—why do they not correct the entirely wrong terminology of party workers, namely, about Latvia leaving the USSR? This is an essential mistake. I think that Latvia, by not joining anywhere, by not signing any treaty with the USSR, cannot today get into a mechanism, must not get into a mechanism, which would go through a process of leaving. There can only be talk about restoration of statehood. I think that Comrade Millers, Comrade Skudra, and the other jurists who are here, and also all the others who take an interest in politics, will agree with that.

I think that the proposition that Latvia and the Baltic region intend to break ties with the Soviet Union, with Russia, with the Ukraine, with Belorussia, is entirely wrong and hostile. This is entirely, entirely I think, a kind of a specially inflaming, inciting tone, because Latvia without Russia cannot exist at all today.

If the statehood of Latvia were restored, then these economic ties, evidently, would become still better, and human relations and nationality relations still closer.

But, at the same time, I want to say, also that Russia cannot live without the Baltic region, without Latvia. This was proven by Peter I, so it was proven by Joseph the Severe, as we among the people call Stalin.

As God has created our countries next to one another, then God, evidently, has willed us to maintain eminently good relations, both human ones and nationality ones. (?and among the states), I do not think that in any event we shall succeed in getting around, at least the USSR Congress of People's Deputies will not succeed in getting around, the restoration of the statehood of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, possibly also the problems of Moldavia. Only after settling this question, when Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia become subjects of international relations, and then equal-rights formations, about which Anatolijs Gorbunovs spoke, then it will be possible to talk about a new common market, a new confederation, and about a new association; not, of course, returning to that category, as it was described by Vaclav Havel, namely, a double status.

I think that, as I have already said from this and other rostrums, we must learn from the united, integrated Europe, which will integrate in 1992 with a unified currency, how those countries preserve their national independence, how their people are not subjected to genocide, although there are both San Marino and Luxemburg in this Common Market, and also France and much bigger countries than those which I have named here.

I shall finish right away, because I am probably beginning to repeat myself. I want to say that only a free Russia and a free Latvia are able to form some kind of free association, and the same applies also to Communist Parties. Russia, to my mind, is searching for statehood in the same way as all the other soviet republics are searching, including the Baltic ones. Russia's strivings for statehood are obvious and evident, and so is the founding of the Communist Party of Russia. It is possible that really, it is possible that really—I shall now express a heretical idea—that those four letters, CPSU, will not survive, but some kind of an association of movements of left-wingers, of parties of left-wingers, will survive.

In a word, I want to say in conclusion that I very much request all of us to listen and to express our attitude towards the statehood of Latvia. Otherwise, we shall lose on all points, and this trend of liquidation is obvious. [passage omitted]

Because if we talk about statehood having been lost without rights, if we are not able to exclude the Communist Party of Latvia from this without-rights mechanism, if we are searching in the entire country for law-governed foundations, then, eviently, the Baltic region cannot be kind of a reservation without rights with regard to people, the party, and states. Thank you.

RSFSR

RSFSR Election Results Reported

LD1403001790 Moscow TASS in English 2302 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—As many as 661,536 people's deputies to local soviets were elected on March 4 during the election of people's deputies of the Russian Federation. This makes up 83.9 percent of the total number of deputies' mandates. This was stated in a report of the Presidium of Russia's Supreme Soviet issued on Tuesday.

Women acount for 35.9 percent of the number of the elected deputies. Members and candidate members of the Soviet Communist Party account for 48.6 percent of the number of elected deputies; 35.2 per cent of the elected deputies were deputies of local soviets of the previous convocation.

As many as 726,877 constituencies, including 10,618 multi-seat constituencies, were formed for the election of people's deputies to local soviets of the Russian Federation; 102.4 million citizens were registered as voters; 78.2 million citizens, or 76.4 percent of the number of registered voters, participated in the voting.

Workers account for 25 percent of the number of people's deputies. Collective farmers for 21 percent. Scientists and workers in the arts, servicemen, housewives, religious leaders were also elected deputies.

Women account for 9.8 percent of the number of people's deputies elected to supreme bodies of state authority in autonomous republics. Workers make up 9.9 percent and collective farmers—7.4 percent of the number of deputies. Ninety percent of the number of deputies are members and candidate member of the Soviet Communist Party; 24.5 percent of the number of elected deputies were deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics of the previous convocation.

On the basis of Article 52 of Russia's Law on the Election to Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation," the election in 6,645 constituencies have been found invalid. Deputies were not elected in 113,754 constituencies as they earned less than half the poll.

In accordance with the legislation, run-off elections are to be held in a fortnight in 42,818 constituencies. In two months new elections will be held in 77,581 constituencies. After that the final returns of the election to local soviets of people's deputies will be published.

Ingush Popular Protest in Nazran Continues

LD0903200790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports that more and more people are getting involved in the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] street meeting which has been continuing since 6 March in the city of Nazran. Today there were at least 40,000 people of Ingush nationality at the city square. Representatives of other peoples of northern Caucasia were also there. The resolution which was adopted speaks about a demand to decide the question of the reestablishment of the Ingush Autonomous Republic at the third Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

A street meeting of 1,500 people in support of the demands of the Ingush people took place today in the city of Groznyy. Bokov, chairman of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Kerimov, chairman of the automous republic's Council of Ministers, and Bekov, secretary of the Chechno-Ingush Oblast CPSU Committee, made speeches and basically supported the opinion of those involved in the street meeting.

Fargiyev, chairman of the informal Organization Committee for the Re-establishment of Ingush Autonomy and USSR People's Deputy, said in a conversation with the TASS correspondent that the Ingush people, in seeking the return of the lands which were in their possession in the past, are in no way striving to evict the Ossetians who are living there now. He noted that we, just as during hundreds of years up to now, can live in peace and harmony.

Meeting Demands Autonomy

LD1203134290 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] A meeting is going on in the city of Nazran in the northern Caucasus for the sixth day running. It is unprecedented in duration, scale, and tension. The people who gathered at the city's central square demand the restoration of the Ingush Autonomous Region, which was eliminated in 1934. The Ingush, a small ethnic group, were subjected to deportation as a result of Stalin's arbitrary practices.

The leaders of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, who earlier took a negative stand on the restoration of autonomy for the Ingush people, have now radically changed their position. The situation in Nazran is unde the control of governing bodies.

Situation Updated

LD1303223290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Video report by correspondent N. Shibalkov in Chechen-Ingush ASSR; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter Fesunenko] Here is a report on what happened today in Chechen-Ingushetiya.

[Shibalkov] The passions one associates with rallies have been seething in this small Ingush town for two weeks now. Up to 70,000 people gather in its main square. Many industrial enterprises have closed down and classes in schools and vocational-technical colleges have stopped. Only enterprises in the services sphere, medical establishments, and public transport are working. What are those who attend the rallies seeking?

[A.Kh. Aushev, first secretary of the Nazran rayon party committee; identified by screen caption] The Ingush people are seeking the restoration of the autonomous republic which was abolished in 1934.

[Shibalkov] The meeting passes peacefully and without any excess emotions. During the whole time there has not been a single violation of law in the town.

[B.B. Bogatyrev, candidate of economic sciences, identified by screen caption] I assure you, the Ingush people are not demanding a single hectare of Chechen, Ossetian, Georgian, or Russian territory.

[Sh.Yu. Gadayev, first secretary of the Ochkho-Martanovskiy Rayon Party Committee, identified by screen caption] The people of my rayon, the Chechens, the vast majority of them, fully support the demands of our Ingush brothers. Their demands are perfectly legitimate. Tomorrow I have a meeting in the rayon with all its inhabitants where we will be preparing to express solidarity and support.

[Shibalkov] This whole knot of problems cannot be solved overnight. What is needed is a careful and balanced analysis of the state of affairs. But it is necessary to come to some kind of common opinion and as quickly as possible. [video shows vast crowd at open meeting; large pictures of Gorbachev and Lenin; closed factory and a school; women working in bakery; more shots of meeting, banners in local language and one in Russian reading: "We demand the complete rehabilitation of the Ingush, Chechen, Akkin, Balkar, and Karachayev peoples," interviews with the three people mentioned above]

Caucasus

Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry Issues Statement

NC1203202490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Report on statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic; date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] The Defenders of Human Rights Organization, which is an international [word indistinct] organization, has submitted a report to the recent 46th meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva entitled: "The Mass Murder of Armenians in Azerbaijan and the [word indistinct] of Nagorno-Karabakh."

The report puts forward fallacious and foolish claims to the effect that the government and people of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] joined forces to kill all the Armenians in the region and that the Popular Front of Azerbaijan has called on the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus to establish a [word indistinct] state and is trying to reinstate a totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union.

The sources of these calumnies and fabrications are well known. For more than two years now, the nationalists in the Armenian SSR, their supporters in foreign countries, and influential Armenian circles have been carrying out intensive and deliberate propaganda against Azerbaijan to discredit the people of Azerbaijan, mislead the peoples of the world on the actual causes of the dispute between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, blame others for their own mistakes, and obtain respect for the so-called suffering Armenian people. They stop at nothing, including shameful lies, provocation, and distortion of history.

The main reason for the incidents in the Transcaucasus is the Amenian nationalists' long-cherished desire to launch open initiatives aimed at creating a greater Armenia at the expense of the neighboring republics. Consequently, regardless of the USSR Constitution and the norms of international law, which are supported by everyone, they resorted to unprecedented activities to wrest the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Azerbaijan, a region which has always belonged to Azerbaijan, to annex it to the Armenian SSR.

The Armenian nationalists, who have adopted a policy of open aggression, have not heeded the warnings that their adventurist intentions may have serious consequences for the two neighboring peoples. Nor have the decisions adopted by the supreme sovereign organs of the Soviet Union, which have repeatedly confirmed that the Armenian SSR's claims for land from the Azerbaijan SSR are illegal, had any effect on them. The Armenian side also rejected the proposals which were repeatedly made by the government of Azerbaijan for a joint effort by the two sides to normalize the situation in the region and restore peaceful and friendly relations between the peoples of the two republics.

As in the case of all the other peoples, the people of Azerbaijan have the right to defend their state sovereignty and territorial integrity against secret (?attempts). The people of Azerbaijan do not covet the land of others. They are only safeguarding their legal rights, honor, and dignity.

In an infamous way, the authors of the report accused the Azerbaijanis of trying to kill the Armenians in the region. But it was the Armenian nationalists who resorted to acts of violence, and the first victims of their criminal activities were the Azerbaijanis who lived in Nagorno-Karabakh's Askeranskiy Rayon. The incidents in Sumgait occurred later on and Azerbaijanis were massacred in the Armenian SSR's (?Ugankh) Rayon. In the space of a few days a total of 165,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from places in Armenia where they had lived for centuries. The homes of the Azerbaijanis in Stepanakert were set on fire and the Azerbaijanis themselves were subjected to other acts of violence. All these crimes were carried out in an extremely merciless and savage way.

The demand put forward by the Defenders of Human Rights Organization, which supports the exclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and a change in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, can only be described as a gross interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan SSR and an attempt against Azerbaijan SSR's territorial integrity. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been established by the USSR Constitution and the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR once and for all. Nagorno-Karabakh is an inseparable part of the Azerbaijan SSR and it will remain as such. All the attempts made to wrest Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijan SSR will definitely fail. The sooner those who have created the fabricated problem of Nagorno-Karabakh realize this, the sooner it will be possible to establish peace and security in the region.

It is hoped in Azerbaijan that the steadfast forces in the Armenian community will realize that the direction in which the Armenian nationalists and extremists have dragged their people lack perspective. As for the people of Azerbaijan, they only wish to live in friendship and solidarity with the other peoples, including the Armenian people, on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

TASS Reviews Situation in Azerbaijan

LD1203115690 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT 12 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Vlazov]

[Text] Baku March 12 TASS—Since the state of emergency was introduced in Baku on January 20, industrial enterprises have failed to produce over 200 million rubles worth of products, First Deputy Chairman of the Baku City Council's Executive Committee Adalyat Azizov told TASS.

All Baku plants are now operating, the majority of them trying to improve the situation. City residents are grateful to the local food industry, trade, communal and other vital services that did not cease working despite the difficulties.

The local underground railway did not stop working, although being jammed. During last January's events, the fuel supply of city buses was interrupted and half of trolley-bus power lines broken. Nevertheless, public transportation resumed its normal functioning in the first 10 days of February.

Baku residents welcomed the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On the Situation in the Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia and Measures to Normalize the Situation in this Region."

They noted with satisfaction the resolution saying that both republics independently and without any interference are ensuring the security and rights of all ethnic groups, as well as providing for normal life and public order on their territories.

"Baku is now getting ready for the traditional spring festival—Novruz-Bairam—which is celebrated late in March by all Baku residents regardless their nationality," Azizov said.

"We must normalize the situation here as soon as possible in order to put people in good spirits again."

Georgian Supreme Soviet Assesses Presidency Law

LD0903175290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1708 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi, 9 Mar (GRUZINFORM-TASS)—Today an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic took place here. Deputies expressed their position respecting the draft law on the establishment of the post of USSR president, which, in their opinion, limits the sovereign rights of the republic. The session adopted a decision containing proposals about guarantees of protection for the state sovereignty of Georgia.